Now That We're Leaving Iraq, What Did We Learn?
2010; The MIT Press; Volume: 90; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Research, Science, and Academia
ResumoON 19 AUGUST 2010, the last combat unit-the 4th Stryker Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division-left as Operation Iraqi Freedom became Operation New Dawn. Already our troop strength is below 50,000 in Iraq. It's premature to say that we have won, but we are leaving an that is perfect, but good enough to leave, as the Washington Post s chief Iraqi correspondent Ernesto Londoflo put it recently.' This is a remarkable turn of events from just a few years ago. Yet, we do not clearly understand just what we did that pulled a potential victory from the jaws of defeat. Conventional wisdom claims that we prevailed because of the American surge between 2007 and 2008 and an aggressive shift in tactical operations to effective counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. These COIN principles included changing our focus from killing and capturing insurgents to protecting the population and liberally funding economic development projects plus essential services. The additional manpower of the surge and placing small combat outposts among the population were critical to our success. The Awakening in 2006 removed a large pool of Sunni insurgents. Partnering with Iraqi Security Forces and the Sons of Iraq militia was also very effective. However, our nonlethal effects were far less important than is usually credited. This is especially true of the billions of dollars we spent on projects and services. The most important requirement for protecting the population was removal of the criminals and insurgents who were causing the problems. The most effective means to remove them was through combat operations designed to kill or capture them. To defend the Iraqi people, we built thousands of barriers and berms to separate the insurgents from the population. Good fences make good neighbors, was how one battalion commander put it.2 We conducted relentless lethal operations against the insurgent enemy. For a time, we sustained high casualties as the price of eliminating a much greater number of insurgents. The Iraqi Security Forces slowly became more professional, not as good as us, but good enough to handle their enemy. Economic incentives were useful to reinforce success, but not before taking down the insurgents. Our experience in verified that lethal operations remain the decisive element of combat power. Ever since the release of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006, official and unofficial military publications have been filled with articles extolling the virtues of nonlethal operations - the of of governance, economic development, essential services, reconciliation, and so forth. Many COIN enthusiasts advocated an immoderate focus on economic development over combat operations - more Greg Mortenson and less Curtis LeMay. Very quickly, the legitimate need to consider other lines of effort shifted to a primacy of nonlethal operations. The emphasis on COIN turned a popular philosophy into a reigning, almost myopic, orthodoxy. A field commander's competence became a perception of his mastery of the nonlethal aspects of COIN, not his effectiveness in reducing violence in his area of operations. Those officers who did not demonstrate enough enthusiasm for nonlethal operations were often dismissed as not getting COIN. We seem reluctant to admit that killing the enemy actually worked. Author and frequent Iraqi embed Bing West noted this reluctance and suggested a reason for it. In the March-April 2009 edition of Military Review, West wrote The theories espoused in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, persuaded the mainstream media that General Petreaus's forthcoming [surge] campaign in Baghdad was righteous. The FM appealed to liberals because it posited the concept of war without blood. Enemies were converted rather than killed. It was the only FM ever accorded a New York Times book review, written by a Harvard professor.3 However, FM 3-24 did not restrict lethal operations. …
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