Leadership on Future Fields: Remembering the Human Factor in War
1999; The MIT Press; Volume: 79; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
ResumoDoctrine must pay more than lip service to battlefield morale, both in human and organizational terms. Units must be structured and employed to minimize the stress placed on the soldiers who serve in them, not just to maximize their weapons' destructive potentia The segregation of tactics and leadership in our training publications is symptomatic of how deeply we neglect the human factor in war. DOCTRINE, SO EXCELLENT in many respects, suffers greatly from its neglect of the human factor in war-something all leaders should still consider important. For example, the 1993 US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, defines friction in war as the accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties and confusion of battle that impede both sides.1 No gut-wrenching terror here, no cowardice, no shirking and no agonized indecision. Very little, it seems, hampers smooth operations that could not be fixed with better intelligence, planning and communications. But Carl von Clausewitz, the concept's originator, added a fourth ingredient to friction-danger. is the realm of danger, he wrote, and its presence inspires fear; fear, in turn, undermines the soldier's desire or ability to carry out the commander's will, thereby multiplying the sources of friction.2 Any modern army, dependent on the synchronization of so many elements for its combat power, is perhaps more vulnerable than ever to friction's debilitating effects, yet we pay little attention to one of friction's primary sources. War in the information age will strain the sinews of leadership in ways we can barely imagine. The conventional battlefield will be a place of physical isolation, fluidity and instantaneous destruction inflicted at an unprecedented pace. Soldiers may wield push buttons more often than bayonets, but metal will still tear flesh with sickening regularity-often without warning. Realistic training and unit cohesiveness can attenuate some of fear's effects, but there is no substitute for strong battlefield leadership in steeling soldiers for the real and perceived dangers of future war. Ardant du Picq wrote that Man is flesh and blood; he is body and soul. And, strong as the soul often is, it cannot dominate the body to the point where there will not be a revolt of the flesh and mental perturbation in the face of destruction.3 Keeping this in mind, fear's debilitating effects can be divided into two general categories: preoccupation with self-preservation rather than mission accomplishment; and mental paralysis. The instinct for self-preservation is a useful part of any soldier's character, instilling a certain and necessary amount of prudence in dangerous environments. But the danger zone has expanded considerably in the past 20 years and will continue to grow until it virtually encompasses the entire battlefield. Moreover, the individual soldier will have less warning of danger's presence and less ability to defend against it. Highly lethal and precise weaponry, often guided by implacable machinery, renders even the strongest defensive position unsafe. Danger penetrates the blackest night and ranges far beyond the edge of the battle area (FEBA). Sensors can detect the slightest activity so that movement, electromagnetic emission, firing and even the simple act of warming up an engine can make the soldier a target. Further, maneuver warfare's nature intermixes armies amid the swirl of combat so that the whole notion of forward and rear areas becomes moot. Every action, even minor routines performed miles from the enemy, becomes a calculated risk. Thus, the fear of death will not be limited to those directly confronting the enemy but will extend throughout the battlefield's depth-a constant, nagging companion of every soldier, 24 hours a day. Consequently, combat stress-usually associated with the maneuver arms-will affect all branches more or less continuously. In fact, by virtue of his greater protection and lesser worth as a target, the infantryman in his foxhole will arguably be safer than the clerk in a command post. …
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