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Against the mind package view of minds: Comments on Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind

2020; Wiley; Volume: 35; Issue: 5 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/mila.12288

1468-0017

Eric Schwitzgebel,

Embodied and Extended Cognition

Carrie Figdor's Pieces of mind lays the groundwork for critiquing the mind package view of minds. According to the mind package view, psychological properties travel in groups, such that an entity either has the whole mind package or lacks mentality altogether. Implicit commitment to the mind package view makes it seem absurd to attribute some psychological properties (e.g., preferences) to entities that lack other psychological properties (e.g., feelings). Contra the mind package view, we are psychologically continuous with plants, worms, and bacteria: Our patterns of mindedness resemble theirs, even if such entities do not have the whole mind package.