State Interests vs. the Umma: Iranian Policy in Central Asia
1996; Middle East Institute; Volume: 50; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
1940-3461
Autores Tópico(s)Economic Sanctions and International Relations
ResumoThis article attributes three motives of varying intensity to Iranian policy toward Central Asia. The primary motive is defensive. The ethnic conflict between Azeris and Armenians threatens Iran's territorial integrity given Iran's large Azeri community. The second motive is economic; Iran would like to strengthen its links in oil exploration and exports with the Central Asian States (CAS). The third motive is messianic, manifesting itself in the Iranian leadership's self perception as the guardians of the Islamic heritage. Recent international and regional developments in the Middle East have opened new venues for Iran to seek influence beyond the Gulf region and the Arab East. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the resulting 1991 Gulf War, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, and the emergence of independent states in former Soviet Central Asia have brought about a number of foreign policy opportunities and security threats for Iranian policymakers. I will argue in this paper that Iranian foreign policy in Central Asia is driven by perceptions of threat and opportunity resulting from new domestic and regional configurations. To analyze these perceptions, I attribute certain motivations to Iranian policymakers. Motivation is based on a compound of factors that predispose a government to move in certain directions and make strategic choices in domestic and foreign policy.(l) I argue that Iranian foreign policy toward Central Asia is driven by three motives: the first, and most important, is the security motive; the second is based on economic factors; and the third motive is messianic. I argue that the major changes in Iran's regional environment, both in Central Asia and the Gulf region, have led to a perception of heightened regional threat and prompted a defensive posture in Iranian foreign policy. Furthermore, the regime continues to face an internal opposition, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, which is willing to use violence and cooperate with external forces against it. Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei, who holds the position of Velayat-e Faqih, and 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is the president of the Republic, succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after his death in 1989. 'Ali Khamenei represents the more ideological faction in the Iranian body politic that aims to export the Islamic revolution to the Muslim community beyond Iran's borders and opposes any reconciliation with the West. Rafsanjani represents the pragmatists who seek reconciliation with the West and want to enhance Iran's economic position and broaden the regime's domestic base of support. These two men represent the divergent views of the Iranian body politic and shape Iran's policies vis-a-vis the Central Asian States (CAS). Iran's complex environment in Central Asia, coupled with its domestic situation, has resulted in a policy that attempts to reconcile its state interests (both economic and security interests) with the ideological zeal of the clerics within the regime. THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT: POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY The Azeris are Turkic people who belong to the Shi'ite sect of Islam, the state religion in Iran. Although Turkic, the Azeris historically have been closer to the Iranians than to the Turks. The Azeri language and culture have been greatly influenced by Persian,(2) and close to ten million Azeris actually live in Iran. Prior to the secession of Azerbaijan from the former Soviet Union on 18 October 1991, Azeris in Iran kept close links to the core group of Farsi speakers in Azerbaijan.(3) When Azerbaijan became independent, however, Iran became worried about the links between its own population and the new republic. It warned its citizens that it was illegal to marry citizens from the Republic of Azerbaijan. In January 1993, Iran's Ministry of Interior's General Foreign Citizen and Emigration Affairs Office indicated that any Iranian citizen intending to marry a citizen from Azerbaijan must get a permit from the Ministry of Interior. …
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