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Note on an Article by Sir Ronald Fisher

1956; Oxford University Press; Volume: 18; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.2517-6161.1956.tb00236.x

1467-9868

Jerzy Neyman,

Philosophy and History of Science

Summary (1) Fisher’s allegation that, contrary to some passages in the introduction and on the cover of the book by Wald, this book does not really deal with experimental design is unfounded. In actual fact, the book is permeated with problems of experimentation. (2) Without consideration of hypotheses alternative to the one under test and without the study of probabilities of errors of the two kinds, no purely probabilistic theory of tests is possible. (3) The conceptual fallacy of the notion of fiducial distribution rests upon the lack of recognition that valid probability statements about random variables usually cease to be valid if the random variables are replaced by their particular values. The notorious multitude of “paradoxes” of fiducial theory is a consequence of this oversight. (4) The idea of a “cost function for faulty judgments” appears to be due to Laplace, followed by Gauss.