Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Theater for Middle East Power Struggles
2020; Wiley; Volume: 27; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/mepo.12495
ISSN1475-4967
Autores Tópico(s)Global Peace and Security Dynamics
ResumoAfrica has experienced an unprecedented level of involvement in its regional affairs by Middle Eastern states in the past few years.11 In the following I focus on sub-Saharan Africa, which is here understood as the community of all African states minus Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. These North African Arab states share a long history with the Middle East and can indeed be considered as core members of the Middle Eastern regional system. For the sake of readability, the adjective "sub-Saharan" is usually omitted. This is a remarkable development, indeed, given that transregional relations have been characterized by reciprocal ignorance for most of the post-World War II period. The scope of these current transregional entanglements can be best observed along the African coast bordering the Red Sea. Middle Eastern states have facilitated peace talks in, for instance, Sudan (Qatar, 2008–2011), and Somalia (Saudi Arabia, 2007; Turkey, since 2011), as well as between Djibouti and Eritrea (Qatar, 2010–2017).22 Mehran Kamrava, "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy," Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (2011): 539–556; idem, "Mediation and Saudi Foreign Policy," Orbis 57, no. 1 (2013): 152–170; International Crisis Group, Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia (Nairobi/Istanbul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012), Africa Briefing 92. More recently, concerted mediation efforts by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have led to an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia — ending, finally, their 20-year war in September 2018 — and stimulated fresh negotiations between Djibouti and Eritrea. New talks have also been facilitated regarding the three-way conflict among Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over sharing the Nile waters.33 Amr Emam, "Optimism in Egypt over Nile Dam Talks Breakthrough," The Arab Weekly, May 27, 2018, 10, https://thearabweekly.com/optimism-egypt-over-nile-dam-talks-breakthrough. However, recent Middle Eastern spats have also left the Horn of Africa facing security-related repercussions. The intra-Gulf crisis pitting Saudi Arabia and the UAE against Qatar and Turkey has reverberated to such an extent that the African Union discussed the spillover in January 2018.44 Patrick Smith, "African Union: Summiteers in Addis Try to Manage a Military Scramble in the Horn and the Sahel amid Fresh Reform Efforts," Africa Confidential, January 29, 2018, https://www.africa-confidential.com/blog-entry/AFRICAN+UNION%3A+Summiteers+in+Addis+try+to+manage+a+military+scramble+in+the+Horn+and+the+Sahel+amid+fresh+reform+efforts. And while the recent diplomatic breakthrough between Eritrea and Ethiopia has been widely praised as an important step toward regional stabilization, observers also caution that Middle Eastern geopolitical rivalries could "provoke destabilizing reactions across the Horn of Africa."55 Camille Lons, "Saudi Arabia and the UAE Look to Africa," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 23, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77561. This is even more true as the Red Sea has experienced notable militarization of late.66 Shehab al-Makahleh and Giorgio Cafiero, "The Militarization of the Red Sea," LobeLog, January 10, 2018, https://lobelog.com/the-militarization-of-the-red-sea/. Besides the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which have already established military bases in the region or are planning to do so, Middle Eastern states are also emerging as regional military players. Egypt, Iran, Israel and Qatar obviously have a stake in these developments, while Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE, which seem bent on becoming key actors in the Greater Horn, are constructing a series of military bases from Sudan to Somalia. The debates about the militarization of the Red Sea obscure, however, the fact that Africa as a whole has become a region of vital interest to these and other Middle Eastern states, each of them with its own history of relations there. While prospective economic benefits and international prestige have long dominated the agenda, present-day dynamics are heavily driven by the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East. This article focuses on the policies of Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the dominant regional powers at the center of the hegemonic competition.77 See also Jens Heibach, "Yet Another Scramble: Why Middle Eastern Powers Are Reaching Out to Africa," GIGA Focus: Middle East, no. 5 (November 2018), https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publication/yet-another-scramble-why-middle-eastern-powers-are-reaching-out-to-africa. On the one hand, their turn to Africa indicates that their foreign policies have become more assertive on the international stage, especially regarding South-South