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Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: A case for proportional taxation

2015; Econometric Society; Volume: 10; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.3982/te1897

1933-6837

André Casajus,

Taxation and Compliance Studies

Theoretical EconomicsVolume 10, Issue 3 p. 887-892 Original ArticlesOpen Access Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: A case for proportional taxation André Casajus, André Casajus [email protected] Economics and Information Systems, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management We are grateful to René van den Brink, Faruk Gul, Andreas Hoffmann, Frank Huettner, Enrico Schöbel, Harald Uhlig, Thomas Steger, and Harald Wiese for helpful comments on this paper. Search for more papers by this author André Casajus, André Casajus [email protected] Economics and Information Systems, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management We are grateful to René van den Brink, Faruk Gul, Andreas Hoffmann, Frank Huettner, Enrico Schöbel, Harald Uhlig, Thomas Steger, and Harald Wiese for helpful comments on this paper. Search for more papers by this author First published: 09 October 2015 https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1897Citations: 9 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Abstract Within a simple setup, we show that proportional taxation is implied by three properties: efficiency, symmetry, and monotonicity. Efficiency: redistribution has no cost. Symmetry: members of the society with the same performance obtain the same reward after redistribution. Monotonicity: whenever both the performance of a certain member of the society as well as the overall performance of the society do not decrease, then this member's reward after redistribution does not decrease. References 1 Fleubaey, Marc and François Maniquet (2011), A Theory of Fairness and Social Welfare. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1 Friedman, Milton (1962), Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1 Hall, Robert E. (1996), Fairness and Efficiency in the Flat Tax. AEI Press, Washington, DC. 1 Hall, Robert E. and Alvin Rabushka (1985), The Flat Tax. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford. 1 Hayek, Friedrich A. (1960), The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1 Lambert, Peter (2002), The Distribution and Redistribution of Income, third edition. Manchester University Press, Manchester. 1 McCulloch, John R. (1975), A Treatise on the Principles and Practical Influence of Taxation and the Funding System. Longmans, Brown, Green, and Longmans, London. 1 Mill, John S. (1848), Principles of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Vol. V, On the Influence of Government. Longmans, Green and Co., London. 1 Musgrave, Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave (1976), Public Finance in Theory and Practice, second edition. McGraw-Hill, New York. 1 Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2000), Economics of the Public Sector, third edition. W.W. Norton, New York. Citing Literature Volume10, Issue3September 2015Pages 887-892 ReferencesRelatedInformation