Technology and the American Civil War
2004; The MIT Press; Volume: 84; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)American History and Culture
ResumoGerman strategist General Helmuth von Moltke once described the American Civil War as two armed mobs chasing each other around the country, from which nothing could be learned.1 Despite Moltke's disdain for America's military efforts during the Civil War, the U.S. Army can learn a great deal about how advances in technology can change the nature of war. The conduct of war changed as a result of three technological advances during the Civil War: the rifled musket, the electric telegraph, and the railroad. The Rifled Musket During the mid-19th century, the use of the rifled musket dramatically changed how the war was conducted. Before the rifled musket came into use, Napoleonic tactics of linear frontal assault of massed forces, supported by direct-fire artillery and quick cavalry charges, was the recipe for battlefield success. European and American military leaders replicated Napoleon's tactics because he optimized the weapons he had at that time--smoothbore muskets with a nominal effective range of 100 yards and canister artillery with a maximum range of 400 yards. In contrast, the Civil War rifle had an effective range of over 500 yards when firing the conical Minie ball bullet. (2) The rifled musket's increased range and lethality had several adverse effects on Napoleonic tactics. For example, an infantryman with a rifled musket was a greater threat to artillerymen and cavalrymen. Napoleon massed his artillery and used canister fire to decimate an advancing infantry line. The Civil War infantryman, using a rifled musket could target artillerymen before they were within range of canister fire, which forced the artillery to operate further from the enemy than was optimal. (3) Using the rifled musket also allowed the infantryman to attack cavalry soldiers from a much greater distance, which reduced the cavalry's shock affect and made a cavalry charge more costly to the attacker. As a result, the long-range firepower of the rifle relegated the artillery and cavalry to lesser roles than they had during the Napoleonic wars. (4) The change in infantry firepower shifted the tactical strength of armies from offense to defense by making frontal infantry assaults too costly, which posed a serious problem for tacticians. Napoleonic-style warfare, as espoused by General Antoine Henri Jomini, emphasized a strong offense for a decisive victory. The problem soon became how to execute an offensive plan when the tactical defense was much stronger. Given the state of technology, the best answer was to avoid massed frontal assaults. One obvious method was to attack an enemy's flanks. (5) During the battle of Gettysburg, Confederate forces attempted to attack the Union flank at the Little Round Top. They found, however, that attacking flanks using linear Napoleonic tactics resulted in disproportionately high casualties for the offense. Toward the end of the war, units were changing their offensive tactics from massed lines to small groups. While some men provided cover, others advanced. Both sides used cover as available and sought to reinforce the skirmish line. Union forces successfully used open-order skirmish tactics to limit offensive losses during Union General William Tecumseh Sherman's Georgia Campaign and Union General Ulysses S. Grant's Petersburg Campaign in late 1864. (6) To further confound the doctrine, soldiers were turning to field trenches and hastily constructed earthworks to protect themselves from increasingly deadly firepower. Both forces used earth and logs to fortify their defensive fighting positions while fighting the 1864 Overland Campaign. During the Battle of the Wilderness at Brock Road on 6 May 1864 and Laurel Hill on 8 May 1864, both sides found that prepared defensive positions allowed them to repel attacks. The key to tactical victory then became attacking an opponent before he had time to establish a defense. In the end, the tactical advantage still lay with the defender because of the rifle's firepower. …
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