relations. On the other, their current strategic approaches and their politics of alliance building follow very closely the logic of conflict dynamics in their home region. Although Ankara, Riyadh and Tehran stress the historic and cultural depth of their centuries-old relations with Africa, the forging of diplomatic ties with postcolonial African states is a relatively new phenomenon. Iran first reached out to the continent's decolonizing states in the 1950s. Under Pahlavi rule, its Africa policy mainly sought to contain communism by supporting the economies of "moderate" states such as Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire. By 1976, on the eve of the Islamic Revolution, it had established bilateral relations with 31 African states.88 Alhadji Bouba Nouhou, "L'Iran et l'Afrique: Une coopération à l'épreuve des faits," Confluences Méditerranée 90, no. 3 (2014): 141–151, 142. The emergence of the Islamic Republic altered the approach to these states, increasing their importance to Tehran in many ways. After the revolution in 1979, Iran was diplomatically isolated across large parts of the globe, including the Middle East.99 Alex Vatanka, "Iran Abroad," in Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond, Christopher Walker and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2016), 67–77, 70. Africa provided an opportunity to politically and economically break this isolation. With international sanctions imposed on Tehran, the continent gained in importance as a market for exports, particularly crude oil, and provided access to raw materials. Poverty in large parts of the African continent, in turn, opened the door to Iranian influence in many states — especially in the Sahel — despite Tehran's limited means.1010 Javad Heiran-Nia and Somayeh Khomarbaghi, "Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in the Sahel," LobeLog, February 8, 2018, https://lobelog.com/saudi-arabia-and-iran-compete-in-the-sahel/. Besides direct military and financial aid, development assistance distributed via Construction Jihad (Jahad-e Sazandegi), an organization created in the wake of the revolution and later merged with the Ministry of Agriculture, was a major tool for gaining a foothold.1111 Eric Lob, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad's Developmental Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa," International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 2 (2016): 313–338. Another was missionary activities, often conducted via Iranian-financed cultural centers or schools, both in countries with significant Shiite minorities such as Ghana and Nigeria, as well as those with Sunni majorities like Mali or Senegal.1212 Wagdy Sawahel, "Iran's 'Branch Campuses' Reach Sub-Saharan Africa," University World News, September 28, 2018, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20180925134208657; Paul Raymond and Jack Watling, "The Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali," Foreign Policy, August 19, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/19/the-iran-saudi-proxy-wars-come-to-mali-shiite-sunni-islam/. Altogether, the Islamic Republic's involvement in Africa has fluctuated in scope and intensity over time, depending on the international pressure on Tehran as well as the foreign-policy orientation of its leadership.1313 Eric Lob, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's Foreign Policy and Construction Jihad's Developmental Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa," International Journal of Middle East Studies 48, no. 2 (2016): 313–338. It was strongest under President Ahmadinejad (2005–13), when, due to the conflict over its nuclear program, Tehran was in need of international partners. It sought them in the Côte d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia and South Africa — a nonpermanent member of the United Nations Security Council from 2007 to 2008.1414 Alex Vatanka, "Iran's Awkward Diplomacy in Africa," The National Interest, March 23, 2016, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/irans-awkward-diplomacy-africa-15571; Ahmad Majidyar, "Iran's FM Zarif Tours South America and Africa to Boost Ties," Middle East Institute, April 13, 2018, https://www.mei.edu/publications/irans-fm-zarif-tours-south-america-and-africa-boost-ties. States with notable uranium deposits, like Malawi, Niger, Sierra Leone, Togo and Uganda, became focal points under Ahmadinejad's tenure1515 Hamdy A. Hassan and Hala Thabet, "Africa and the Middle East: Shifting Alliances and Strategic Partnerships," in Africa and the World: Bilateral and Multilateral International Diplomacy, eds. Dawn Nagar and Charles Mutasa (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 335–357, 347. — as did "rogue states" such as Eritrea and Sudan, mostly for reasons of their geostrategic location.1616 Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Iran in the Horn of Africa: Outflanking U.S. Allies," Middle East Policy 19, no. 2 (2012), 117–133; Gerald Feierstein and Craig Greathead, The Fight for Africa: The New Focus of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 2017), Policy Focus 2, 1–2. During President Rouhani's