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ASNI: Attenuated Signature Noise Injection for Low-Overhead Power Side-Channel Attack Immunity

2018; Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers; Volume: 65; Issue: 10 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1109/tcsi.2018.2819499

1558-0806

Debayan Das, Shovan Maity, Saad Bin Nasir, Santosh Ghosh, Arijit Raychowdhury, Shreyas Sen,

Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption

Computationally-secure cryptographic algorithms implemented on a physical platform leak significant "side-channel" information through their power supplies. Correlational power attack is an efficient power side-channel attack (SCA) technique, which analyzes the statistical correlation between the estimated and the measured supply current traces to extract the secret key. The existing power SCA countermeasures are mainly based on reducing the SNR of the leaked information, power balancing, or gate-level masking, each of which introduces significant power, area or performance overheads, which calls for an efficient generic countermeasure. This paper presents ASNI: Attenuated Signature Noise Injection, which is an energy-efficient generic countermeasure, and shows SCA resistance on the AES-128 encryption as an application. ASNI uses a shunt low-drop-out (LDO) regulator to suppress the AES current signature by >200× in the supply current traces. The shunt LDO has been fabricated and validated in 130 nm CMOS technology. System-level implementation of the ASNI, with the AES-128 core operating at 40 MHz, shows that the system remains secure even after 1 M encryptions, with ~25× reduction in power overhead compared to that of noise addition alone.