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U.S. Geopolitics and Nuclear Deterrence in the Era of Great Power Competitions

2020; Oxford University Press; Volume: 136; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1002/polq.13132

1538-165X

Peter Rudolf,

Nuclear Issues and Defense

A NEW ERA HAS BEGUN IN WORLD POLITICS. This, at least, is the assumption that has taken shape in the U.S. discourse over the past few years and found its way into the National Security Strategy under President Donald Trump. The United States as the leading great power sees itself challenged by Russia and China. Both states are perceived as “revisionist” powers, seeking to change the international order in their favor and claiming spheres of influence. This runs counter to the traditional geopolitical core interest of the United States: to prevent one or more hostile great powers from gaining control of Eurasiaʼs resources. As it is argued in this article, the United States is faced with the question of whether to seek some form of geopolitical accommodation based on de facto spheres of influence and buffer zones. In the prevailing narrative, however, spheres of influence are considered incompatible with liberal concepts of world order. If the United States maintains its current line—that is, rejecting geopolitical accommodation while maintaining military superiority—great power conflicts are likely to intensify, and the nuclear deterrence system could become paramount. In the U.S. security policy discourse, strategic competitions with a rising China and a resurgent Russia have moved into the spotlight. The United States, which, in the prevailing view, has been the global guarantor of security and stability since the Second World War, is now exposed to a new strategic environment.11 As an expression of this perception, see, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, “America in a New World,” The American Interest, 23 May 2016, accessed at https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/05/23/america-in-a-new-world/, 19 October 2020; and Thomas J. Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-First Century and the Future of American Power (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017). There is lot of talk about a “new era of great power competitions”22 John McCain, chair, Restoring American Power: Recommendations for the FY 2018–FY 2022 Budget (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 2017), 2, accessed at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798107, 19 October 2020. or the “return to great power competition,”33 Jim Mattis, U.S. Secretary of Defense, statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 13 June 2017, 4, accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mattis_06-13-17.pdf, 19 October 2020. and topoi such as that of an “aggressive Russia” and an “assertive China” are widely heard of.44 On this and the problematic aspects in the case of China, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is Chinaʼs New Assertiveness?,” International Security 37 (Spring 2013): 7–48; and Björn Jerdén, “The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (March 2014): 47–88. On the negative perception of Russia in American media, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, “The Dark Double: The American Media Perception as Neo-Soviet Autocracy, 2008–2014,” Politics 37 (February 2017): 19–35. China and Russia are perceived as “revisionist” states that want to expand their power and influence at the expense of the United States and the U.S.-led international order, using all means in the “gray area” below the threshold of war.55 For more information on this view, see Nathan P. Freier (project director and principal author), At Our Own Peril: DoD Risk Assessment in a Post-Primacy World (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017), 60–62. Talk of a new era of new great power competitions had already begun under the administration of Barack Obama. But at that time, the White House tried to contain the discourse and instructed the Pentagon not to use the term “great power competition” because it could create the impression that the United States and China were almost inevitably on a collision course.66 See David Larter, “White House Tells the Pentagon to Quit Talking about ‘Competition’ with China,” Navy Times, 26 September 2016, accessed at https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2016/09/26/white-house-tells-the-pentagon-to-quit-talking-about-competition-with-china/, 19 October 2020. In contrast, the National Security Strategy published under President Trump in December 2017 clearly reflected the view that the United States is in a world of growing power competitions, that it is challenged by Russia and China in the struggle for influence, and that the hope has been disappointed that the integration of both states into international institutions and the international economy would make them reliable partners. As the National Security Strategy states, “Russia and China want to shape a world antithetical to American values and interests” and “they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.”77 White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, 25, 27, accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 19 October 2020. In his speech on the publication of the National Security Strategy, President Trump spoke of “a new era of competition” and asserted that Russia and China “seek to challenge American influence, values, and wealth.”88 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Administrationʼs National Security Strategy,” 18 December 2017, accessed at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-administrations-national-security-strategy/, 19 October 2020. Talking