Voltar
Artigo Acesso aberto Revisado por pares
BIBTEX RIS

Agency Model and Wholesale Pricing: Apple versus Amazon in the E-Book Market

2017; Taylor & Francis; Volume: 25; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13571516.2017.1401282

ISSN

1466-1829

Autores

Franz Wirl,

Tópico(s)

Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing

Resumo

Apple's choice of the agency model (i.e., Apple demands a share from the retail price set by the publishers) when entering the e-book market was surprising because: (i) the upstream firms can accrue all rents in a simultaneous move game if it determines the retail price; and (ii) the incumbent, Amazon, used wholesale pricing arrangements. This paper compares the two different contract types, pure and mixed: one retailer opts for wholesale, the other for the agency model. Departing from a standard and symmetric oligopolistic setup of Bertrand competing retailers and producers, the model accounts for retailers having (a) a significant contribution to the final value and (b) a strategic first-mover advantage. Both conditions combined are necessary (but not sufficient) in order to explain Apple's choice and the possibility of an asymmetric equilibrium.

Referência(s)