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From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era by Thomas C. Field Jr.

2016; Duke University Press; Volume: 13; Issue: 3-4 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1215/15476715-3596045

1558-1454

Robert Smale,

Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics

In the 1960s, Bolivia received more per capita development aid than any other Latin American nation; the country quickly won generous inclusion in John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. Yet in late 1964, Bolivia’s powerful civilian president, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, fell in a military coup to his vice president, General René Barrientos. How did development so quickly devolve into dictatorship? Answering that question is the central focus of Thomas C. Field Jr.’s book. From Development to Dictatorship is one among a number of recent studies that reexamine the relationship between Bolivia and the United States during the Cold War; these works include those of James F. Siekmeier and Kenneth D. Lehman. Field’s book is unique in its detailed focus on Paz Estenssoro’s second stint as president (1960–64) and Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress. This study reinforces findings by scholars in other Third World regions that insist on intimate linkages between modernization, anticommunism, and authoritarianism in US foreign policy during the Cold War.The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–61) had generously funded Bolivia’s Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) government in the wake of that country’s 1952 revolution as a counterweight to more radical alternatives. Kennedy expanded that assistance through the Alliance for Progress and encouraged the Bolivian military’s participation in development projects. US-backed programs specifically sought to weaken the country’s communist mineworker unions. The unions fought back, leading to bloodshed and a hostage crisis in December 1963 involving four US government officials. Throughout these difficulties, US diplomats consistently backed Paz Estenssoro, who was deeply committed to authoritarian development programs. Kennedy’s assassination did not disrupt US policy, and Lyndon B. Johnson maintained continuity. Eventually, Paz Estenssoro became dependent on both the US government and Bolivia’s military, so much so that in 1964 he was pressured into accepting Barrientos as his running mate. While US support never wavered, the Bolivian military’s did, and Barrientos deposed Paz Estenssoro in late 1964. Authoritarianism was a fundamental aspect of development programs throughout, and the transition to dictatorship was an easy one.Field’s book is part of the Cornell University Press series, The United States in the World. The series title is an attempt to rebrand US diplomatic history. From Development to Dictatorship takes seriously the Bolivian side of bilateral relations and roots its analysis in that country’s political, social, and economic history. While lesser-known peasant and union leaders often play important roles in Field’s history, the dominant figures are the traditional actors of diplomatic history: presidents, high-ranking politicians, and embassy operatives. The two most imposing figures are Bolivian: Paz Estenssoro and Barrientos. Authoritarian development policies were not one-sided US impositions and meshed seamlessly with Paz Estenssoro’s modernizing nationalism and intolerance of opposition. The MNR president was an astute politician who sometimes sought to play both sides of the Cold War divide, but he ends up coming off as a bit of a villain in Field’s history. The head of Paz Estenssoro’s secret police (Control Político), one Claudio San Román, disgusted even the CIA station chief in Bolivia. US officials personally liked Barrientos but felt that Paz Estenssoro was the educated and firm hand needed to steer the country toward development.Field provides an authoritative and multisided account of the 1964 coup that deposed Paz Estenssoro and brought Barrientos to power; this is one of the book’s principal contributions. Paz Estenssoro and his supporters have always asserted the existence of a US plot to overthrow him. Field convincingly argues that no such plot existed. In fact, US diplomatic operatives supported him throughout and worried about the potential stability of a Barrientos government. Writers who argue the existence of a US plot attribute a powerful clandestine influence to Colonel Edward Fox, the US Air Force attaché to Bolivia at the time and a personal friend of Barrientos. Field extensively interviewed Fox, and his narrative of an autonomous movement among younger officers to depose the MNR president is convincing. Field also does an excellent job of explaining the odd and fleeting political coalition that destabilized the MNR government. Paz Estenssoro worked hard to maintain some level of grudging support among Bolivia’s heterogeneous Left, but in August 1964 the US government pressured him to break with Fidel Castro’s Cuba. US officials dismissed Paz Estenssoro’s prescient arguments that a break would cause him difficulties with Bolivian leftists. The decision prompted many communists to ally with far-right agitators already working to bring the government down. Many communists later related to Field in interviews that in hindsight they regretted having made that decision. In the end, the coup worked out for the US government despite its misgivings; Barrientos eventually dismissed his more leftist advisers and followed a pro-US line during his four years in power.Newer approaches to diplomatic history analyze more than just the big political players. Field includes more humble actors, including peasants and miners, in his narrative of the December 1963 hostage crises involving four US officials detained in Bolivia’s radicalized Siglo XX mining camp. Social history has had a definitive impact on Field’s approach to diplomatic history. In late 1963 the Bolivian government fired hundreds of mineworkers to break opposition to its development programs. Paz Estenssoro’s secret police also detained two popular labor leaders. In response, mineworkers took thirty hostages, including four US development workers. Field highlights the critical role played by such female activists as Domitila Barrios de Chungara in guarding the hostages and sustaining negotiations. Paz Estenssoro wanted to take a hard line and employ military force. The Johnson administration counseled negotiation and restraint. Bolivia’s military leadership agreed with US officials—they were not gung ho to invade the mining camps. The more cautious approach eventually led to a peaceful resolution.Field’s research is impressive and extensive. He consulted archival material from Bolivia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic. Especially illuminating, given the central role that Paz Estenssoro plays in Field’s history, is a collection of papers from Paz Estenssoro’s second presidency (1960–64) that only recently became available to scholars. For decades these documents lay forgotten in the rafters of Bolivia’s presidential palace but are now available in Bolivia’s National Library in Sucre. The papers highlight Paz Estenssoro’s manipulation of US officials’ fear of a perceived communist threat and the MNR leader’s belief that economic development was the country’s only path to national liberation. Field also interviewed fifty-two individuals—almost all of the important players in Bolivia’s late twentieth-century history—in preparation for this book. This extensive use of interviews is reminiscent of the late Robert J. Alexander’s approach to diplomatic and labor history.From Development to Dictatorship is meticulous and engaging—a difficult balance to achieve. Field’s careful accounting of the Bolivian government’s massive expenditure of US-supplied tear gas projectiles is a great example of entertaining detail. He also captures the biting dark humor that Bolivians often employ when talking about their country’s politics. The Bolivian Communist Party joked that with its limitless supplies of tear gas, the Alliance for Progress was bringing “nothing but tears to the eyes of Bolivians” (66). Field opens his preface with a 1963 visit to Bolivia by the gonzo journalist Hunter S. Thompson. The famous journalist found the country’s politics Byzantine and eccentric. Field unravels that complexity with care and clarity, and his book is a substantial contribution to our understanding of the Bolivian revolution’s final years and its eventual replacement by military dictatorship.