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Why nationalism? Because nothing else works

2020; Wiley; Volume: 26; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/nana.12619

1354-5078

Yael Tamir,

Russian Literature and Bakhtin Studies

Nations and NationalismVolume 26, Issue 3 p. 538-543 BOOK DEBATEOpen Access Why nationalism? Because nothing else works Yael (Yuli) Tamir, Corresponding Author tamiryuli@yahoo.com Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford, UK Correspondence Yael (Yuli) Tamir, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford, UK. Email: tamiryuli@yahoo.comSearch for more papers by this author Yael (Yuli) Tamir, Corresponding Author tamiryuli@yahoo.com Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford, UK Correspondence Yael (Yuli) Tamir, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford, UK. Email: tamiryuli@yahoo.comSearch for more papers by this author First published: 19 July 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12619Citations: 2AboutSectionsPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat 1 INTRODUCTION I am writing this comment during the Corona days, my thoughts are travelling back and forth from the distressing reality outside my sheltered study to the theoretical questions placed at the heart of our discussion. I cannot but ask myself how the one influences the other. I therefore end my comment with some preliminary reflections on nationalism in the age of Corona. It is impossible to predict where the world is heading, yet human nature is unlikely to change; hence, it is quite safe to assume that questions of identity, self-expression and self-rule will remain central to our personal and national ways of thinking. The recent Corona crisis teaches us an interesting lesson; even in times of a global crisis, people tend to segregate themselves along national lines. Headlines these days stress the global spread of the virus but then point to the cultural aspects of national policies: criticizing the disorganised nature of the political system in Italy; pondering about German obedience; comparing the Chinese way of doing things with the American way; and wondering about the British decision to put personal liberty before public health. Whatever the medical and political outcomes of the pandemic will be, the correlation between national cultures and the structure and behaviour of political institutions is more evident than ever. Moreover, the pandemic forced nation-states to step up to the challenge of offering functional solutions to a fast spreading sense of helplessness. Consequently, the pendulum swinging between the national and the global pole is coming closer to the national one. This does not mean that international cooperations will be put on hold. Quite the contrary, nations share knowledge and help each other when necessary, but focus on the best interest of their own citizens. Nationalism then is on the raise. Attempts to rethink nationalism are more urgent than ever. 2 LIBERAL NATIONALISM Why Nationalism (Tamir, 2019) is such an attempt, written in the pre-Corona days and motivated by the crisis of hyper-globalism and neoliberalism; it argues that liberal nationalism is the best guide for contemporary nation-states, as it balances two families of rights, one grounded in freedom and the other in identity. Varun Uberoi suspects that my effort to redefened liberal nationalism is unnecessary as it is widely accepted and needs no reassertion. He argues that I ignore the influence and success of my earlier work and the work of other liberal nationalists. "Repeatedly suggesting, as Tamir does in the book, that liberals are inclined to reject ideas of nationalism, conveys the impression that few liberals accept its value even though many prominent liberal philosophers, liberal social scientists and liberal commentators have come to do so (Uberoi 2020). In a sense Uberoi is right, there is a growing body of theoretical literature on liberal nationalism, and since its appearance in 1993, it gathered support from leading thinkers such as John Rawls (1995), Martha Nussbaum (2009), David Miller (1995), Gustavsson and Miller (2020) and others. And yet, many more are left unconvinced. Much work has yet to be done in order to turn liberal-nationalism into a household name. The horrific events of the 20th century left their mark on our collective memory and many are still reluctant to associate nationalism with progressive or liberal ways of thinking. Consequently, while concepts such as patriotism, communitarianism, or social solidarity are used to describe the moderate edge of the political spectrum, the term nationalism is designated to describe extreme forms of behaviour including a long list of social malaises: xenophobia, populism, authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The liberal war cry is still: combat nationalism, restrain its power, push it back to the margins of history. Swayed by a desire to rebuttal nationalism, progressive communities and leaders lose the desire to hold a nuanced debate and are ready to "throw out the baby with the