The Populist Elite Paradox: Using Elite Theory to Elucidate the Shapes and Stakes of Populist Elite Critiques
2019; Emerald Publishing Limited; Linguagem: Inglês
10.1108/s0195-631020190000034010
ISSN0195-6310
AutoresMarte Mangset, Fredrik Engelstad, Mari Teigen, Trygve Gulbrandsen,
ResumoAbstract Critiques of elites define populism, which conceives of power relations as a unified, conspiring elite exploiting the good people. Yet, populism itself is inherently elitist, calling for a strong leader to take power and channel the will of the people. Elite theory, surprisingly overlooked in scholarship on populism, can clarify this apparent paradox and elucidate the dimensions of populism and its risk of authoritarianism in new ways. In contrast to populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society, elite theory points to the possibility that several elites with diverging voices and interests exist. Furthermore, elite theorists argue that such elite pluralism is a necessary component of a well-functioning democracy. Much scholarship on populism, often aiming to understand its causes and focussing on Western Europe and North America, points to the similarities of populist movements. The focus on similarities strengthens the understanding of populism as a uniform phenomenon and populist elite critiques as homogeneous. However, broader comparative studies show that different populist movements target a range of various elite groups. Indeed, the empirical reality of populist elite critiques targeting diverse elite groups is more in line with elite theory than populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society. A key to grasping the democratic challenges posed by the power relations between elites and masses in both populist critiques and populist solutions is an understanding of the institutional conditions for elite integration versus elite pluralism. This central discussion in both classical and modern elite theory is applied to analyse populism in this contribution. Keywords Anti-elitism Authoritarianism Democracy Elite pluralism Elite theory Populism Citation Mangset, M., Engelstad, F., Teigen, M. and Gulbrandsen, T. (2019), "The Populist Elite Paradox: Using Elite Theory to Elucidate the Shapes and Stakes of Populist Elite Critiques", Engelstad, F., Gulbrandsen, T., Mangset, M. and Teigen, M. (Ed.) Elites and People: Challenges to Democracy (Comparative Social Research, Vol. 34), Emerald Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 203-222. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0195-631020190000034010 Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited Copyright © 2019 Marte Mangset, Fredrik Engelstad, Mari Teigen and Trygve Gulbrandsen License Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This chapter is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this chapter (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode The Populist Elite Paradox The current rise of populism across the world has revived classical questions about power relations between the elites and masses and the related democratic challenges. Populism, on one hand, is a salient response to the unequal distribution of power and privilege, but on the other hand, populism has its own problematic understandings of the relationship between the people and elites. How does populist ideology conceptualise these power relations, and in what way are these conceptualisations democratically challenging? Critiques of elites define populism, which conceives of power relations as a group of conspiring elite exploiting the good people. However, populism is also inherently elitist, calling for a strong leader to take power and channel the will of the people. The understanding of the wicked elite as a homogeneous, united group with common interests is bearer of elitism in a very specific manner. So does the populist understanding of a more adequate leadership as a leader who, freed from intermediate elites and institutional obstacles, voices and promotes the people’s interests. Elite theory, surprisingly overlooked in scholarship on populism, can clarify the apparent paradox of populist elitism and elucidate the dimensions of populism and its risks of authoritarianism in new ways. In contrast to the ideal–typical populist conception of power relations in society, elite theory points to the possible plurality of elites: elites at different hierarchical levels of power and elites in different sectors of society – with possibly diverging interests. Furthermore, in contrast to the populist concept of a political leader with an adequate relationship with the people, elite theory argues that a certain degree of separation between different elite groups is necessary for a well-functioning democracy (Aron, 1950). This chapter explores the opposition between populist ideological understandings of elites and elite theory’s conceptualisations of elites and their relations with the people in order to shed new light on populism. However, to grasp populist perceptions of the relationship between the elites and masses, we must look beyond its ideal–typical ideological conceptualisations and explore the more composite empirical reality. Much empirical scholarship on populist movements, often aiming at understanding its causes and focussing on Western Europe and North America, points to their similarities. In particular, several scholars stress the strength of the cultural thesis (in which anti-immigrant voters criticise the liberal political elites) over the economic and institutional theses in explaining the rise of populism. These studies reinforce the understanding of populism as uniform, voicing a homogeneous elite critique. However, broader comparative studies show that different populist movements target a range of elite groups. West European and North American populists attack cultural and political elites for being too liberal, Eastern and Southern European populists criticise their political elites for being