first term (2013–17), Iran's engagement in Africa abated. With the international nuclear deal in the offing, the continent's political and economic importance to Iran decreased considerably. Iranian trade figures can be seen as a clear indication of this. Paradoxically, this is about the same time that Saudi Arabia began to rediscover its strategic interest in Africa after a prolonged period of neglect. The beginnings of Saudi Arabia's Africa policy date back to King Faisal (1964–75), who is credited with having established the bulk of the country's diplomatic relations with African states after the Six-Day War of 1967 in an effort to isolate Israel. Faysal is thus deemed responsible for the first coherent policy toward the continent, one that was abandoned, however, soon after his death.1717 ʿAbdallah Ibrahim al-Tarifi, Saudi-African Relations under King Faysal [Arabic] (Kuwait: Markaz dirasat al-khalij wa-l-jazira al-ʿarabiyya, 2005). This is not to say that Riyadh was ever completely absent from the continent thereafter. The kingdom has always sought to secure its vital interests in its immediate neighborhood, the (Greater) Horn of Africa — especially Somalia. In the latter, it backed up the United States in containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War and, later on, attempted to bring about agreements between warring factions in the new millennium.1818 Peter Woodward, The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 157–8; Harry Verhoeven and Eckart Woertz, "Saudi Arabia and the Horn of Africa," in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation, ed. Neil Partrick (London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016), 92–110. Apart from being export markets for crude oil and hydrocarbon products, food security was another reason some African states remained on the Saudi agenda.1919 Thomas W. Lippman, "Saudi Arabia's Quest for Food Security," Middle East Policy 17, no. 1 (2010): 90–98, 92. When prices for staple foods doubled on the world market in 2007, the kingdom — via the Agricultural Development Fund — launched the King Abdallah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investments Abroad, providing subsidies to Saudi companies prepared to invest in foreign farmland. By then, Saudi agricultural investments had already flowed into Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.2020 "List of Regulations Concerning the Provision of Credit Facilities and Concessions for Saudi Investors within the Framework of the King Abdallah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investments Abroad [Arabic]," Agricultural Development Fund, n.d., 6. Notwithstanding the Turkish media's proclivity to depict Erdoğan as Africa's best friend, Turkey's policy toward the continent is not, in fact, altruistic. Saudi Arabia rediscovered its strategic interest in Africa in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011, chiefly for fear of Iranian encroachment into the continent. Even before this time, Saudi embassies in Africa had warned Riyadh of the increased proselytizing activities by local Iranian cultural centers and demanded their own government's political responses.2222 Paul Raymond and Jack Watling, "The Iranian-Saudi Proxy Wars Come to Mali," Foreign Policy, August 19, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/19/the-iran-saudi-proxy-wars-come-to-mali-shiite-sunni-islam/. Yet it took some years for Riyadh to funnel commensurate resources to back up its new strategic interest. Still, in 2013, a report by the General Department for African States at the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs lamented that Saudi embassies in Africa were ill-equipped to counter Iranian moves, let alone China's advances toward Africa.2323 The report, prepared by the General Department for African States at the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is published by Wikileaks; see Doc#117636, https://wikileaks.org/saudi-cables/. In fact, Saudi Arabia's new focus on Africa only became visible in 2015. It thus coincides with the coming to power of Mohammad bin Salman, the crown prince and de facto leader of the kingdom, and with the beginning of the war in Yemen. The Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, whom the kingdom considers to be Iranian proxies, drastically altered the geostrategic importance of the Horn of Africa in the eyes of Riyadh2424 Asteris Huliaras and Sophia Kalantzakos, "The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: A New Hinterland?," Middle East Policy 24, no. 4 (2017): 63–73, 66. — and of Abu Dhabi, Riyadh's main Gulf ally and crucial partner in this war. Although the UAE has become one of the most active external players on the African continent in its own right,2525 See, for instance, International Crisis Group, The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa (Abu Dhabi/Washington, DC/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018), Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 65. with major economic stakes there, it appears that Abu Dhabi has so far been closely coordinating its policies with Riyadh.2626 Besides the recent concerted mediation