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Powerplay: the origins of the American alliance system in Asia

2017; Oxford University Press; Volume: 93; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1093/ia/iix038

1468-2346

Joel R. Campbell,

International Relations and Foreign Policy

It is a curious fact that, in the early postwar era, America opted for different sorts of politico-military alliances in Europe and Asia: a Europe-wide multilateral grouping in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) versus a bilateral hub-and-spokes system in east Asia. In an excellent overview of early Cold War history, former Bush National Security staffer Victor Cha explains how the US developed the one-on-one system for Asia and suggests that management of alliance partners was a rational response to the disunited security environment of the region. In light of the leadership change now under way in Washington, this study is recommended for anyone seeking a way forward for America's ties to dynamic east Asia. The central concept that Cha employs to explain the difference in America's alliances in Europe and Asia is ‘powerplay’: alliances designed ‘to exert considerable political, military, and economic control over key countries’, especially in east Asia (p. 3). For both Taiwan and South Korea, such bilateral alliances were intended to both support and restrain American clients. These tie-ups endured for so long in part because of the lateness of democratization in the region; not having to work with democratic governments actually gave the US an advantage in maintaining these exclusive arrangements. Cha feels that the powerplay concept makes more sense than traditional theoretical notions in International Relations, which emphasize either threats and geography (realism) or differing levels of economic development and the role of foreign aid (liberalism). Powerplay is based on the nature and ‘pathologies’ of alliances (p. 20), and the main variables for alliance partners are over-reliance on and entrapment in alliances. In Asia, American policy-makers harboured intense fear of being dragged into regional conflicts. Bilateral relationships gave the Americans more control since multilateralism tends to allow more leverage to smaller powers. In Europe, US fears of entrapment were relative moderate, so it could pursue a ‘distancing’ policy and allow more control by the alliance itself (p. 32).