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Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games

2003; Springer Science+Business Media; Volume: 56; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1007/s001860200240

1432-5217

Mark Voorneveld, S.H. Tijs, Sofia Grahn,

Economic theories and models

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger. Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.