corrupt, and South American populists direct anger towards economic elites. Moreover, populist movements often attack different intermediate elites, such as the leaders of political parties, central banks, employer organisations and unions. Broad, comparative approaches uncover the empirical reality of populist elite critiques targeting diverse elite groups. These critiques are more in line with elite theory’s conceptualisations of elite pluralism than populist ideologies’ conceptualisations of power relations in society. The key to understanding the democratic challenges of the power relations between the elites and masses in populist critiques and populist solutions is the question of degrees of elite pluralism and elite integration, a question much debated in elite theory. The populist ideological perception of the elite as uniform and conspiring should be taken seriously in the sense that it should be object of empirical scrutiny. Elite theory contributes analytical tools to scholarship on populism that can be fruitfully used to investigate descriptively whether elites are integrated and homogeneous and to discuss normatively how such unity may represent a challenge to democracy. In this chapter, elite theory and new combinations of existing research on populism are used to discuss theoretically the relationship between the degrees of elite pluralism, institutional conditions for such pluralism and elitist character of populism. Our discussion on populist ideologies’ conceptualisations of power relations and politics draws on empirical and theoretical scholarship on populism, and we construct an ideal–typical model of populist ideologies based on this scholarship. The model might not be accurate for all versions of populist ideologies, but it incorporates key features found in the various definitions and versions of populism and serves as an analytical tool for discussing other conceptualisations of elite–mass relationships. We consider these ideological conceptualisations to be narratives on which populist leaders often draw when mobilising voters and followers. We further compare these populist ideological conceptualisations to elite theoretical conceptualisations of elite–mass relationships initially developed by elite theorists with more descriptive, analytical goals. However, the analytical tools in elite theory are thought to also provide a more informed point of departure for making a normative assessment of elite–mass relationships. Although these two types of conceptualisations have somewhat different statuses, they can be fruitfully discussed in relation to each other. They are both intended to describe the power relations between the elites and masses in ways that enable normative assessment of those relations. We lay out these two types of conceptualisations. Anti-Elitism as the Defining Feature of Populism Among the numerous approaches and definitions of populism, a basic set of criteria has gained agreement from most scholars: Margaret Canovan’s (1981, p. 294, 1999) minimalist definition that all populist ideologies express anti-elitism and in some way exalt the people, whatever that term may refer to. An elite critique is always part of the definition whether one sees populism as a class-based movement related to large-scale societal transformation, a response to economic grievances and political institutional failures such as corruption or a specific set of ideas about society and how politics work (Silva, 2017, pp. 11–17). Those who focus on the political dimension of populism, perceiving it as a discourse (Laclau, 2005), political style (Knight, 1998), thin-centred ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a form of mobilisation (Meny & Surel, 2001), all incorporate a fundamental opposition between the good people (the majority) and the wicked elite (the minority; Silva, 2017, p. 12). Populism is anti-elite. Central to the definition of populism is the homogeneity of the people who are good and have a common general will and set of values, interests and desires (Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000). It, therefore, follows that there is no room for disagreement or fundamental differences within the people (Silva, 2017, pp. 14–15). Populism, thus, clearly opposes pluralism and the idea of democracy as a space where diverging interests can be debated and decided. Populist ideologies conceiving of the people as homogeneous and good in this specific manner also need the other half of this complementary Manichean whole: the wicked elite minority who exploits the people. The people are the underdog in the power relations, and the goal of the populist movement is to reverse those relations. Populist ideologies present the exploitation by the elite as motivated by the wish to protect the special interests of this minority group considered to be illegitimate and opposed to the people’s general will. The elite is perceived as a homogeneous entity, united in the interest of exploiting the people. Populism as Elitism To develop into a broad movement, populism depends on the formation of its own leadership – its own elite. The question is how this elite should be shaped and how the power relations between the leader and the movement are conceptualised. Although it might seem paradoxical, populist conceptions of this relationship can be described as particularly elitist in a multifaceted way. First, populist movements generally favour strong leaders. When thinking of empirical examples of strands of populism, we generally associate populist movements with strong, charismatic leaders, such as Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Vladimir Putin in Russia and Jean-Luc Mélenchon in France. Mudde (2004) argues that a charismatic leader does not define populist movements, but that the choice of such a leader generally follows from the defining element of a leader who interprets and expresses the people’s general will without debating or confronting their interests and