Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Self-Governing Agencies in the Economic Field in Uruguay

1956; SAGE Publishing; Volume: 22; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1177/002085235602200102

0552-3060

M. Enrique Sayagues Laso,

Employment, Labor, and Gender Studies

Résuméby Laso Enrique SayaguesA concise analysis of the legal position of Uruguayan « entes autónomos », i.e. the public agencies, most of them with economic objectives, similar to what is known in France as « public establishments » and elsewhere as « self-governing agencies » or « public corporations ».They first made their appearance in the middle of the XIXth century, and are mainly of two types. Some have banking prerogatives, e.g. the National Bank which also deals with currency; « Banco de Seguros », holding a monopoly of almost all insurance; the Postal Savings Bank; the « Banco Hipotecario », granting mortgage loans. Other « entes autónomos » are industrial or commercial in character, such as the monopoly for production of electric power and for telecommunications; that of alcohol and intoxicating beverages, the sale of fuel by-products of mineral oil and of cement used in public works; the National Ports Authority; the railways; the Sanitary Works, which control the supply of water; the control of import and export trade.A third category is in charge of education: the university, secondary and lower schools, crafts and manual labour schools.Some other « entes autónomos » exist, but those listed by the author sufficiently illustrate his point.The system applied to the « entes autónomos » is one of very broad administrative decentralisation, the origin and juridical development of which are analysed in full. The author then goes on to examine the present regime of the industrial and commercial services: the organisational set-up of the « entes autónomos », their control by the Executive (with reference to their difference from the « servicios decentralizados » which are less independent) and their position with regard to Parliament.An interesting point here is that members of the Boards of Directors of « entes autónomos » are precluded from any participation in politics, for the duration of their tenure of office. The Executive has the right of comment on the Boards' policies, but no more; and Parliament — the Senate specifically — may intervene only to arbitrate when differences occur.The author's conclusion is that « entes autónomos » are functionally preferable to « servicios decentralizados », mainly because they are protected against politically-inspired intervention. But prof. Sayagues Laso makes this remark specifically within the limits of internal organisation only, so as to offer no general pronouncement on the principles of State intervention and of nationalisation.