Applying Principles of Counterinsurgency to the Fight against Sexual Assault in the Military: Countering the Insurgency within Our Ranks
2013; The MIT Press; Volume: 93; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0026-4148
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
Resumo[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] AFTER OVER A decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan combating a violent insurgency of extremists, the U.S. military is now facing a new fight with another violent enemy--one hidden within our own ranks. Failures in leadership and the lack of personal accountability within our formations ensure this enemy's survival. Leaders fail to create a culture of respect and professionalism, provide an environment that is safe and supportive of victims, deliberately investigate accusations, and ruthlessly prosecute offenders. While the battlefield and enemy have changed, the principles of warfare remain the same. The Army should use the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan to more effectively combat the current war against sexual predators in the Armed Forces. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are very complex and have been the topic of numerous books, articles, and debates over the last decade. There are six fundamental principles of COIN that apply to all counterinsurgency operations. Examining these principles and applying them in conjunction with lessons learned in Afghanistan may help the military to end sexual assault. Fundamental Principles of COIN Department of the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, defines COIN as military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. (1) COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations spanning multiple agencies. To be successful, COIN requires cooperation on all levels. Just like COIN, the Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) program includes multiple organizations, such as the Army Community Service, Family Advocacy Program, and the Criminal Investigations Division. FM 3-24 devotes an entire chapter to discussing the importance of integrating civilian and military activities into counterinsurgency operations. (2) It also investigates how insurgents strive to disguise their intentions, and when successful, make COIN operations extremely difficult. Insurgencies take many different forms, and while each is unique, they tend to share certain commonalities. (3) Although the structure, level of organization, and goals of each insurgent group may vary, fundamental COIN principles are applicable to all insurgent groups. * Identify insurgent motivations and depth of commitment. (4) * Identify likely insurgent weapons and tactics. (5) * Identify the operational environment in which insurgents seek to initiate and develop their campaign and strategy. (6) * Stabilize the area of operation to facilitate the local government's ability to provide for the local populace. (7) * Conduct education and information operations targeting insurgents, victims, and potential victims. (8) * Train the indigenous government and security forces to conduct effective COIN operations independently. (9) [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Identify insurgent motivation and depth of commitment. An insurgent's level of commitment and drive correlates to various motivating factors. For example, a hardline Islamic extremist who is motivated by a convoluted view of religious duty, a hatred for Western culture, and disgust of the basic concept of freedom will not negotiate. (10) However, myriad factors motivate large numbers of the local population in Afghanistan to cooperate with insurgents. In many cases the Taliban intimidate the local populace and coerce them into action by providing or limiting certain resources or services. In many villages, the Taliban demand cooperation and support from the population--resistance results in threats to destroy homes, crops and livelihood, or even death. Another motivating factor is economic necessity. Afghan families typically depend on the men for survival. Many of the men have no ideological commitment to the insurgent cause, but monetary compensation is incentive enough to convince them to plant improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or become an informant for the Taliban. …
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