ideas. Second, an element defining populism and underpinning its elitism is the idea of a direct connection between the people and a leader. Leaders of populist movements should not educate or try to change the people but rather should express their desires and will. Populist leaders should forge policy that directly expresses that will (Canovan, 1999; Kazin, 1998; Mudde, 2004; Silva, 2017). The idea of the people as a homogeneous entity with a common general will is central to populism’s conceptualisation of its own leadership. The single person who takes on the leadership role in a populist movement should be able to interpret and appropriately articulate the people’s desires and will. The leader should not demonstrate independent or creative leadership but simply embody and transmit the people’s general will. Although this leadership style can be interpreted as anti-elitist and very democratic and is often presented as such by populist leaders, this direct relationship between the electorate and its leader does open to a particular form of elitism. Populist ideologies argue that to be able to channel the people’s will, the leader should be free from institutional constrains and interfering intermediate elites thought to be prone to promote their own interests rather than the people’s interests. This conceptualisation of adequate policy leadership as based on a direct connection between the people and the leader unmediated by interfering or obstructing elites is itself elitist. It allows for a concentration of power in the hands of the leader and a very narrow elite, freed from possible counter-elites. A feature of populist ideologies and their conceptualisations of legitimate power relations between the leader and the people thus are the dismissal of intermediate elites and a plurality of elites as illegitimate. A third element underpinning elitism in populist ideological conceptualisations of the relationship between the governing and the governed is the way in which political leaders are legitimised. Charismatic authority rather than rational-legal authority (Weber, 1992 [1921]) is held up as the source of legitimacy for populist leaders. Although populist parties indeed gain legitimacy through democratic elections, this legitimacy is based on a very thin understanding of democracy. The populist idea of the leader as one who directly interprets and channels the will of the people represents a conception of politics markedly different than liberal democracy (Dahl, 1989). Furthermore, this populist understanding of the relationship between the leader and the governed distinguishes itself from the idea of politics as a process in which various groups deliberate and compete for approval of their views and interests – also in the political decision-making and implementation processes after elections. Populist leaders are not expected to deliberate rationally with other power bases in the government apparatus or to limit their own power by rules and procedures because they are thought to be those who truly know what the people want. Charismatic leadership is a central tool for populist leaders to gain legitimacy as the true interpreters of the people’s will. They often have an aura of being a godsend akin to kings’ divine nature: therefore, their judgment and actions are the most adequate means to detect what the people’s general will is (Silva, 2017, p. 15). Such an interpretation of charismatic leadership is quite in line with Weber’s (1992 [1921]) understanding of charismatic authority. Giving power to a leader on the top to judge the correct interpretations of the people’s will and the appropriate policy to achieve it has a deeply elitist nature. Table 1 summarises these three elements characteristic of the populist ideas of adequate political leadership. Table 1. Elements Contributing to the Elitist Character of Populist Ideal-Typical Leadership. Components of Populist Ideal–Typical Leadership Pathway to Elitism (Concentration of Power in a Narrow Elite) 1 Image of a strong leader Legitimises leaders who make decisions and take action based on their own judgment 2 Direct relationship between the people and the leader Delegitimises counter-voices, deconcentration of power at the top and institutional constraints on leadership 3 Legitimisation by charismatic authority The image of the leader as the only legitimate interpreter of the people’s will hinders exchange of ideas and opinions and protects the leader from critique Populist ideology ideal typically thus both describes the political situation as characterised by a united, oppressive elite and suggests making changes in power relations that also concentrate power in the hands of a narrow, united elite. This is the paradox of populist elitism. This solution, however, is clearly presented as not elitist but as a way of handing power to the people. Analytical tools from elite theory, thus, make clear the elitist character of populism. Before addressing in more depth why the populist solution of political leadership is democratically problematic and whether the populist diagnosis of a united, homogeneous elite is accurate, we look at how elite theory analyses the relationship between the elites and masses. Classical Conceptualisations of Elite Pluralism Classical elite theory, surprisingly overlooked in scholarship on populism, provides analytical tools for discussing the relationship between elite pluralism and power and clarifying the paradox of populist elitism. The opposition between the ruling minority elite and the ruled masses conceived in populism is a core point in Vilfredo Pareto’s (1963) and Gaetano Mosca’s (1939 [1896]) contributions to classical elite theory. Normatively, the fundamental views of Pareto and Mosca are quite different from populist ideologies and see ruling elites as a necessary, valuable organisation of politics and society. The authors consider all societies to be necessarily hierarchised and believe egalitarian distribution of power to be