Rotating Savings and Credit Associations When Participants are Risk Averse*
2003; Wiley; Volume: 44; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00097
ISSN1468-2354
Autores Tópico(s)Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
ResumoWe model rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) among risk‐averse participants who experience privately observed income shocks. A random Rosca is not advantageous, whereas a bidding Rosca is if temporal risk aversion is less pronounced than static risk aversion. The payoff scheme of a bidding Rosca facilitates risk sharing in the presence of information asymmetries. The risk‐sharing performance of a simple arrangement where a group of homogenous individuals runs several bidding Roscas simultaneously is as good as that of a linear risk‐sharing contract, and is more enforceable because it carries a fixed rather than a variable contribution.
Referência(s)