Reading the Story of Moses and Khidr through the Lens of Islamic Law
2018; Duke University Press; Volume: 56; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1215/00138282-4337553
ISSN2573-3575
Autores Tópico(s)Medieval and Classical Philosophy
ResumoAl-Kahf (18, vv. 60–82) is often cited as the locus classicus for Muslim discussions about the relationship between mysticism and doctrine. This passage in the Qur’an tells the story of an encounter between the prophet Moses and an unnamed figure whom tradition identifies as Khiḍr.1Al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-qurʾān (The Compendium of Legal Rulings of the Qur’an) by Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurṭubī (d. 671 AH/1272 CE) and al-Tafsīr al-kabīr (The Great Commentary) (or Mafātīḥ al-ghayb [The Keys of the Unseen]) by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) indicate that most scholars considered Khiḍr a prophet, although al-Qurṭubī’s commentary indicates that others considered Khiḍr a righteous servant of God or an angel.2 One argument in support of the view that Khiḍr is a prophet is the following: Khiḍr was Moses’s guide and teacher so he must be superior to Moses; only a prophet can be superior to another prophet; therefore Khiḍr was a prophet. This argument is mentioned in both al-Jāmiʿ li-aḥkām al-qurʾān and al-Tafsīr al-kabīr (tsq, 751).3The story begins with Moses and his servant setting out on a quest for “the place where the two seas meet.” The passage reads as follows: (v. 60) And when Moses said unto his servant, “I shall continue on till I reach the junction of the two seas, even if I journey for a long time. (v. 61) Then when they reached the junction of the two, they forgot their fish, and it made its way to the sea, burrowing away. (v. 62) Then when they had passed beyond, he said to his servant, “Bring us our meal. We have certainly met with weariness on this journey of ours.” (v. 63) He said, “Didst thou see? When we took refuge at the rock, indeed I forgot the fish—and naught made me neglect to mention it, save Satan—and it made its way to the sea in a wondrous manner!” (v. 64) He said, “That is what we were seeking.” So they turned back, retracing their steps. (v. 65) There they found a servant from among Our servants whom We had granted a mercy from Us and whom We had taught knowledge from Our Presence. (v. 66) Moses said unto him, “Shall I follow thee, that thou mightest teach me some of that what thou hast been taught of sound judgement?” (v. 67) He said, “Truly thou wilt not be able to bear patiently with me. (v. 68) And how canst thou bear patiently that which thou dost not encompass in awareness?” (v. 68) He said, “Thou wilt find me patient, if God wills, and I shall not disobey thee in any matter.” (v. 70) He said, “If thou wouldst follow me, then question me not about anything, till I make mention of it to thee.” (v. 71) So they went on till, when they had embarked upon a ship, he made a hole therein. He said, “Didst thou make a hole in it in order to drown its people? Thou hast done a monstrous thing!” (v. 72) He said, “Did I not say unto thee that thou wouldst not be able to bear patiently with me?” (v. 73) He said, “Take me not to task for having forgotten, not make me suffer much hardship on account of what I have done.” (v. 74) So they went on till they met a young boy, and he slew him. He said, “Didst thou slay a pure soul who had slain no other soul? Thou hast certainly done a terrible thing!” (v. 75) He said, “Did I not say unto thee that thou wouldst not be able to bear patiently with me?” (v. 76) He said, “If I question thee concerning aught after this, then keep my company no more. Thou hast attained sufficient excuse from me.” (v. 77) So they went on till they came upon the people of a town and sought food from them. But they refused to show them any hospitality. Then they found therein a wall that was about to fall down; so he set it up straight. He said, “Hadst thou willed, thou couldst have taken a wage for it.” (v. 78) He said, “This is the parting between thee and me. I shall inform thee of the meaning of that which thou couldst not bear patiently: (v. 79) As for the ship, it belonged to indigent people who worked the sea. I desired to damage it, for just beyond them was a king who was seizing every ship by force. (v. 80) And as for the young boy, his parents were believers and we feared that he would make them suffer much through rebellion and disbelief. (v. 81) So we desired that their Lord give them in exchange one who is better than him in purity, and nearer to mercy. (v. 82) And as for the wall, it belonged to two orphan boys in the city, and beneath it was a treasure belonging to them. Their father was righteous, and thy Lord desired that they should reach maturity and extract their treasure, as a mercy from thy Lord. And I did not do this upon my own command. This is the meaning of that which thou couldst not bear patiently.” (tsq, 748–56)What has made this passage so fertile for generations of readers is the contrast (and indeed tension) between sharīʿah, symbolized by Moses, and esoteric knowledge, symbolized by Khiḍr.4 The story is preceded by the story of the Companions of the Cave (vv. 9–26) and followed by the story of Dhū l-Qarnayn (vv. 83–98);5 all three stories share a common theme related to contrast: life and death, exoteric and esoteric