bathwater." And yet, "the baby" is ours and is too precious to hand out to others who may misuse it. Apart from its controversial reputation, liberal nationalism faces inherent difficulties to which both Uberoi and Benner point. Theoreticians lament the definitional ambiguity of both liberalism and nationalism. Time and again critics wonder: "what does nationalism/liberalism mean?" I will not repeat here answers I have given elsewhere (Tamir, 1995, 1997) but only mention that other concepts frequently used in political theory, be they social justice, representative democracy, individual rights or the common good, suffer from inherent ambiguity. One thus faces a methodological choice: constructing typologies listing different (well-defined) variations of each concept or entering the zone of ambiguity in order not to lose sight of the bigger picture. I have chosen the second route, searching for a birds-eye view, knowing that some details are going to be missed while general patterns of change are more likely to be noticed. From a distance, it becomes clear that liberalism and nationalism share a common germ. There are times when they grow apart, but in moments of crisis, they come home, drawn back to their common roots. In the 21st century, liberalism has returned from its triumphant ride to the end of history while nationalism pulled back from its most extreme versions. The two meet at a common junction, one stressing the importance of self-expression, self-determination and self-rule. Liberals are drawn to this meeting point due to their desire to reconnect to the political institutions that govern their lives, nationalists are drawen back to fill the gap created by the success of identity politics that left members of national majorities searching for ways of redefining their identity. Both are eager to find a message relevant for this time and age: a message that connects individuals and institutions and reflects the need to develop new forms of governance. Liberal expected "free hands" to gather different identity groups under the rainbow. This failed attempt turned identity politics into a war zone: where different identities competed with each other for social status for political power. Benner is wrong to assume that I dismiss the importance of such struggles. On the contrary, the re-emergence of nationalism, I argue, is motivated by the success of multiculturalism, an attempt to recapture a lost sense of dominance, repositioning the national identity of the majority as a worthy competitor for all other identities. In a situation of cultural, lingual and national dominance multiculturalism is often a seen as a way of opening up new venues of inspiration, but in times of crisis, it is suspected of diluting the anyhow stressed collective identity. The debate between nationalism and multiculturalism thus turns into a debate about the level of diversity a society can accomodate without falling apart. Rethinking the relationship between nationalism and multiculturalism exposes a simple truth: social and political attitudes towards others distinguishes one kind of nationalism form another. While Liberal-nationalists demand self-determination in order to protect their identity they do not promote feelings of superioity, mellowing xenophobic and confrontational powers that can easily go out of hand. Chauvinistic, right-wing nationalism, does the opposite— fostering supriority, inciting against others, making them scapegoats for whatever goes wrong, as a way of strengthening their own identity. Acknowledging the need to foster their national identity alongside respect for diversity forces liberal nationalists to adhere to a set of untidy compromises. Torn between different social forces, and sets of values they follow one guiding principle: ideas taken to their logical conclusion turn sour. The art of governing is the art of compromising and balancing. It is therefore wrong to assume that I place nationalism in the driving seat, giving it "a pretty free hand to create a sense of belonging, self-government, and political equality amid the shambles of liberal globalism." On the contrary, what I call for is that liberals will join hands with nationalists in order to be able to keep the political vehicle on the main road avoiding being side tracked to highly dangerous and extreme diversions. 2.1 Who needs the nation-state? Many claim that any kind of nationalism is an obstacle to good governance. In his book 21 Lessons for the 21 Century, the Israeli philosopher Yuval Noah Harari ponders whether nationalism can help promote real solutions to the unprecedented problems of our times "or is it an escapist indulgence that may doom humankind and the entire biosphere to disaster?" (Harari, 2018). In order to answer this question, Harari identifies three major human challenges: nuclear, ecological and technological, (and misses one—a global pandemic). Nation-states, he argues, are unable to deal with such challenges, "insisting on seeing things from a local perspective is likely to lead to a cosmic disaster." If nationalism and nation-states prevent us from dealing with