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Science, modernity, and the Muslim world

2017; Springer Nature; Volume: 18; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.15252/embr.201643517

1469-3178

Wasim Maziak,

Health and Conflict Studies

Science & Society12 January 2017free access Science, modernity, and the Muslim world To improve scientific research in Muslim countries requires profound social and economic liberalization of their societies Wasim Maziak Wasim Maziak [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-6126-8420 Stempel College of Public Health and Social Work, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA Search for more papers by this author Wasim Maziak Wasim Maziak [email protected] orcid.org/0000-0001-6126-8420 Stempel College of Public Health and Social Work, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA Search for more papers by this author Author Information Wasim Maziak1 1Stempel College of Public Health and Social Work, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA EMBO Reports (2017)18:194-197https://doi.org/10.15252/embr.201643517 PDFDownload PDF of article text and main figures. ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareFacebookTwitterLinked InMendeleyWechatReddit Figures & Info Whatever indicator one looks at, the status of science in most Muslim countries is bleak 12. Just as evident is the fact that this situation is not caused by an idiosyncratic relationship between science and Islam, or between science and Muslims, as rational science flourished under the Abbasid Caliphate during the 8th to 13th centuries and Muslim scientists fare well in academic institutions around the world 2. Several analyses have tried to explain the state of scientific progress in Islamic societies, mostly focusing on traditional factors, such as inadequate funding, brain drain, or shortcomings of the educational system 234. Others have taken a historical perspective by contrasting the evolution of science in the Muslim world with the path of Western science 456. However, these analyses failed to account for the modest return on considerable investments in science that some rich Muslim countries have made during the past years 78, or how countries such as Japan, South Korea, or China successfully implemented “Western science” without having gone through the Enlightenment and the Scientific Revolution. What is still missing in this debate are the unique dynamics of how the interplay between religion and politics during the 20th century created a hostile environment to the general values of modernity in Islamic societies. These dynamics, I argue, have more to do with the stagnation of science in Islamic societies than other factors, such as lack of funding and scientific capacity. The grave challenges facing much of the Muslim world nowadays raise doubts as to whether the question of science is even relevant or timely. I argue however, that the processes that delayed the adoption of science in Islamic societies are at the heart of their current struggle for stability. In other words, these societies' political, social, and scientific failures are all manifestations of the same dynamics that have kept them from modernizing despite the impressive developmental façade of rich Islamic nations. Obviously, it is hard to make generalizations of a heterogeneous compendium of Islamic countries, or to use religious denominations to describe a complex web of power manipulation, feudal-like alliances, economic interests, and historical animosities. With these constraints in mind, I try to explain some of the dynamics that have kept Muslim societies from modernizing, and how these dynamics underlie these societies' current existential struggle for stability and security. … the processes that delayed the adoption of science in Islamic societies are at the heart of their current struggle for stability. Islam is the solution Most Arab countries in the Middle East, the heart of the Muslim world, came to be as a result of the collapse of the last “formal” Islamic Caliphate of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 and the short period of colonialism that followed. After centuries of Ottoman (Muslim Turks) rule that witnessed most of the decline of Islamic civilization, Arabs coalesced around a strong nationalistic drive that dominated the post-WWI era. As a result, the major Arab states emerging after WWII were ruled by Nationalists—the Baath party in Iraq and Syria or Nasserism in Egypt—that brought some stability during a turbulent period, but failed to deliver socially, politically, and economically. In addition, conflicts within the Arab Nationalist movement began to accelerate after the defeat in the 1967 Arab–Israeli War. This war was a pivotal moment in the history of Middle East that shattered the last shred of “legitimacy” of Arab Nationalism and their quasi-secular model. Discontent started brewing in many Arab societies, and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's cry “Islam is the solution” started to echo throughout the Middle East. It meant in ideological terms that