about great power rivalries or competitions is a simplification. In terms of their power resources, the United States, China, and Russia do not belong to the same category. The United States as a superpower is still ahead of the rest, followed by China, which can be described as an “emerging potential superpower,” while Russia is to be regarded as a great power.99 In detail, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century: Chinaʼs Rise and the Fate of Americaʼs Global Position,” International Security 40 (Winter 2015/2016): 7–53. Moscow does not have the means to challenge U.S. global preponderance. Russia has failed to use the proceeds from oil and gas reserves to diversify its economy and modernize its infrastructure, demographic trends are unfavorable, and social problems are not being solved in the long term. Against this background, it is questionable that Russia will become an important player in the context of global shifts of power.1010 Rajan Menon, “Pax Americana and the Rising Powers,” Current History 108 (November 2009): 353–360; and Stephen Fortescue, “Can Russia Afford to Be a Great Power?” (Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, June 2017), accessed at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/documents/Can%20Russia%20afford%20to%20be%20a%20great%20power_WEB.pdf, 19 October 2020. It is by no means clear whether China will catch up or even overtake the United States economically and militarily at all and, if so, when. Chinese economic statistics are not reliable, and projections of current trends problematic.1111 See Derek Scissors, “US-China: Who Is Bigger and When” (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 26 March 2019), accessed at https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/us-china-who-is-bigger-and-when/, 19 October 2020; for a very skeptical estimate of Chinaʼs power, see Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the Worldʼs Sole Superpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). China, however, at least has the potential to become a new superpower.1212 On the debate, see Yuen Foong Khong, “Primacy or World Order? The United States and Chinaʼs Rise—A Review Essay,” International Security 38 (Winter 2013/2014): 153–175; John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?,” The National Interest, 25 October 2014, accessed at https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204, 19 October 2020; and Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap,” Foreign Policy, 9 June 2017, accessed at https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/, 19 October 2020. As historical experience indicates, integrating rising powers into the international system is not an easy task. Such states tend to extend the scope of their activities in their efforts to gain raw materials, markets, and military bases, thereby creating conflicts with other powers, even if they do not pursue aggressive, revisionist, risk-prone foreign policies.1313 Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), 1–31. Processes of power transition are risky for the stability of the international system because unequal economic growth processes lead to changes in the distribution of power, which the existing international order no longer corresponds to. The greater the imbalance, the greater is the risk of war, according to the realist view of international politics. The likelihood of a military conflict is seen as greatest when a nonsaturated challengerʼs military power comes close to the leading stateʼs military power; disputed is whether the challenger is more likely to take up arms or the leading power to start a preventive war. Power transition theories, whose core idea has been popularized as the “Thucydides trap,” are problematic, and their explanatory value is controversial. As a “political construct,”1414 Steve Chan, “The Power-Transition Discourse and Chinaʼs Rise,” in William R. Thompson, ed., Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 17. however, they shape the view of Chinaʼs rise.1515 For more information, see Christopher Layne, “The US-Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana,” International Affairs 94 (January 2018): 89–111. This perspective is clearly reflected in the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report of the U.S. Department of Defense, which says, “As China continues its economic and military ascendance, it seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and, ultimately global preeminence in the long-term.”1616 U.S. Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region,” 1 June 2019, 8, accessed at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF, 19 October 2020. What is to be expected from the American point of view if China becomes the hegemon in East Asia and possibly the leading superpower? Would that endanger the United States? Or are hegemonic conflicts less about tangible interests than about questions of status and prestige?1717 For example, John Glaser, “The Ugly Truth about Avoiding War with China,” The National Interest, 28 December 2015, accessed at https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-ugly-truth-about-avoiding-war-china-14740, 19 October 2020. With respect to the more near-term challenge, it is widely believed in the U.S. debate that China aims at establishing an exclusive “maritime sphere of influence” in the South China Sea.1818 Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2018, accessed at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning, 19 October 2020. From this view, China is expanding its military options to counter U.S. intervention capabilities on its periphery and to project its military power into the East Asian region and beyond. In conjunction with increased economic