Elevating Choice over Quality of Representation: United States V. Gonzalez-Lopez
2006; Wiley; Volume: 30; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0193-4872
Autores Tópico(s)Legal Cases and Commentary
ResumoThe Supreme Court's Counsel Clause jurisprudence generally has been preoccupied with effect of alleged violations on and reliability of trial process. (1) This approach seemed ripe for reexamination after Crawford v. Washington, which held that Sixth Amendment does not provide substantive guarantee of fair but rather specifies procedural safeguards that must be present for trial comport with Constitution. (2) Last Term, in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, (3) Court eliminated need revisit these problematic precedents by redefining criminal defendant's right to have Assistance of Counsel for his defence. (4) In holding by 5-4 vote that defendant's right is necessarily violated whenever he is erroneously deprived of his first-choice attorney, Court declared that counsel of choice--the liberty choose one's lawyer--was central of Counsel Clause. (5) It thereby imported customary practice into Constitution without sound basis either in precedent or in text, structure, or historical of Sixth Amendment. Shortly after Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez was charged with conspiring distribute marijuana in Eastern District of Missouri, he retained California lawyer Joseph Low represent him. (6) Low applied district court for admission pro hac vice, but was twice rebuffed without explanation. (7) Finally, court explained that it had denied Low's application because he had violated Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct by communicating with Gonzalez-Lopez and with defendants in another case without their respective attorneys' permission. (8) Gonzalez-Lopez proceeded trial with local attorney, Karl Dickhaus, and was convicted. (9) The Eighth Circuit vacated conviction and remanded case for new trial. (10) The panel first held that Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct do not prevent lawyer from communicating with represented party unless lawyer is representing another party in same case. (11) Not only had district court denied Low's application based on its erroneous interpretation of local rule, but it had also failed consider effect of its decision on Gonzalez-Lopez's Sixth Amendment right, as non-indigent criminal defendant[], be represented by his preferred counsel. (12) The panel concluded that Gonzalez-Lopez had been denied his Sixth Amendment right of choice and that this denial could not constitute harmless error. (13) The Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for Court, Justice Scalia (14) rejected government's argument that Sixth Amendment is not violated unless defendant's lawyer is ineffective within of Strickland v. Washington. (15) Instead, he concluded that denial of of choice mandates reversal even if substitute counsel's performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial defendant. Justice Scalia explained that right effective derives chiefly from Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment's purpose of ensuring fair trial, (16) whereas right choose one's attorney is root meaning of Counsel Clause. (17) The Court would not require proof of prejudice, therefore, because doing so would substitute general fairness standard for specific procedural protection guaranteed by Counsel Clause. (18) Justice Alito dissented, (19) maintaining that defendant who is convicted after being wrongfully denied his first-choice attorney is not entitled reversal unless he can make least some showing of an adverse effect on of assistance he received at trial. (20) Though agreeing with majority that Counsel Clause guarantees a limited right be represented by of choice, Justice Alito argued that the focus of right is quality of representation that defendant receives, not identity of attorney who provides representation. …
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