activities in several Horn of Africa states, Saudi-Emirati cooperation is best captured in their joint efforts to establish — and run — military bases. It has been stated, for instance, that "the military bases, airports and sea terminals owned by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the eastern coast of the Horn of Africa […] are considered partial military forces, but they all perform in a unified manner." Haifa Ahmed Al Maashi, "From Security Governance to Geopolitical Rivalry: Iran-GCC Confrontation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean," Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 11, no. 4 (2017): 46–63, 54. Concerning the Emirati military base in Assab, Eritrea, a recent report by the International Crisis Group holds that "Riyadh signed a security agreement […] to use Assab, leaving Abu Dhabi to carry out the deal's terms." International Crisis Group, The United Arab Emirates, 5. In October 2018, Riyadh reportedly intervened with Mogadishu, admonishing Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khayre not to obstruct Emirati investments in Somaliland and, by extension, Berbera—which hosts another Emirati military base. "DP World in Negotiations with Djibouti and Hargeisa," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, October 26, 2018, no. 1484, 7. Because Saudi Arabia and the UAE are ultimately pursuing their own interests in Africa, it is fair to assume that conflict dynamics in the Middle East — and the war in Yemen in particular — have facilitated the building of common ground, especially on the Red Sea's African shores. In the past five years, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have invested great effort in upending Iran's relations with Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Somalia. These efforts had largely been successful at first, as most of the abovementioned states loosened their ties with Tehran, making it more difficult, for instance, for Iranian vessels to navigate the Red Sea.2727 Riham Bahi, "Iran-Saudi Rivalry in Africa: Implications for Regional Stability," Middle East Policy 25, no. 4 (2018): 26–40, 32–3. Also, the UAE now runs military bases in Eritrea (Assab) and Somaliland (Berbera), while Saudi Arabia is about to open its first one in Djibouti.2828 John Aglionby and Simon Kerr, "Djibouti Finalising Deal for Saudi Arabian Military Base," Financial Times, January 17, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/c8f63492-dc14-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce; Hamdi ʿAbd al-Rahman, "Competition for Military Bases in the Horn of Africa [Arabic]," al-Siyasa al-Duwaliyya 53, no. 211 (2018): 122–127. Yet the conflict constellations in the Red Sea are complex and rapidly shift. The recent diplomatic tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on the one hand, and Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia on the other, have opened up space for their Middle Eastern competitors to regain influence in the Horn, including Turkey.2929 Will Todman, The Gulf Scramble for Africa: GCC States' Foreign Policy Laboratory (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), CSIS Brief November, 6–7; ʿAbd al-Rahman, "Competition for Military Bases," 124–5. Turkey has been struggling to extend its clout in the regions adjacent to the Middle East for the past two decades.3030 Emel Parlar Dal, "Conceptualising and Testing the 'Emerging Regional Power' of Turkey in the Shifting International Order," Third World Quarterly 37, no. 8 (2016): 1425–1453, 1431. While its initial interest in Africa can be traced back to the coalition government of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (1999–2002), Turkish relations with African states intensified with the coming to power of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan — who in 2005 launched his country's official "Opening to Africa" policy.3131 Mehmet Ozkan and Serhat Orakci, "Turkey as a 'Political' Actor in Africa: An Assessment of Turkish Involvement in Somalia," Journal of Eastern African Studies 9, no. 2 (2015): 343–352, 344. Though a relative newcomer, Ankara would rapidly gain on Riyadh and Tehran — today self-confidently presenting in government fact sheets the fruits of its labors.3232 Zuahl Demirci and Fatih Hafiz Mehmet, "Turkey in Intense Cooperation with Africa," Anadolu Agency, February 10, 2018, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-in-intense-cooperation-with-africa-/1059565. The figures are certainly telling. The number of Turkish embassies in Africa, for instance, rose from 12 in 2009 to 40 in 2018. Its bilateral trade volume with African countries reached $18.8 billion in 2017, a threefold increase since 2003. Turkish investments are estimated to have surpassed $6 billion by early 2018. The ruling AKP government also stresses the rising numbers in its official development assistance (ODA) to African countries and the fact that Erdoğan, who has visited 23 African states some 39 times, is "the leader who visited Africa the most in the world."3333 "Latest Leg of Erdoğan's Africa Tour to Mark New Firsts," Daily Sabah, February 25, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2018/02/26/latest-leg-of-erdogans-africa-tour-to-mark-new-firsts-1519595203. Notwithstanding the Turkish media's proclivity to depict Erdoğan as Africa's best friend,3434 Fazlı Şahan, "Erdoğan Is Africa's Best Friend [Turkish]," Yeni Şafak, July 31, 2018. Turkey's policy toward the continent is not, in fact, altruistic. Ankara's Africa policy in the new millennium has been mainly motivated by the prospects of economic gains and political visibility in international affairs.3535 Umut Korkut and Ilke Civelekoglu, "Becoming a Regional Power While Pursuing Material Gains," International Journal 68, no. 1 (2013): 187–203. Such strategic concerns seem to have become even more pressing in the last few years. Africa's economic potential surely remains a driving force of its Opening to Africa policy, but it is not the sole explanation for Ankara's advances. In fact, Turkish exports to sub-Saharan states have been stagnating, whereas investments chiefly concentrate on North Africa. While Erdoğan's latest visits to Africa3636 In the past five years alone, Erdoğan has visited the Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda (2016), Chad, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania and Tunisia (2017), Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia (2018), Gambia and Senegal (2020). may thus have aimed to stimulate the Turkish economy,3737 Pinar Dost-Niyego, "Turkey's Growing Presence in Africa, and Opportunities and Challenges to Watch in 2018," Atlantic Council, March 26, 2018, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/event-recap/turkey-s-growing-presence-in-africa-and-opportunities-and-challenges-to-watch-in-2018/. they also served to strengthen political relations with new allies after Turkey's falling out with the European Union and the escalation of Middle Eastern power struggles.3838 Burhanettin Duran, "Erdoğan's Visit to Africa and Turkey's New Identity," Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmalari Vakfi, March 6, 2018. In addition, the upgrading of diplomatic relations with sub-Saharan African countries — home to 15.5 percent of the world's Muslim population3939 And thus only slightly less than the Middle East and North Africa, with 19.8 percent in 2010. However, by 2050, sub-Saharan Africa is projected to have a larger share (an estimated 24.3 percent) of the world's Muslim population than the Middle East and North Africa (an estimated 20 percent). Pew Research Center, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050 (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), 71. — is also supposed to undergird Ankara's claim to global Islamic leadership,4040 See, for instance, Gonul Tol, "Turkey's Bid for Religious Leadership: How the AKP Uses Islamic Soft Power," Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-01-10/turkeys-bid-religious-leadership. something that is heavily contested by Riyadh. We thus have a mixture of reasons accounting for past periods of Iranian, Saudi and Turkish engagement with — or disengagement from — Africa. Besides proselytization, which has been chiefly conducted by Riyadh and Tehran and seems to have been a means rather than an end,4141 That said, since the coming to power of the AKP, religion has become a key instrument of Turkish foreign policy — including with respect to Africa — as a way to bolster Ankara's claims to Islamic leadership. Offering religious services, most notably religious education, via the state-run Diyanet Foundation or other Turkish Islamic organizations with close ties to the AKP has been an effective tool for gaining influence among African Muslim communities in, for instance, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia. See Gonul Tol, "Turkey's Bid for Religious Leadership: How the AKP Uses Islamic Soft Power," Foreign Affairs, January 10, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-01-10/turkeys-bid-religious-leadership. African states have often been seen as a recruitment pool for international allies. Moreover, economic motives have dominated the Iranian and Turkish agendas, as well as that of Saudi Arabia, whose exports to sub-Saharan states by far eclipse those of Iran and Turkey. Yet, in view of their figures for sub-Saharan states as a percentage of total trade, it is hard to see how economic reasons alone can explain the latest stepped-up efforts. This holds especially true for Saudi Arabia, as its oil-based economy is hardly complementary with those of many African states, whose own companies are also based on natural resources — often, hydrocarbons.4242 Gladys Lechini and Maria Noel Dussort, "The GCC and the BRICS in Sub-Saharan Africa: Is China the Main Driver?" in The Arab States of the Gulf and BRICS: New Strategic Partnerships in Politics and Economics, ed. Tim Niblock (Berlin: Gerlach, 2016), 223–241. That said, the Saudi minister of energy, industry, and mineral resources recently stressed the importance of economic cooperation with Africa to the success of Saudi economic reforms. ʿUkaz, "Al-Falih: Vision 2030 Marks the Beginning of Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Africa [Arabic]," November 19, 2016. Arguably, it seems clear in