influence, this might enable China to “decouple” the United States from Asia, thereby gaining supremacy in the region.1919 Ashley J. Tellis, “Protecting American Primacy in the Indo-Pacific,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 April 2017, accessed at https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tellis_04-25-17.pdf, 19 October 2020. It is rarely spelled out what is feared if China emerges as a real global peer competitor, maybe even overtaking the United States: China could threaten Americaʼs security by establishing itself militarily in the Western Hemisphere; the U.S. dollar could lose its current role as international reserve currency, which, in turn, would increase the costs for the United States and limit its scope for action; and international institutions shaped by Washington would change. If the United States were no longer the undisputed number one, no longer attractive for the financial inflows that help secure American prosperity, and no longer able to defend its interests far from its own territory and close to its potential opponents, this would mean a severe restriction of its “strategic autonomy.”2020 See Ashley J. Tellis, Balancing without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 14; see also Ely Ratner, “There Is No Grand Bargain with China,” Foreign Affairs, 27 November 2018, accessed at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-11-27/there-no-grand-bargain-china, 19 October 2020. In this perspective, Chinaʼs rise threatens not only Americaʼs status as the leading power but also the privileges and economic advantages resulting from this status (the nature and extent of those are assessed differently in the scholarly discussion).2121 Michael Mastanduno, “System Maker und Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International Political Economy,” World Politics 61 (January 2009): 121–154; Daniel W. Drezner, “Military Primacy Doesnʼt Pay (Nearly as Much as You Think),” International Security 38 (Summer 2013): 52–79; and Doug Stokes and Kit Waterman, “Security Leverage, Structural Power and US Strategy in East Asia,” International Affairs 93 (September 2017): 1039–1060. From the American perspective, a time of new, potentially dangerous great power conflicts has begun. The debate on how the United States should react to this is ongoing. A consistent strategy that goes beyond the instinctive effort to maintain U.S. supremacy is not yet discernible.2222 See Michael J. Mazarr and Hal Brands, “Navigating Great Power Rivalry in the 21st Century,” War on the Rocks, 5 April 2017, accessed at https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/navigating-great-power-rivalry-in-the-21st-century/, 19 October 2020. The changes in the international security environment have activated the traditional core interest that Washington developed in the 1940s under the influence of geostrategic thinking and the policies of the Axis Powers and that has since been the rarely questioned premise of U.S. security policy: to prevent one or more (hostile) great powers from controlling Eurasiaʼs resources and thereby acquiring power resources that could endanger American security (and, from the realist point of view, any great power might develop hostile intentions).2323 Ronald OʼRourke, “A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress” (Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 8 June 2016). This thinking is rooted in the geopolitical ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas Spykman. Closely related to realist thinking, which postulates the immutability of power politics, the geopolitical perspective focuses on the significance of certain geographic regions—and in particular the security consequences that could result from the domination of the Eurasian continent by one power.2424 On the role of geopolitical thinking, see Geoffrey R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987 (New York: St. Martinʼs Press, 1988); Simon Dalby, “American Security Discourse: The Persistence of Geopolitics,” Political Geography Quarterly 9 (April 1990): 171–188; William Mayborn, “The Pivot to Asia: The Persistent Logics of Geopolitics and the Rise of China,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 15, no. 4 (2014): 76–101; and Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 228–230. In this case, as Mackinder saw it in 1904, such a hegemonic power would have access to immense resources for fleet construction—and this would bring world domination within reach. Under the influence of Nazi Germanyʼs expansionist policy, Spykman sharpened this view in 1942 to the effect that whoever controlled Eurasia would hold the fate of the world in his hands. The conflict with the Soviet Union was also viewed from this perspective. Never should an adversarial power take over the industrial centers of Eurasia; in this case, the United States would be forced to change its political and economic system in order to survive in the global power struggle.2525 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992); and Akira Iriye, The Globalizing of America, 1913–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Against the background of the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s, the traditional principles of American foreign policy—national self-determination and open access for the American economy, which corresponded with both the economic interests and the values of the United States—gained an overriding importance for national security. Bilateralism and autarky in closed economic areas, two economic developments of the 1930s, not only affected access to foreign markets. Such a policy also allowed Germany and Japan to mobilize resources for war.2626 Warren I. Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945–1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3–4. The geopolitical argument that a hostile power controlling Eurasiaʼs resources could dominate the world and endanger American security dates back to a time when economic interdependence was low and nuclear weapons were not yet the ultimate guarantor of security.2727 As a critical perspective see Stephen Van Evera, “American Foreign Policy for the New Era,” in Stephen Van Evera, ed., How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security (Cambridge, MA: Tobin Project, 2006), 87–96. However, this geopolitical view has been conserved and perpetuated in the U.S. foreign policy discourse. Even many realist supporters of a more restrained foreign policy share this view in general, even though they do not foresee any hegemonic power on the Eurasian continent in the foreseeable future.2828 For example, Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 70–71. Fear of a Eurasian hegemon is rarely considered to be a “strategic artifact of the prenuclear era.”2929 Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: Americaʼs Future Grand Strategy,” International Security 22 (Summer 1997): 86–124, at 117. The old geopolitical concern about global domination by means of Eurasian resources may be anachronistic, as former security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski argued, calling for a policy of “accommodation” with respect to emerging powers. In the case of China, he pleaded for the tacit recognition of its “geopolitical preeminence on the mainland of Asia.”3030 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 131, 174. But the old thinking has considerable inertia. A report coauthored by the chair of the House Armed Forces Committee in 2016 stated that the traditional goal of preventing an enemy power from gaining control of one of the key regions—Europe, the Western Pacific, and the Persian Gulf—remained unchanged.3131 Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “Preserving Primacy: A Defense Strategy for the New Administration,” Foreign Affairs 95 (September–October 2016): 26–35. And in an analysis published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the future security environment and the consequences for U.S. armed forces, Spykman is explicitly quoted, who wrote in 1942, “If the three land masses of the Old World can be brought under the control of a few states and so organized that large unbalanced forces are available for pressures across the ocean fronts, the Americas will be politically and strategically encircled.” Reading the document, one gets the impression that two authoritarian states, armed with nuclear weapons, are about to dominate the Eurasian landmass. According to this perception, China and Russia are preparing to limit American influence by consolidating their spheres of influence.3232 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World,” 14 July 2016, 27–29, accessed at https://fas.org/man/eprint/joe2035.pdf, 20 October 2020. In this respect, the United States also faces the question of whether and, if so, how the “ultimate geopolitical nightmare” can be prevented: the alliance of two authoritarian challengers.3333 Greg R. Lawson, “Avoiding Americaʼs Ultimate Geopolitical Nightmare,” The National Interest, 2 April 2014, accessed at https://nationalinterest.org/commentary/avoiding-americas-ultimate-geopolitical-nightmare-10173, 20 October 2020; in addition, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Authoritarian Challenge: China, Russia and the Threat to the Liberal International Order (Tokyo: Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2017), 74–75. With the revival of geopolitical thinking, the preservation of American military supremacy with regard to China and Russia has found a new justification. When U.S. security policy had to adapt to a new situation after the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the George H.W. Bush administration decided to maintain clear military superiority at a time of upheaval and uncertainty—and the security establishment showed little inclination to change the status quo and the strength of the military arsenal.3434 Alexandra Homolar, “How to Last Alone at the Top: US Strategic Planning for the Unipolar Era,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34 (April 2011): 189–217. This also held true for the role of nuclear weapons. Although the number of deployed nuclear weapons was significantly reduced, the structure of the nuclear posture (the triad of land-based intercontinental missiles, sea-based missiles, and airborne systems) remained in place. Operational planning was made more flexible to the extent that “rogue states” were targeted. The number-one potential adversary, however, continued to be Russia.3535 Amy F. Woolf, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure” (Report RL31623, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 23 January 2008), accessed at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31623.pdf, 20 October 2020. In the first two decades after the end of the Cold War, this policy was linked to the expectation that Americaʼs huge military preponderance would discourage other great powers from competing militarily with the United States and from challenging the U.S.