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Properties of scoring auctions

2008; Wiley; Volume: 39; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00004.x

1756-2171

John Asker, Estelle Cantillon,

Merger and Competition Analysis

The RAND Journal of EconomicsVolume 39, Issue 1 p. 69-85 Properties of scoring auctions John Asker, John Asker Stern School of Business and New York University; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorEstelle Cantillon, Estelle Cantillon FNRS, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), and CEPR; [email protected]Search for more papers by this author John Asker, John Asker Stern School of Business and New York University; [email protected]Search for more papers by this authorEstelle Cantillon, Estelle Cantillon FNRS, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), and CEPR; [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 16 September 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00004.xCitations: 177 This article supersedes an earlier paper distributed under the title "Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions." We thank Max Bazerman, Matthew Jackson, Luca Rigotti, Al Roth, Nicolas Sahuguet, Sasha Wolf, as well as audiences at Barcelona Auction Workshop 2005, Case Western Reserve, CORE, Decentralization Conference 2004, ECARES, Essex, Gerzensee, Harvard/MIT, Inform 2003, London Business School, London School of Economics, New York University, Ohio State University, Rome Auction Conference 2004, University College London, and WZB Berlin for useful conversation and suggestions. The editor and two anonymous referees provided useful comments. Ioannis Ioannou provided excellent research assistance. The financial support of the Division of Research at Harvard Business School is gratefully acknowledged. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. Citing Literature Volume39, Issue1Spring 2008Pages 69-85 RelatedInformation