Produção Nacional
Corruption and Political Strategies: Just Suspicious or Corrupt in Fact?
2018; Academy of Management; Volume: 2018; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.5465/ambpp.2018.15130abstract
ISSN2376-7197
AutoresAndre Leonardo Pruner Da Silva, Paulo Roberto Arvate,
Tópico(s)Media Influence and Politics
ResumoWe investigate the impact of anti-corruption law on obtaining preferential treatment from politically connected firms. We argue that if there is any relationship between CPA and corruption as the theory suggests with the institutional tightening of the law, the preferential treatment obtained by connected firms decreases. With a research design that uses the anti- corruption law as an exogenous shock, we conduct a diff-in-diff estimation to test two CPA mechanisms; donation for election campaigns and the hiring of employees with political experience. Our results point to the decrease in the expenditure amount and quantity of contracts of companies connected through donations. Further tests with a database of companies punished for corruption provide more empirical evidence that corrupt and connected firms are even more affected by the law. However, despite all specification being negative for companies connected through donations, the results achieved with firms connected by the hiring of employees only impact on the reduction of the contracts quantity. Our study contributes to the management theory investigating the relationship between CPA and corruption. Besides the theoretical contribution, our findings and our identification strategy also contribute methodologically to understanding the causal effect of this relationship.
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