The Pinochet Generation: The Chilean Military in the Twentieth Century
2018; Duke University Press; Volume: 98; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1215/00182168-4294744
ISSN1527-1900
Autores Tópico(s)Political and Social Dynamics in Chile and Latin America
ResumoThe Chilean military coup d'état against Salvador Allende in 1973 has received much attention from the academic community. Numerous scholars have tried to explain the violent coup, focusing generally on the political crisis, the political parties, the violence in the streets, the support by the United States, or the internal errors of the Allende administration. Surprisingly, there is still a lack of information about the main actor of the Chilean drama in 1973: the armed forces. John Bawden's book aims to correct this paucity of historical knowledge. He analyzes the generation of Chilean officers born between 1915 and 1925, and he examines historical episodes in twentieth-century Chile from the perspective of these soldiers. He argues that the nature of the Augusto Pinochet regime cannot be separated from the culture and traditions that the officers inherited. This is a new and very important contribution to Chilean history. The book provides new insights into the causes of the military overthrow and the longevity of the dictatorship. To achieve his task, the author relies mainly on published sources, which—also surprisingly—academic practitioners have not used very much until now. John Bawden examines the institutional journals of the army, the navy, and the air force, along with the testimonial literature written by military officers. This methodological approach allows him to get close to core values, beliefs, orientations, and interpretations of the Chilean armed forces.Bawden underlines the heritage that became an important part of the Pinochet generation's self-perception: Prussian discipline in the army, a proud British tradition in the navy, a sense of superiority as the unbeaten military forces buttressed by victories of nineteenth-century wars, and a collective memory of the 1891 civil war as the event to avoid in the future. In addition, the chaotic dictatorship of General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo in the 1920s and 1930s widened the separation between soldiers and civilians. The military increasingly grew suspicious about partisan politics.In the following decades, the influence of the United States grew among Chilean soldiers, strengthening anticommunist feelings among the Pinochet generation. The soldiers adopted the concept of subversion—meaning the threat posed by internal enemies of the state—which legitimized all means of “modern warfare” to defend the country. Yet Bawden states that US influence was not the main factor. The officers drew their own lessons from world conflicts and the perceived political standstill at home. Hierarchy, unity, and sacrifice for the patria were seen as values that make soldiers superior to civilians. At the same time, the Chilean armed forces developed a pride in their international reputation for apolitical professionalism.The author shows that core ideas of the Pinochet regime, including its extreme brutality, were already discussed in military journals before the start of the Allende presidency, but officers showed “noteworthy” caution and patience at the beginning of the socialist government (p. 96). Bawden advances some new arguments explaining Allende's overthrow in 1973. The experience of the 1891 civil war raised fears of a renewed breakdown of military discipline and the chain of command. In addition, officers worried that an internal crisis could threaten external security, especially in regard to the old rivalry with Peru. As a result, the military triggered the putsch.Bawden points out that keeping silence on internal discord by military actors, the junta's reluctance to halt Pinochet's concentration of power, and the ongoing support from the civilian bourgeoisie were all factors for the stability of the regime. For all these reasons, the military left power in 1990 with a sense of their mission being accomplished. In their view, they had saved the country and institutionalized a political system that would give the armed forces a high degree of political autonomy and influence while avoiding a future backlash into anarchy.Bawden delivers some very convincing arguments for why the Chilean military decided to overthrow Allende and install an extremely brutal dictatorship. Nonetheless, this approach, while having many strengths, also suffers from some weakness. To some degree, Bawden occasionally sounds apologetic (which is clearly not his intention), because focusing on the perception inside the military creates a rational and logical narrative that downplays ideological, political, or even selfish motivations. Bawden rightly outlines the heterogeneity of the Chilean soldiers before the coup. Yet he cannot fully explain why the constitutional traditions of the Chilean military permitted both the law-abiding general Carlos Prats and his successor, Augusto Pinochet. It is not always clear why there was not a single military voice speaking up against Pinochet's repression although many officers did not agree with his politics. The respect for the chain of command cannot entirely explain this conundrum, especially as the military did not afford the same respect to the constitutional generals René Schneider and Carlos Prats.These points by no means belittle the important contribution of John Bawden, who introduces some crucial new insights to the interpretation of Chilean history and the motivations for the overthrow of Allende.
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