Islam must become again the source of all political, economic, legal, and social transactions in Muslim societies, in order to return to the “glorious days” of Islamic civilization. It also undermined allegiance to existing political structures for the sake of a poorly defined, in political terms, “Nation of Islam”. As the cradle of Islam, and the richest country in the region, people started looking to Saudi Arabia for guidance during this period. This coincided with Saudi's own concerns about the threat that pan-Arabism (and its secular model) posed to their Islamic rule. Soon, the wheels of Islamization of Arab societies were set in motion. From shielding Islamists fleeing their “secular” regimes to financing religious ventures such as mosques, schools, groups, TV channels, and popular preachers all over the region, the Saudis did not miss the opportunity to become the epicenter of the Sunni Muslim world. This was timely, also to confront the increasingly expansionist Shiite theocracy of Iran that came to power after the Islamic revolution in 1979. Both countries came at odds in a new round of rivalry between Sunnis and Shiites dating back to Islam's original schism 14 centuries ago. Sensing the threat of Islamization, Arab rulers began a race toward social “piety” through power alliances with the clergy that gave them an expanded influence in all aspects of societal interactions. During the 1980s and 1990s, religious schools, media programs, elaborate public celebrations of religious holidays, and the crackdown on “unethical” and “Western” lifestyles became commonplace in most societies in the Middle East. In fact, both Islamic and Nationalist rulers in the region saw social Islamization as a strategy to absorb the discontent of the rising Islamic tide, without having to give away power or undergo any substantial political reforms. The Western path to modernity was thus paved by liberalism and capitalism, for which science provided a universal catalyst. The problem with this strategy, however, is that it encouraged religious hypocrisy and curtailed individual freedoms and civic activism. More importantly, social Islamization started a race to the bottom, where discontented members of already “Islamized” societies were left with only one option: to offer more extreme platforms. This explains why increasingly conservative societies in the Middle East kept generating more radical movements throughout recent decades. With the power of the Internet and social media, these radical views were carried to every corner of the globe, transforming their context from local to global, and signaling the arrival of global Jihadi Islam. Economic liberalization In the West, the advancement of science was a slow process associated with a shift in religious dogma from being the central pillar of society to a domain mostly concerned with individuals' spiritual well-being. Within that complex and often bloody history, important milestones emerged: the Protestant Reformation, the advance of empirical science, and the rise of industrial capitalism. The Protestant Reformation provided an alternative moral basis centered on economic activity, compared to the self-purification ethics of Catholicism 9, while the economic wealth created by the Industrial Revolution during the 18th and 19th centuries made European cities, with their emerging bourgeoisie and diverse socio-economic makeup, the epicenter of the European renaissance. The Western path to modernity was thus paved by liberalism and capitalism, for which science provided a universal catalyst. After Islam's initial stage of expansion and conquest, the vastness and riches of the Abbasid Caliphate during the 8th to 13th centuries created optimal conditions for the arts and science to flourish. The course of science in the Islamic world was different. After Islam's initial stage of expansion and conquest, the vastness and riches of the Abbasid Caliphate during the 8th to 13th centuries created optimal conditions for the arts and science to flourish. Moreover, the focus of Abbasids on trade rather than conquest was perhaps a major factor in seeding the diverse and tolerant society that prevailed during that period. Coupled with a fundamental focus of Islam on learning and the patronage of knowledge hubs, the Abbasids ushered in a rational path to knowledge influenced by Greek philosophy. Thinkers from all creeds and backgrounds mingled in the major Islamic centers of Baghdad, Damascus, and Cordoba to translate the body of Greek knowledge and to search for answers to natural phenomena that were based on reason and observation. As divisions and changing alliances began to erode the house of Abbasids, their knowledge quest came under attack by conservative scholars, who propagated an interpretation of Islam that denounced philosophy, reason, and any causal framework that was not derived from divine will. The calamitous fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258 marked the end of the “Golden Age” of Islamic Caliphate and the rise of conservative schools of thought that continue to dominate the Muslim world until today. One