Worlds, Voyages and Experiences: Commentary on Pelczar’s Sensorama
2016; Oxford University Press; Volume: 76; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1093/analys/anw049
ISSN1467-8284
Autores Tópico(s)Philosophical Ethics and Theory
ResumoMill believed that the physical world is nothing more than potential for experience. The existence of a banana in my fruit basket consists (at least roughly speaking) in nothing more than the fact that I would experience this banana were I to look in the basket. The same is true for the existence of anything else in the physical world. Needless to say, this radical form of idealism has not caught on; it is widely believed that there are insurmountable problems that any attempt to develop the position will face. So it is surprising, and refreshing, to find that Michael Pelczar has devoted an entire book to developing and defending a version of the Millian idealist metaphysics. Has he succeeded in finding a defensible version? Here, I'll try to briefly explain why I think his version is still highly problematic, despite his ingenuity in constructing and defending it.
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