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Virtue and Happiness Essays in Honour of Julia Annas . Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supplementary Volume, 2012

2015; Duke University Press; Volume: 124; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1215/00318108-2845852

1558-1470

Joachim Aufderheide,

Classical Philosophy and Thought

This festschrift for Julia Annas contains fifteen papers (six on Plato, one on Aristotle, four on the Stoics, and four on eudaimonism), all of which deal with aspects of virtue and happiness, the central topic of Annas's wide-ranging work. The editor, in her helpful introduction, summarizes the papers judiciously and explains how they relate to Annas's work. As is befitting for the occasion, many of the papers engage critically with Annas's often seminal contributions to the topics: this festschrift is not a eulogy, but a lively philosophical dialogue with Annas.Two papers deal with Plato's epistemology. In “Socrates’ Refutation of Gorgias: Gorgias 447 C–461 B,” Mark L. McPherran brings out nicely the steps of Gorgias's refutation by focusing on the difference between philosophy and rhetoric. The difference is not the method—both use rational and nonrational means of persuasion—but the goal: philosophy but not rhetoric aims at truth (25). Nicholas D. Smith, in “Plato on the Power of Ignorance,” is more straightforward about the notion of truth reached by knowledge (in Republic 5): a conception of beauty gained through knowledge gives me a full grasp of beauty so that my judgments always come out as true, whereas ignorance is tied to misconceptions, resulting in false judgments (if that). Since conceptions as relata of cognitive powers (what they are epi) are obviously central, one may wonder what Plato's word for ‘conception’ would be.Four papers tackle justice. Jonathan Barnes, in “Justice Writ Large,” offers a new criticism of the city-soul analogy. Barnes argues that the form of wisdom manifest in a given virtuous city must be different from that in its leaders, as the city is wise in virtue of the wisdom of its leaders (47). Plato blunders by not following this model for justice. Plato maintains that the form of justice is the same for individuals and for the city: each is just in virtue of their three constituent parts doing their own job—and that, Barnes claims somewhat hastily, is blatantly false (48–49). Unlike Barnes, Paul Woodruff tries to find what Plato got right in “Justice as a Virtue of the Soul,” namely, that citizens of a healthy and just city/state must be just persons. Unlike Rawls's justice as fairness, Plato's justice is not the product of an agreement; rather, agreement—indispensable for a healthy city—is the product of justice in the citizens (100). In the same spirit, C. C. W. Taylor sketches in “The Role of Women in Plato's Republic,” why Plato might be fairly congenial to feminist thought (pace Annas): (a) Plato is against institutional discrimination of women (84), and (b) if happiness is understood as self-fulfilment, then Plato enables women to achieve that (85). Can there be philosophically sound reasons for retribution? Not in Plato's Laws, argues Malcolm Schofield in “Injury, Injustice, and the Involuntary in the Laws.” By highlighting the difference between treating a crime as injury (which can be voluntary) or as injustice (which cannot be voluntary), Plato leaves no conceptual space for wrongful injury that would call for retribution (112).Daniel C. Russell valiantly argues in “Aristotle's Virtues of Greatness” that Aristotle's virtues of magnificence and magnanimity are not objectionably elitist but should be integrated in contemporary Aristotelian virtue theory (144). While these virtues are the prerogative of an elite group, the fault lies not in Aristotle's theory of virtue but in society (125): common people simply do not have the opportunity to develop the deliberative skills and hence the virtues (which differ from the small-scale counterparts) required for dealing well with large-scale honors and lasting effects. This is plausible, but does it really assuage the charge of elitism?The papers on Stoicism are particularly strong. Both Richard Bett and Brad Inwood persuasively answer their title questions “Did the Stoics Invent Human Rights?” and “How Unified Is Stoicism Anyway?,” respectively. Their line on indifferents and the role of the sage prevents the Stoics from coming anywhere near human rights: either the right makes no difference to a person's well-being, or it belongs only truly to the Stoic sage—in which case the notion of right does not apply (164–65). But is there the Stoic line on indifferents? Anna Maria Ioppolo chronicles the Stoics' struggle with this question in “Chrysippus and the Action Theory of Aristo of Chios” by tracing how Aristo's opposition to the orthodox Stoic account of preferred indifferents influenced Chrysippus's more nuanced position.The (attempted) unity between Stoic value theory and its implications for human character and behavior is also the only unity that Cicero takes seriously in De Finibus, as Cicero's answer to the Stoic's exposition in 4.53 shows. But does not Cato say in 3.74–75 that Stoicism is maximally unified: take one proposition away and the whole system will collapse? Yes, but Cato is only a character in a dialogue: for this character such a grand claim is appropriate, even if it is not supported by any arguments (238). Inwood thus successfully challenges the only evidence typically adduced to support the claim that Stoicism is a unified system.Rosalind Hursthouse's rich contribution “Excessiveness and Our Natural Development” tries to answer the question why emotional responses from nonsages are always excessive. With reference to human development, she argues that an emotional response is excessive when it puts the agent beyond rational control (think of jealousy). This illustrates how the emotions of a wicked person are excessive: they are beyond rational control in the sense that he or she will not be amenable to right reason, that is reason appealing to virtue.In “Plotinus, Ennead 1.4 as Critique of Earlier Eudaimonism,” the last paper concerned with exegesis of ancient philosophers, A. A. Long succeeds in showing that Plotinus knowledgeably criticizes earlier eudaimonists, especially Aristotelians, Stoics, and even Epicureans, for their inadequate metaphysics of happiness (no happiness without undescended soul!). Long's clear analysis opens up the field for defenders of the Stoics or Aristotelians to assess how strong Plotinus's criticism really is.Two further papers address eudaimonism from a contemporary perspective. Drawing on Davidson's work, Mark LeBar and Nathaniel Goldberg argue in “Psychological Eudaimonism and Interpretation in Greek Ethics” that we all have the dominant desire to live well, or else we could not understand ourselves and others as rational agents. They seek to defend this bold claim against counterexamples, such as Kantians, moral saints, and akratics. Eudaimonism is also the only proper response to the threat of dualism in practical reason (275), according to Paul Bloomfield's “Eudaimonia and Practical Rationality.” He offers the familiar naturalist story (without addressing the familiar objections) of grounding morality in human nature, and then making good human functioning (including exercising the moral virtues) central to happiness. This way there is no longer a tension between two goals of practical rationality (morality vs. self-interest), but only the difficulty of balancing self-regarding considerations against other-regarding considerations (282).The volume closes on a personal note: Scott LaBarge considers “How (and Maybe Why) to Grieve Like an Ancient Philosopher.” How should you respond, emotionally, to the death of someone dear to you? Plato, Epicurus, and Epictetus claim that you should not be sad at all; Crantor, Seneca, and Plutarch allow you a little bit of sadness. Taking his cue from Epictetus (339–41), LaBarge defends the first lot, suggesting that you should value each day that your beloved ones are alive, and remember the good times when they are dead (without being sad)—after all, it is to nobody's benefit if you are sad.The high standard of production (complete with index), as is the custom for Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, matches that of the papers. Specialists in ancient philosophy will find this volume rewarding, as will contemporary philosophers interested in virtue ethics.