existential challenges, they ought to be eliminated, but what if they are the solution to some of our greatest challenges? The question indicates that we have moved from a deontological sphere to a utilitarian one. Assuming we judge nationalism in terms of utility rather than rights, we need to present a list of problems it must help solve. The answer seems to be hidden in the question itself. An answer to the question of whether nationalism can help solve a global challenge like clean air differs from one that refers to challenges such as economic inequality, the collapse of social solidarity or the crisis of governance. It is commonly assumed that nationalism is more effective in solving the latter than the former. Harari points to risks that are, by their very nature, global. Clean air is not restrained by national boundaries, nuclear war is likely to contaminate the whole atmosphere, and artificial intelligence travels easily from one place to the another carrying with it unexpected benefits and damages. Though it seems reasonable to assume that global challenges demand global institutions, in reality, international collaboration starts with the state. To begin with, it is important to note that presently, there are no effective global institutions. If we do not wish cooperation to depend only on the goodwill of individuals or private international corporations such as Amazon, Google or Facebook, we must look back to the state as our starting point. Even if individual states cannot, by themselves, deal with major global crisis, this does not attest to their redundancy. To put it differently, the fact that no state is powerful enough to make a global difference does not prove that any other political entity can replace it. A hint of the importance of nationalism for a better-governed world is to be found in Harari's own argument. It would be a mistake, he argues, to assume that without nationalism, we would live in a global liberal paradise. "More likely we will be living in tribal chaos." (Harari, 2018) The more stable and successful states, he notices, "like Sweden, Germany and Switzerland enjoy a strong sense of nationality whereas the list of countries lacking robust national bonds includes Afghanistan, Somalia and Congo, and most other failed states." According to this description, nationalism is a necessary component of political stability. As this list exemplifies states that enjoy a strong sense of nationality are more democratic and cooperative than others. Both Benner and Uberoi challenge the claim that the national aspect of nation-states is essential for the emergence of redistributive solidarity. Can trust be more easily nurtured between fellow nationals? Does social solidarity demand shared values and cultural norms? In a recent field research, Gina Gustavsson argues that: "alongside self-interest and similarity, sharing common membership in a group has been found to be one of the most important factors for inducing compassion with and concern for other people's needs." (Gustavsson, 2020, p. 61) When it comes to caring for others, national identity stands out as an important psychological motivation. I grant that the proof is not conclusive—much work has yet to be done on this important issue. The shortage of empirical data may tempt us to look into work done by media advisors who study their customers' state of mind. Their conclusions seems unqualified: in times of crisis, when social solidarity is necessary, it is useful to turn to the flag, the hymn, the national symbols, in order to rally people around a common task. Nothing exemplifies this better than the present Corona crisis to which I will soon return. The fact that there is in-state solidarity does not mean that there would be cross-state hostility. All the effective trans-national institutions we know—from the UN, the European Community, FIFA and the Eurovision—are grounded in a collaboration of states (mostly nation-states). The problem then is not nationalism itself, but a very particular kind of nationalism—"isolationist nationalism"—the kind of nationalism that turns its back to the world ready to scarify global interests for the sake of local benefits. Surely, nationalism has the potential to foster self-centred policies, but it can also stimulate collaboration. Is nationalism then the right approach to deal with the global crisis? An unexpected answer emerges from the way the world is dealing with the present Corona crisis. 