of the main messages of this historical synopsis is that Islamic societies have yet to muster a class similar to the European industrial bourgeoisie: entrepreneurs who have an economic stake in modernization and the power to champion it. This is due in part to the fact that the richest Muslim societies are natural resources economies that lack real market dynamics, which can drive innovation and competition. Moreover, the concentration of power and resources in the hands of ruling elites, and lack of tolerance to opposition in most Islamic societies hindered free economic enterprise and civic activism that could have challenged the status quo. As a result, scientific institutions in the Muslim world could not develop into independent hubs of knowledge through free association with diverse societal ventures and economic interests, and continue to be dependent on political patronage and subject to political interference. Social liberalization Generally speaking, Islam differs from Christianity in that it does not distinguish between the political and the religious, and provides a complete system within which all aspects of life submit to the service of religion. The prophet Mohammed, after all, belonged to the socio-political order of tribal Arabia, and thus had direct claim to dominion—the new religion provided the legitimacy for his ascent to power. This made religion's involvement in all aspects of life germane to the culture of Islamic societies, a situation that has been exploited by different fractions at different times to suppress any “unwarranted democratic” trends. Increasingly, most Islamic societies became rife with taboos and codes, where the cultural, religious, and political mix and match according to the context to quell any attempts at breaking out of these taboos. … a general look at the scientific landscape of most Islamic societies reveals a striking absence of social and political sciences, and the absence of critical research topics … From the science perspective, a general look at the scientific landscape of most Islamic societies reveals a striking absence of social and political sciences, and the absence of critical research topics, such as sexual and reproductive health 10. When these topics are researched, it is usually done at the descriptive level without any attempt to probe into their underlying social, economic, and political roots. For example, women's obesity levels in many Islamic societies are among the highest in the world, yet no serious research is being done to get at the root of this problem in terms of power relations, gender roles, and the normative values of these societies 10. Antagonism to science can be overcome by promoting the value of free exchange of ideas and the role of scientific evidence in guiding development. Far from being a formal inquisition, incidents such as the targeting and imprisonment of secular reformists in different Islamic societies have had a ripple effect throughout the Islamic world. The glorious days of Islam, in contrast, reveal an extraordinary level of tolerance by today's standards. I can cite the example of Abul Ala Al-Ma'arri (973–1057), the renowned Muslim philosopher and poet and an outspoken critic of religion. Despite his highly controversial views, Abul Ala lived in his hometown Ma'arra (Syria) as a venerated figure until his death at the age of 84. Below are few of Abul Ala's translated verses criticizing religion and affirming his outright rejection of it. What is religion? A maid kept close that no eye may view her; The price of her wedding gifts and dowry baffles the wooer. Of all the goodly doctrine that I from the pulpit heard. My heart has never accepted so much as a single word. Eleven centuries later, in 2011, a Muslim zealot killed Salmaan Taseer, the governor of Punjab province, for merely advocating the amendment of Pakistan's harsh blasphemy laws. His murder was celebrated by many Muslims in his country and beyond. Science of the infidels The scientific revolution was at its core a Western development and, for many Muslims, also a Christian one. This belief created negative connotations in the popular perception of science and modernity among Muslims, which was further enforced by the continued failure of the Western-dominated post-WWII political system to deliver anything but mayhem to many in the Muslim world. These sentiments have been channeled outwards in the form of disdain for the West and its values, and inwards in the call to return to Islamic roots. They were further conceptualized into a bipolar perception of the world: technologically conquered by the material West, and morally conquered by spiritual Muslims. Accordingly, any attempts to expose problems with the assumed moral stronghold of Islam, such as the debate about women's rights, are viewed as a Western conspiracy against Islam 10. As a result, anti-Western rhetoric became an essential component of most Islamist movements, and, by default, devalued the Western system of liberal democracy and its institutions, including science. Antagonism to science can be overcome by promoting the value of free