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Scandinavia and the "Finlandization" of Soviet Security

1991; Academy of Political Science; Volume: 38; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.2307/1173813

2325-9124

Phillip A. Petersen,

European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies

The existence of a common culture and the development of Nordic cooperation have promoted the image of an informal though genuine alliance among Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. Since even a united Nordic bloc does not have the resources to form an independent military factor in Europe, however, their respective security policies have long been vulnerable to great-power demands. Ever since the rise of modern Germany, security in the Nordic region has been dominated by the struggle between Germany and Russia. Thus the Finnish decision in 1990 to no longer consider as applicable the military restrictions of the 1947 Treaty of Paris may reflect a resurrection of the old struggle for influence in northern Europe between Germany and Russia. The deviation of the Nordic states from neutrality during World War II, however, was as much a reflection of public opinion in the Nordic countries as it was the reality of their geostrategic circumstances. Therefore, to the axiom that in a democracy the public gets the government it deserves may be added that the public also frequently gets the security for which it is willing to pay. The fate of the Nordic states during World War II may have been predictable from the percentages of state expenditures devoted to defense: Finland, 25 percent; Sweden, 17.5 percent; Norway, 11.5 percent; and Denmark, 10 percent.' Finland concluded that an attack could come only from the east and adopted a Northern Line policy in the hope that Sweden would help guarantee its security. This policy did not fail completely, as reflected in the fact that Sweden allowed arms from its own stocks to be delivered to Finland after 1939, including the antitank and antiaircraft equipment in which Finland was almost entirely lacking.2 Furthermore, when the Soviet Union attacked Finland, a Swedish Volunteer Corps was deployed in Finnish Lapland so that Finnish forces with battle experience could redeploy to the Karelian Isthmus, the only Finnish strategic troop movement during the Winter War of 1939-40.3 At the end of the war, there were about 8,000 Swedish volunteers in Finland. Military assistance from Britain and France, however, was