impossible. Populist ideologies, in contrast, are based on the idea that it is possible and preferable to take power from elites and give it to the people (Coenen-Huther, 2004). Nevertheless, Pareto’s and Mosca’s understandings of the relationship between the elite minority and the ruled majority analytically resonate with populist ideological understandings of the relationship between the people and elites as both sides consider the people to be dominated by elites. However, elite theory, developed for a quite different purpose than populist ideologies, offers a more nuanced understanding of these power relations. In addition to the binary opposition between the rulers and the ruled majority, Pareto (1963, p. 1423) is most famous for defining elites as those who possess the knowledge and skills that make them the best in their areas of activity, whether they are the best chess players, the best political leaders or the best thieves. This is a concept of elite delimited to specific occupational fields and can be characterised as expert or professional elites (Mangset, 2015). In many respects, Pareto’s (1963) understanding is compatible with a meritocratic understanding of elites as groups that deserve privileges and power in specific fields, a conception clearly opposed to the populist assessment of the legitimacy of elite domination. Pareto wrote that the most able rulers have power over elites in other fields, as well as over the masses. Nevertheless, his specification of capable elites in a range of different fields implies a certain degree of pluralism. A concept connecting elites to excellence within a specific field necessarily implies a plurality of elites.1 Although Pareto does not necessarily consider this to imply dispersion of power, he provides an analytical tool for thinking of the possibility of such dispersion of power and connecting it to elite pluralism. Mosca’s (1939 [1896]) writings highlight another tension between elites. In addition to the binary opposition among the ruled majority and the ruling minority, Mosca draws a distinction between different levels of elites: the political elites, who are the ones truly governing, and a broader set of intermediate elites between the top group and the general population. These mediators are necessary for governing; without them minority rule, even ‘any sort of social organization would be impossible’ (Mosca, 1939 [1896], p. 404). Here, too, emerges the germ of a pluralist conception of elites. Moreover, Mosca envisages a counter-elite, ‘another ruling class or directing minority necessarily forms … antagonistic to the class that holds possession of the legal government’. A plurality of elites functions as an opposition that may ‘seriously embarrass an official government’ (Mosca, 1939 [1896], p. 116). Conceiving of elites as possibly divided into groups with potentially differing interests, as found in the classical writings in elite theory of the nineteenth century, opens possibilities for multiple voices and dispersion of power – key conditions for liberal democracy (Aron, 1950). Pareto’s and Mosca’s theories on elite pluralism are applicable to contemporary normative discussions on the legitimacy of elites in democratic societies. The legitimacy of elites depends on whether they are one integrated group or several different elites; Mosca and Pareto show that several elites are possible. These insights into elite pluralism starkly contrast with populist ideological understandings of the oppressive elite as necessarily homogeneous and characterised by converging interests. Despite overwhelming differences between the types of society envisaged and interpreted by Pareto and Mosca and the variety of stable democracies in the modern world, fundamental asymmetries of power between majorities and minorities persist in contemporary democratic societies. The ubiquity of various sorts of large organisations created by far-reaching social differentiation in modern societies contributes to such asymmetries of power between the masses and elites. These organisations’ hierarchical structure concentrating most power at the summit makes their top leaders core members of any type of social elite. These organisations’ institutional make-up and relationships with the political and societal systems of which they are part are crucial to the kinds of relationships among the different elites at the top. Are they united and conspiring together, as populists claim, or do they promote different worldviews and interests? Pareto’s and Mosca’s theories open up imagining the existence of several elites, but more recent elite theory goes further and focusses on the question of how united these different elites are. The Possibility of Elite Pluralism Nearly all modern elite theorists acknowledge a certain diversity of elites, as indicated by traditional elite theory. Wright Mills (1956), Dahl (1961), Field and Higley (1980) and Scott (2008) subscribe to a definition of elites as those occupying leading positions in powerful institutions, to use a formulation by Giddens (1972). The main debate in modern elite theory concerns the degree to which these various elites constitute highly integrated groups defending common interests or, to the contrary, are more dispersed, characterised by differing recruitment patterns, interests, worldviews and patterns of career mobility. Do they form a closed group, power elite in Mills’s (1956) term, or is the image of a plurality of elite interest groups more relevant? Those who view elites as integrated and united are often called monists, whereas those who view elites as split into separate, competing groups are called pluralists (Genieys, 2011). Elite theorists disagree on interpretations of the empirical situation in a given society at a particular time (e.g. how integrated American elites were in the 1950s) but generally agree on the normative stance that a plurality of elites is beneficial for democratic societies (Dahl, 1961; Mangset, 2017; Mills, 