exchange of ideas and the role of scientific evidence in guiding development. Yet, most educational systems in the Middle East focus on rote and sterile learning, and often serve as propaganda outlets for the political regimes. The scientific revolution, for example, is often framed within an imperial context, and stripped of its liberal and free market roots. Science's inconvenient roots moreover are dealt with by turning it from a process to a commodity that can be purchased “purified” from its historical origins, or the moral values of its producers 4. This allows consumers to selectively choose or reject “products”, such as evolution, the origins of life, and free market economics, based on religious rather than scientific justifications. This did not only prevent Islamic societies from learning from the Western experience, but also created a religious buffer from modernity. For this buffer to work, the sanctity of religion needs to take precedence over the welfare of its holders, a fact that is tragically translated nowadays into Muslim-on-Muslim violence. Concluding remarks Without any illusions about the remote prospect of Western-style democracy becoming a reality for most Muslim countries, the described dynamics underscore the lack of real champions or an environment that could nurture science and usher in modernity in most Islamic societies. Large sectors of these societies are not only disenchanted with science, but denounce any value of modernity beyond technological consumerism. Nurtured initially by their own governments, this attitude gradually became a self-sustaining current that made change difficult by creating a contradiction between the values of modernity and those of Islamic societies. It also hijacked the modernization discourse in Islamic societies into a reactive mode in response to the “invasion” of Western values, rather than an internally needed debate about the welfare of Muslims. Muslims, as far as history is concerned, need not borrow any foreign system to modernize, for they can find all the ingredients they need in their own “Golden Age”… Many societies throughout history, including the European nations, have started from this point of antagonism between prevailing values and those of science and modernity. Muslims, as far as history is concerned, need not borrow any foreign system to modernize, for they can find all the ingredients they need in their own “Golden Age”; tolerance, rationalism, and economic activity for the pursuit of peace and prosperity. In the end, Muslims are not different from anybody else in their yearning for a prosperous future for their children and themselves, but they are trapped in an identity crisis based on false contradictions. The recent election of a liberal government in Tunisia and the economic success of Turkey's free market system show that, given the choice, Muslims can dissociate elements of their cultural identity from how they want to be governed and develop. The modernization of Islamic societies is not primarily about investment in science, increasing research capacity, or acquiring top equipment and scientists, as it is usually suggested. It is more about social and economic liberalization that can provide a natural driver for innovation and competition. In essence, traditional societies' political hold on the economy and the pandering to an assumed religious sensitivity need to give way to a wider involvement of the moderate majority in shaping the modernity discourse in Islamic societies. There is an opening now, given that even the most “pious” regimes in the Muslim world understand that they cannot control the extremism monster they helped to create with the usual manipulation-and-exploitation game. The way to modernization, therefore, is not only in keeping with core Islamic values of tolerance, sanctity of life, and the virtues of knowledge seeking, but it is the best bet for promoting peace and progress in Muslim societies. Otherwise, the tides of refugees that we are witnessing today, the rising extremism on all sides, and the mushrooming of terror groups are likely to be the opening salvo of a global, never-ending conflict. Conflict of interest The author declares that he has no conflict of interest. References Royal Society (2014) The Atlas of Islamic world science and innovation. https://royalsociety.org/~/media/policy/projects/atlas-islamic-world/atlas-final-report.PDFGoogle Scholar Ofek H (2011) Why the Arabic world turned away from science. 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Interestingly, the Elongator complex shows an asymmetric assembly where one hexameric Elp456 subcomplex binds to only one of the two Elp123 lobes. From Maria Ibarra Dauden, Sebastian Glatt, Christoph W Müller and colleagues: Architecture of the yeast Elongator complex, and from Dheva T Setiaputra, Calvin K Yip and colleagues: Molecular architecture of the yeast Elongator complex reveals an unexpected asymmetric subunit arrangement. For details, see Articles on page 264 and 280. Cover design by Maria I Dauden. Volume 18Issue 21 February 2017In this issue ReferencesRelatedDetailsLoading ...