Reassessing Strategy: A Historical Examination
2001; The MIT Press; Volume: 81; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoLieutenant Colonel Dominic J. Caraccilo, US Army In The Art of War, Sun Tzu says that [v]ictory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.' Antoine Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tw-masters of war strategy--offer timeless views of the face of battle. Clauswitz argues that perfect prewar planning for contingencies is difficult, if not impossible, because of the fog of war. To anticipate the full array of possibilities of changes and plan a way to adapt to all of them is, at least, futile. Therefore, the strategist and his enamored tactician must be able to properly assess the situation, given wartime realities, and adapt to battlefield changes. Revising the strategic net assessment is a first step on the road to victory. Clausewitz states, Friction, as we choose to call it, is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.2 Idealistically, a strategist wants to anticipate and plan contingencies so as to conquer all changes in the character of war. Sun Tzu indicates that good intelligence makes it possible to predict the outcome of a war in battle. However, Clausewitz says, [T]he very nature of interaction is bound to make [war] unpredictable.' History is rich with examples which show that prewar plans do not directly relate to wartime realities. Strategists' ability or inability to reassess and adapt to volatile changes-the friction and fog of war-played key roles in the American Revolution, the Korean War and in the Algerian insurgency. The American Revolution During the American Revolution, the British had a prewar plan of using coercive measures to force colonists to capitulate to British empirical and parliamentary rule. The prewar British plan was seemingly simpleput down a rebellion and return the colonies to the desired status quo. Sun Tzu would have criticized the British for not considering in the prewar planning process the colonials' will to resist and ability to prevail. He would have told the British to anticipate French and Spanish forces' joining the battle. In short, he would have suggested that the British needed a better scriptwriter. Shooting British subjects would not win colonial hearts and minds. If they had ascertained that using force would do nothing more than nourish the rebellion and recognized that force was detrimental to their cause, the British could have designed courses of action to counter colonial reaction. They could have determined whether it was more feasible to go for the decisive blow or to accept a colonial independence while maintaining a prominent economic existence. While the British did not believe they would have to resort to force to put down what they viewed as a weak rebellion, shedding blood at the onset should have led them to reconsider their strategy.4 Ideally, it would be great if the strategist could foresee all changes that might occur. But, even Sun Tzu would not argue against the fact that it is nearly impossible to flawlessly script an entire campaign. Because of such uncertainty, prewar plans are always marginal, at best. The Korean War The character of the war in Korea could have led to US use of nuclear weapons to prevent communist Chinese intervening between the North and South Koreans.' Considering the inability to anticipate changes in the character of war, it is questionable whether Sun Tzu or Clausewitz would have decided to play the nuclear trump card. Arguably, a preplanned nuclear reaction to a possible change in battle would have been detrimental to the military situation in Korea and to international diplomacy. …
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