knowledge, the two seas, and the two mountain barriers (v. 93) located between eastern and western extremes (tsq, 748).In general, commentators have identified three main themes in the story of Moses and Khiḍr: the difference between exoteric knowledge based on scripture or reason and unmediated esoteric knowledge; the roles of master and disciple; and the existence of hidden interpretations (taʾwīl) of events that take place in plain sight (tsq, 749). Regarding the first theme, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) suggest that “the two seas” signify Moses and Khiḍr, two seas of different kinds of knowledge (tsq, 749).6 The commentators cite the phrase “whom We had taught knowledge from Our Presence (ʿilm min ladunnā)” in verse 65 as evidence of the type of knowledge that Khiḍr possesses: “knowledge of the Unseen, which lies only with God”(tsq, 751).7 “It is an esoteric knowledge of the inner realities of things and of universal truths revealed directly to him [ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī and al-Qurṭubī] without the intermediary of a human teacher [al-Kāshānī, al-Rāzī, and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sulamī (d. 412/1021)]—acquired through Divine inspiration rather than through human effort [Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1072)]” (tsq, 751). Based on verse 65, Sufis developed the technical term ʿilm ladunnī, meaning knowledge acquired through “unveiling.” According to al-Sulamī, the Sufi master al-Junayd ibn Muḥammad al-Baghdādī (d. 297/910) “referred to Khiḍr’s knowledge as the ‘unveiling of lights from the recesses of the Unseen’” (tsq, 751).Most readings of this passage indicate that there is a tension between mysticism and doctrine, esoteric and exoteric knowledge, Moses and Khiḍr—after all, freshwater and saltwater do not mix. I suggest that law offers a framework within which this tension is resolved.Few commentators have focused their attention on verses 67–68: “He said, ‘Truly you will not be able to bear patiently with me. And how can you bear patiently that which you do not encompass in awareness?’” These two verses suggest that Moses’s inability to understand Khiḍr’s actions is not blameworthy. Not only is Moses not expected to consider good and righteous something that is prima facie “terrible,” but to do so without reason is unconscionable. Take the case of murdering the young boy. If we describe the scenario in the language of law, here is what it might look like: Based on sharīʿah and (practical) reason, Moses knows that murder is wrong. Regarding reason, murdering an innocent person is unjust (ẓulm), injustice is repugnant to reason (qabīḥ), and the Lawgiver cannot endorse that which is repugnant to reason.8 Furthermore, the relationship between sharīʿah and reason is governed by “the principle of correlation” (qāʿidat al-mulāzamah), according to which whatever is ordered by reason is also ordered by religion (kull mā ḥakama bih al-sharʿ ḥakama bih al-ʿaql) and vice versa.9 When Moses witnesses Khiḍr murder the boy, two conclusions are justified: it is forbidden (harām), and it is “terrible.” The first conclusion is justified on the basis of sharīʿah; the second conclusion is justified on the basis of reason, and ultimately they are interdependent. Reason determines the act to be terrible, and, based on “the repugnance of obligations of which one is incapable” (qubḥ al-taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq), it also excuses Moses for opposing what is ultimately right and good. These elements are operative on the first two levels of law: primary norms (aḥkām awwaliyyah) and secondary norms (aḥkām thānawiyyah).Khiḍr’s actions pertain to the third level of law: discretionary or executive authority (aḥkām wilāʾiyyah). First, Khiḍr has been taught “knowledge from Our Presence” of specific circumstances. Second, he has been given authority: in verse 82 he states, “And I did not do this upon my own command.” His knowledge of specific circumstances results in either a valid exception or a realization that the original rule did not cover this case (e.g., what both sharīʿah and reason actually dictated is not to kill a person who will not cause substantial harm to others, or something to that effect). Having established that, he must still have executive authority to kill the boy. He has this authority, and so he can legitimately kill the boy.By offering a framework within which norms are layered, law can resolve the tension between mysticism and doctrine as it is expressed in the story of Moses and Khiḍr. The cost of resolving this tension, however, is another matter. The framework described above allows the modern Iranian state to be progressive in certain arenas.10 The upshot is that the administrative practice of the state supplants sharīʿah. In the absence of coercion, one has no motivation to abide by the norms of sharīʿah. If the basic question animating sharīʿah is “What is the ethical thing to do?” then this change has far-reaching implications. In the end, resolving the tension in a systematic way has had the effect of subverting the basic premise of law. However, without discretionary or executive authority, the project of law faces difficult challenges as well. So perhaps the tension itself is essential and ultimately productive.
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