Politeia as Focal Reference in Aristotle's Taxonomy of Regimes
2005; Philosophy Education Society Inc.; Volume: 58; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
2154-1302
Autores Tópico(s)Classical Philosophy and Thought
ResumoTHE NATURE OF POLITEIA AND ITS CANDIDACY FOR STATUS as best in doctrine of Aristotle remains disputable question. Some scholars insist that whatever best may be, it must be kind of polity. (1) Others, however, firmly contend that best must be variety of aristocracy, with significant number arguing that best may be monarchy should suitable candidate be available. (2) Moreover, it has been argued that since ancients did not desire establishment of polities and hence pluralistic politics, but that this has been concern of moderns, one must conclude that understanding of politeia as being mixed regime would be a contradiction in terms, proper cannot have several different authoritative opinions concerning what is just and what is not and still remain workable system. (3) Arguably, however, if one adverts to certain parallels in Aristotle's reasoning manifested in his considerations of method and his use of differentiae in biological analyses, his reflections on politeia are set into greater relief. After all, in Aristotle's purview, ethics is dependent upon nature for materials in which it has to work, even though nature imposes no predetermined law upon human nature, and so the moral philosopher must have some theoretical knowledge of soul, even more than medical practitioner requires certain amount of theoretical knowledge in regard to body and its various organs. (4) Equally must philosopher be cognizant of different kinds of materials that enter into making man social and animal that he is, since it is because man is animal with such and such characters, therefore is process of his development necessarily such as it is; and therefore it is accomplished in such and such order. (5) Thus, without careful examination of what is presupposed as prior in generation and time to what is posterior and prior in order of perfection, polis is unintelligible, and afortiori that that at first glance remains so elusive in revealing its specific difference, politeia. (6) I It is often remarked that two fundamental hierarchical orders are encountered early in first book of Aristotle's Politics, that of soul in relation to body and that of soul's powers in relation to one another. In first, as is well known, soul commands body despotically ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (7) In contrast, within second hierarchical order it is nous or intellect which, by possessing logos ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.] ]), exercises political and rule over appetite ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII.]). (8) The focus is not incidental, since in all matters of magnitude an error at beginning, though quite small, bears same ratio to errors in other parts. (9) The manifestation of each of these real relations within proto-political society of home is evidenced within master/slave relation and that of husband/wife, with purely royal rule being exercised over offspring who are subjects of enculturation to act in conformity with reason. Thus, we have inductive inference of following ratios: soul : body :: master : slave = despotic measure; reason : appetites :: husband/wife = royal and rule or measure; reason : potential reason :: father : child = regal rule. The first principally implies measure imposed upon what is lacking capacity to exercise reason and virtue from within, second, rule of reason through deliberative and coparticipative collaboration in seeking arete for common good, and third instillation of virtue through gradual habituation. Hence, first is benignly despotic in character, and second is royal and in terms of father to mother as ordered to common good of household but aristocratic in terms of friendship that is its basis and finality. …
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