-led international order. Already formulated in the Pentagonʼs strategic plans after the collapse of the Soviet Union,3636 Easy access to the relevant documents is available in “‘Prevent the Reemergence of a New Rival’: The Making of the Cheney Regional Defense Strategy, 1991–1992,” National Security Archive, 26 February 2008, accessed at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/index.htm#3, 20 October 2020. For more details on these ideas and plans, see Hal Brands, “Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 2 (2018), accessed at https://tnsr.org/2018/02/choosing-primacy-u-s-strategy-global-order-dawn-post-cold-war-era-2/, 20 October 2020. this view was most clearly expressed in the 2002 National Security Strategy: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.”3737 White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” September 2002, 30, accessed at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf, 20 October 2020. In this way, traditional power rivalries, so the optimistic assumption goes, could be overcome. But this hope proved to be false. Already under President Obama, the Pentagon began to focus its planning on the challenges posed by a resurgent Russia and a rising China, signaling to both potential adversaries that the United States remained determined to maintain the capability to dominate in a military conflict.3838 U.S. Department of Defense, “Remarks by Secretary Carter on the Budget at the Economic Club of Washington, DC,” 2 February 2016, accessed at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/648901/remarks-by-secretary-carter-on-the-budget-at-the-economic-club-of-washington-dc/, 20 October 2020. Accordingly, U.S. military technological superiority was to be preserved so that challengers would not have incentives to use military force preemptively in a crisis, and, in case a military conflict could not be avoided, Washington would have the capability to end the fighting successfully before the nuclear threshold was crossed.3939 Bob Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies,” remarks delivered at the Willard Hotel, Washington, DC, 28 January 2015, accessed at https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies, 20 October 2020. The Trump administration has left no doubt that it wants to maintain the military superiority of the United States. As the National Security Strategy states, “We must convince adversaries that we can and will defeat them—not just punish them if they attack the United States. We must ensure the ability to deter potential enemies by denial, convincing them that they cannot accomplish objectives through the use of force or other forms of aggression.”4040 White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2017, 28. See also U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Militaryʼs Competitive Edge,” 2018, accessed at https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, 20 October 2020. With great power conflicts becoming more intense, the preservation of military superiority cannot but exacerbate the security dilemma between those powers.4141 This term originally stems from John H. Herz and was later elaborated by Robert Jervis. John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (January 1950): 157–180; and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30 (January 1978): 167–214. This means that in an “anarchic” international system—that is, a system without supreme authority—no state can be safe from attack, domination, or even extinction. However, measures to enhance oneʼs own security, whether through arms, territorial expansion, or alliances, are likely to impair the security of other states and lead to power competitions. Sensitivity to the security dilemma is not particularly strong in the United States. In its own self-image, America as a liberal democracy is no threat to other states; all well-meaning people should appreciate that Washington guarantees international stability.4242 For possible causes of this self-perception, see Christopher J. Fettweis, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace,” Security Studies 26 (July–September 2017): 423–451. The National Security Strategy of 2017 and the Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 exemplify this insensitivity to the security dilemma: the possibility that other states might perceive the United States as threatening is nowhere taken into account.4343 White House, “National Security Strategy,” 2017; and U.S. Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, accessed at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF, 20 October 2020. Occasionally, it is conceded that an increase in defense spending to secure the dwindling military supremacy in connection with the forward deployment of armed forces in Eastern Europe and East Asia may aggravate tensions with Russia and China. But for those who believe in “peace through strength,” this is at best a regrettable but unavoidable side effect of policies that are necessary to preserve stability in the long term: watching the other two states increase their military strength instead of limiting their ability to exert pressure and coercion could prove far more destabilizing.4444 For example, Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, “The Crisis of American Military Primacy and the Search for Strategic Solvency,” Parameters 46 (Winter 2016/2017): 27–42, at 40. The revitalization of nuclear deterrence under conditions of geopolitical competitions between great powers has become a core theme of the security policy discourse in the United States, as it is also reflected in the Nuclear Posture Review of February 2018. The function of nuclear deterrence is traditionally not limited to dissuading potential opponents from attacking the American homeland, but also from aggression against those allied states in Europe and Asia that are under the American “nuclear umbrella.” For decades, “extended deterrence,” as it is called, and its credibility problem have had a major impact on American nuclear policy. How can aggressive acts against allies be deterred when the United States itself is vulnerable to Soviet/Russian and Chinese nuclear attacks? What possibilities are there to prevent the other side from nuclear escalation if deter