1956). The importance of the descriptive and analytical discussions on the degree of elite integration to modern elite theorists are important to this chapter as it allows better understanding these power relations and provides a foundation for discussing the normative issue of elites’ legitimacy in democratic societies. Debates and insights from elite theory thus are relevant to discussing two aspects of populism. First, regarding populist ideological understandings of the problem of how a united elite exploit the people, elite theorists focussing on elite integration, such as Mills, present an analysis similar to populism in some respects. Furthermore, elite theorists focussing on elite pluralism, such as Dahl and Higley, agree with populists – and Mills – that if the elites were united and homogeneous, that would represent a problem. Second, modern elite theory is relevant to discussing populist ideological understandings of the solution to replace the current arrangements: undivided political leadership. Monists and pluralists in modern elite theory are both critical of the democratic legitimacy of this populist conceptualisation of political leadership. Contrary to populist ideological understandings of today’s power relations, the degree to which elite groups are integrated and have the capacity for collective action is likely to vary between countries and through history. The institutional structures for recruitment, career patterns and relations between sectors vary by country and time; so do the conditions for elite integration (Hartmann, 2010; Mangset, 2017). Close analyses also show different modes of elite integration (Engelstad, 2018). At the same time, processes of disintegration may be at work. We find it most fruitful to regard elite integration not as a defining criterion of elite formation but, rather, as an empirical question (see also Higley & Burton, 2006; Scott, 2008, p. 34). The degree to which elite groups are integrated and act in concert in any society at any time must be examined empirically. It cannot be stipulated a priori that they are homogeneous and united, as populist leaders tend to claim in their attempts to rhetorically seduce the masses. Varieties of Populist Elite Critiques Although populist ideology ideal–typically conceives of the elite as a united, homogeneous group, populist movements across the world have attacked a range of elite groups and laid different accusations against them. This empirical diversity of elite critiques is interesting as it tells us that populists themselves are well aware that different types of elites exist – in contrast to what their ideological model states. In this section, we look closer at specific versions of populism and populist elite critiques to illustrate this diversity, without aspiring to exhaustivity. After briefly pointing to some features of populist ideologies and organisations that open up this diversity, we examine four types of populist elite critiques. Several types of populism can be distinguished according to their political orientations and the specific issues at stake. In addition to the common distinctions between right-wing populism generally opposing the state and left-wing populism opposing both the state and advanced capitalism, an intermediate version focuses on the functioning of the democratic system (Kriesi, 2014, p. 362). Populism grows out of a variety of organisations and movements (Aslanidis, 2017; Ciani & Della Porta, 2017), and its ideas are diffused through several channels (Veugelers & Menard, 2017). Despite this diversity, political parties are the most central organisations of populist mobilisation. Even if parties are interdependent with less institutionalised movements, movements that seek to make significant differences have to be visible in the political centre, which generally requires being represented by one or more political parties. Hence, the dynamics of populist movements are closely linked to party politics and the dominant political rhetoric. The points of departure for this brief description of various types of populism and their elite targets are Canovan’s (1981) minimal definition and Mudde’s (2004) conception of populism as a thin-centred ideology with a limited core of values. In contrast to a thick-centred ideology covering a wide range of societal issues, thin-centred ideologies have specific, limited areas of concern. Other examples of thin-centred ideologies are feminism and ecologism. In the case of populism, its core values are anti-elitism and exaltation of a unified, homogenous people and their general will. Accordingly, populist parties show a high degree of flexibility in the issues they emphasise and the groups they attack and may shift relatively quickly over time. Central elements in attacks on elites are political rhetoric and rhetorical strategies deployed in general, mediatised political discourses (Kriesi, 2014). They are launched on a particular vector, closely connected to common sense and the vernacular in opposition to abstract reasoning and specialised modes of speech and academic jargon. Populist rhetorical strategies are intended to debunk subtleties and replace them with efficient, striking, often derogatory metaphors. It, thus, becomes easy to subsume different types of elites under one heading: The Elite. In the following sketch of variations of elite critiques, the discussion is based on examples collected by ordinary observations in order to complement current research, which, in some respects, is limited in studies on political parties. Our analysis of these examples, which indeed comprise a range of different forms of elite critiques, results in four overarching categories: critiques of political elites, intermediate elites, economic elites and cultural elites. Populist Critique of the Political Elite The initial impetus for contemporary populism came from tax resistance and the establishment of anti-tax parti
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