2.2 Corona and the national world order When the coronavirus disappears, it will leave behind a different world. Not just because social, economic and medical uncertainty has entered our lives and is here to stay, but also because the current pandemic invites us to re-examine the political, economic and social assumptions by which we live. The first, and most surprising lesson, is that although the coronavirus is a global phenomenon, it reinforces the notion of national sovereignty. The virus does not recognise national boundaries, but the struggle against it reflects a distinctly national state of mind. One by one, nation-states closed down, taking measures to protect their citizens, putting their nation first. Faced with the prospect of numerous victims at home, countries closed their borders physically separating citizens from all others. The medical logic of such an act is flimsy: an Italian from Milan is probably geographically, economically, commercially, culturally and personally closer to a Swiss from Lausanne than to a compatriot from Sicily. Hence, a more effective strategy might be to ignore national boundaries and map social and economic interactions. And yet, national sentiments prevailed, proving once again, that in times of crisis, fellow nationals come together. Others—in this case, those residing outside national borders—turn into a threat. Following Italy, Spain, Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Georgia and Russia closed their borders: even Emanuel Macron, one of the European Union's greatest champions, came around. Although he initially declared that the virus "has no passport" and is devoid of national characteristics, he did not withstand the pressure and joined the national choir. A great people, he said, "is one that stands together in times of crisis." Angela Merkel also gave in. At first, she preached the maintenance of open borders, but within days, she too succumbed to the virus and closed Germany's borders with its neighbours. The European Union, for its part, was late to respond. By the time it closed its borders the national horses had already bolted the stable: it had no choice but to agree retroactively that every country would decide its own policy. The Schengen Agreement—which created an intra-European freedom of movement—was put to the test and failed. In each of the countries facing the crisis, a common ritual ensued, with the leader addressing his or her citizens. Appearing against the backdrop of the national flag, he or she would announce the latest restrictions, before concluding with the encouraging words, "We are strong," "We stand together," and of course, "God Bless Our Nation." Even the battered Italians wrapped themselves in their tricolour flag while they stood on their balconies singing the national anthem. National solidarity did not end with flag waving. The pandemic sharpened the importance of nationwide services that are capable of coping with emergencies: airlines, health care, emergency-response forces, the education system and public transportation. The nationalisation of an airline—whether Alitalia or El Al—suddenly seems like a reasonable move, as does the partial and temporary nationalization of hospitals, pharmaceutical supply chains and other means of production. And, if the economic crisis worsens, states may also decide to take control of such private services as cash machines, pharmacies and supermarkets. The economic crisis that follows the medical one also requires states to become active players in the employment sector: in labour relations and perhaps also in offering alternative employment to those left jobless by the crisis. It is the state that will decide who will be rescued, in what manner and for how long. One thing is clear: in contrast to the 2008 crisis, this time the bailout will target individuals rather than banks. It will focus on working people and will involve generous public funding. If in recent decades, both academics and elected officials tended to criticise the public services, characterising them as too expensive, inefficient and to some extent immoral, the present pandemic makes it clear that without a solid (and generous) public system, states will not be able to survive. A country like the United States, which lacks both a national health system and a federally managed educational system, is likely to reveal the shortcomings of the thin state. The fact that 30 million Americans do not have health insurance and a similar number of workers do not have paid sick leave is turning into a national problem. Similarly, the dramatic weakening of the British National Health Service (NHS) presents a challenge to Johnson's government and to the whole of the British people, as much as Italy is now paying an enormous price for its lack of public planning. There are other examples—all of which teach the same lesson—in times of major crisis, the class of the vulnerable includes members of all classes (including the Prince of Wales) and none of them can meet the challenge on his/her own. The severity of the pandemic is inducing governments to open their wallets: until recently, the test of a government's financial stability was the level of its national debt. In the years ahead the test of a state's economic strength will be its ability to kick-start the economy, increase people's buying power and create new jobs. This message snuck in very quickly. Conervatives, socialists and centrists alike are wrangling over who will transfer more resources to those in need. The "invisible hand" vanished, while the state's active role in coping with economic, social and health crises became evident. Ironically, the international nature of the plague makes clear that there is no escape, nowhere to go. With borders closing