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Five Private Language Arguments

2004; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 12; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/09672550410001679837

1466-4542

Stephen Law,

Philosophical Ethics and Theory

Abstract This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a 'useable criterion of successful performance' (Pears) or 'operational standard of correctness' (Glock) for its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails. Keywords: Wittgensteinprivate languagesensationsinner spacerule‐followingverification Notes Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). Whether Wittgenstein also insists that any language must actually be shared, as opposed to just shareable in principle, is an issue I set to one side. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), III.ii.1. Ibid. For a fairly straightforward example of the NIC Argument, see Norman Malcolm, 'Exposition and Criticism of Wittgenstein's Investigations', in O. R. Jones (ed.) The Private Language Argument (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 33–49. This point is also made by Pears in his Wittgenstein (London: Fontana, 1971), p. 161. Paul Johnston, Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 21. David Pears, The False Prison, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 312. Hans‐Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 312. Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), p. 48. Johnston maintains that 'where we can properly speak of rule‐following, there are established ways of determining whether or not something is in accordance with the rule'. Johnston, op. cit., p. 20. Rule‐following requires that there be established a 'process of independent verification', p. 21. David V. Canfeild, 'Private Language: Philosophical Investigations section 258 and Environs', in Robert L. Arrington and Hans‐Johann Glock (eds) Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, 1992). Glock, op. cit., p. 312. Independent of my memory, at least, though of course the check is not independent of anyone's memory. Pears, The False Prison, Vol. 2, p. 333. Ibid., p. 344. Ibid., p. 345. This is not to say that the conclusion that one cannot have a private language without possessing a public one would not be an important conclusion to draw, of course. Canfeild, op. cit., p. 131. The expression 'truth‐tracking' comes from Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), Ch. 3. See, for example: Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (London: Blackwell, 1972), p. 3. Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 109 (note that I have substitued 'S' for 'pain'). Marie McGinn, Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 131. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 59–60. One might be tempted to reply that Wittgenstein elsewhere rules out the possibility of an individual evolving such a rule‐governed practice in isolation. If one supposes, along with Kripke, that Wittgenstein embraces the 'sceptical solution' to the rule‐following paradox, then one will suppose that on Wittgenstein's view any rule‐governed practice must actually be shared. Therefore, it is impossible for the private linguist to evolve such a practice in the manner I have just suggested. The difficulty with this reply is, first, that this Kripkean interpretation is highly controversial. Secondly, the argument of PI §258 is presumably not supposed to depend on adoption of the 'sceptical solution', for then it would in any case be rendered redundant: if any rulegoverned practice must be shared, it follows immediately, without the need for any further argument, that a necessarily private language is impossible. Thirdly, in any case McGinn cannot use this reply, for she denies that Wittgenstein adopts the 'sceptical solution'. Wittgenstein (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), p. 194.