the Saudi case that Riyadh's hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East are the main driver of its current foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. It is mainly bent on containing its regional competitors, as well as using the continent's resources to further its claims to leadership in the Middle East. But Riyadh's latest moves have, in turn, provoked strategic reactions by Ankara and Tehran. As a consequence, Africa is increasingly becoming a theater of Middle Eastern conflict. Scholars of international relations have long ignored the meaning of regions for world politics; they have quite often been seen as just another stage for great-power competition. Still, there are few approaches accounting for the interests of systemic actors, including non-great powers, in a given region. Pursuant to one prominent rationale, extra-regional actors develop their interests in a region in accordance with how they strengthen their positions, both internationally and in their home region. Put differently, a region gains — or loses — in importance to external actors depending on its intrinsic, extrinsic and negative value.4343 Gil Merom, "Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace," Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 1 (2003), 109–135. The Africa policy of Saudi Arabia fits into this logic in multiple ways. First, official narratives regularly portray Africa as a region with negative value due to its importance to Riyadh's adversaries. As noted, Africa only resurfaced on the Saudi agenda after Riyadh had fully realized the continent's strategic meaning for Ankara and Tehran.4444 Ayman Shabana, Diplomatic Motion: The Goals Underlying the Saudi Turn to the African Continent [Arabic] (Amman: Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies, 2016). In 2012, for instance, a Saudi diplomat applauded Riyadh's turn to Africa, arguing that "as a result of our big absence we will lose the competition with other states if we miss the chance to powerfully penetrate Africa — which would only mean a natural geopolitical expansion to us."4545 Saʿud Kabli, "Our Foreign Policy in Africa [Arabic]," al-Watan, July 29, 2012. Appraising Riyadh's Africa policy, the newly appointed minister for African affairs, Ahmad Qattan, recently stated, "We are now on the right track — the more so as we have not adapted ourselves to the African continent in past decades as was required, providing an opportunity to others, some of which have caused trouble."4646 "Qattan: We Changed the Causes of Trouble and Disturbance in Africa [Arabic]," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 14, 2018. Second, today more than ever, Riyadh considers Africa as a region of intrinsic value owing to its vital resources.4747 For a rather straightforward assessment, see, for instance, Samiya ʿAbdallah, "Saudi Arabia and Africa: How to Avail Oneself of the Hidden Treasure [Arabic]," Shu'un Khalijiyya, March 29, 2016. Elaborating on the reasons for Riyadh's new comprehensive approach, which will be geared toward all African states, Qattan placed emphasis on the continent's potential to enrich the Saudi economy.4848 "Qattan: We Changed the Causes of Trouble and Disturbance in Africa [Arabic]," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 14, 2018. But Africa's resources are certainly not limited in effect to economic gain. Riyadh relies, for instance, on Sudanese and Somali forces in its military campaign in Yemen and, in concert with Abu Dhabi, has recently begun to negotiate with Kampala regarding the deployment of Ugandan soldiers there.4949 "Uganda: Sam Kavuma Gears the UPDF Up for Yemen," The Indian Ocean Newsletter, May 18, 2018, no. 1474, 8. Furthermore, African states are supposed to back the Saudi position in diplomatic disputes;5050 See, for instance, Ahmed Soliman, "Gulf Crisis Is Leading to Difficult Choices in the Horn of Africa," Chatham House, June 29, 2017; or, pointing to the broader phenomenon, Judd Devermont, The World Is Coming to Sub-Saharan Africa: Where is the United States? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), CSIS Brief August, 5–6. to be a source of prestige by joining the ranks of the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT) or attending the Arab Islamic American Summit during Donald Trump's visit to the kingdom in May 2017, thereby supporting Riyadh's claim to leadership in the Muslim world.5151 Seventeen sub-Saharan states are members of IMAFT (total 40), while 22 heads of states attending the summit were from sub-Saharan Africa (total 55). In May 2017, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced that, apart from safeguarding its economic and political interests, Tehran was determined also to establish stability and security in Africa. Yet Riyadh's heightened engagement is provoking a stepping-up of Turkish and Iranian activities in return. The opening of a Turkish military base in Somalia, as well as Ankara's leasing of Sudan's Suakin Island in the Red Sea in late 2017, may, for instance, be interpreted as a response to Saudi and Emirati moves.5858 On the Turkish ration
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