one after the other, high-flying globetrotters have to face the reality that their survival depends, to a large extent, on the health of their fellow citizens. Even those who find refuge in their mansions are likely to cross paths with others exposed to the pandemic. In short, if your compatriot's life is in danger, so is yours. This is important because the wealthy will have to foot much of the bill of the coronavirus crisis; tax planning and tax shelters will go out of fashion. The independence of the mega-corporations will be limited—and they too will be obliged to contribute their share. Some have already started to send the public messages attesting to their heightened sense of responsibility. Following the manifesto of Business Roundtable which redefined the purpose of a corporation to promote an economy that serves all Americans, the business culture is likely to change, moving from a stakeholder alliance to a shareholder alliance. In this defining moment, the question of corporate responsibility becomes acute. Just recently, Starbucks published a statement detailing the measures it is adopting for the economic protection of its employees during the temporary closure of its branches. Other companies are likely to follow. Containing the plague is going to be largely a function of a government's strength and of citizens' trust in the system. When the coronavirus period is examined retrospectively, we will not be able to ignore the fact that the pandemic has put the affinity between the structure of a political system, the thickness of its social services and the effectiveness of governmental polices to a test. The biggest threat the virus carries is that the breakdown of social and political trust will lead to an economic and political meltdown. The devastating combination of economic slow down, high unemployment and a growing sense of social and political alienations could be a prelude to political chaos that would breed totalitarianism. When the crisis passes, nation-states will be forced to re-direct theselves in a more just, democratic and inclusive direction. While not ignoring the disastrous effects of the pandemic, we can take solace in what the epidemic has not done in the meantime: it has not exacerbated tensions between citizens and migrants, between rich and poor, and between residents of the centre and of the periphery.11 Though there are signs of Anti-Semitism evoked by the high rate of infected Jews. The fact that the virus started in Hunan, which is an economically developed and rapidly growing region of China, and spread to the richest parts of northern Italy, made it clear that the plague is not a poor peoples disease. One can only imagine what would have happened if the virus has started to spread outwards from immigrant and poverty-stricken neighbourhoods—but it did not. As Benner argues, we need to balance the civic and ethnic aspects of nation-states. The virus reminded us the importance of civic proximity. The coronavirus thus succeeded where many other, more well-meaning efforts have failed. It has placed at the centre of the political stage a civic-territorial kind of nationalism that treats all citizens alike balancing it against a cultural nationalism that emphasizes the close affinity between the national culture and tradition and the structure of political institutions. One can only hope that the Corona pandemic will trigger a significant political shift: reinforcing the structure of nation-states as democratic and inclusive, boosting national solidarity, re-legitimising the welfare state while fostering a desire to forge international cooperation across national borders, in short, that it will make liberal nationalism a viable and preferred option. There are then a lot of reasons to be fearful, but also some grounds for hope. ENDNOTE 1 Though there are signs of Anti-Semitism evoked by the high rate of infected Jews. REFERENCES Gustavsson, G. (2020). National attachments – cohesive, divisive or both? In G. Gustavsson, & D. Miller (Eds.), Liberal nationalism and its critics: normative and empirical question. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar G. Gustavsson, & D. Miller (Eds.) (2020). Liberal nationalism and its critics: Normative and empirical question. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Harari, Y. N. (2018). 21 lessons for the 21 century. London: Jonathan Cape. Google Scholar Miller, D. (1995). On nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Nussbaum, M. (2009). Political emotions, why love matters for justice. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar Rawls, J. (1995). The law of peoples. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Google Scholar Tamir, Y. Y. (1995). The enigma of nationalism. World Politics, 47(3), 1995. CrossrefGoogle Scholar Tamir, Y. Y. (1997). Theoretical difficulties in the study of nationalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 26, 63– 92. Google Scholar Tamir, Y. Y. (2019). Why nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar Citing Literature Volume26, Issue3July 2020Pages 538-543 ReferencesRelatedInformation