MICROLEVEL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES AS DETERMINANTS OF NON-CEO EXECUTIVE PAY.
2002; Academy of Management; Volume: 45; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/3069426
ISSN1948-0989
AutoresMason A. Carpenter, J. B. Wade,
Tópico(s)Merger and Competition Analysis
ResumoWe dflvalop a thatny wheraiii the pay of luiii-CEO execiittves con be explained by mlcio-leTel opportmiity atmctuns-^tbe intenectian of fiuutioiial position, CEO backgroimd, hnnian capital, and firm Btrategic reaource allocatiini dedsions.Our tbeoiy suggests a positive association between pay and a position made visible by rasoiuce allocation dedsions, a ftanctkmal background similar to tbat of tbe CEO, and a position tbat belps tbe firm manage strategic resource allocations.A unique longitudinal data set tbat combines survey and aicbival data an tbe four bigbest ecbelons of senior executives in large U.S. firms provided support for tbis multilevel firamework.Executive compensation is an integral component of corporate governance.Indeed, "few such topics on strategic leadership generate the same degree of controversy" (Finkelstein & Hamhrick, 1996: 263).The tremendous attention paid to compensation can be attributed to beliefe that pay affects executives' perceptions of equity and £Edmess, motivates their behavior and, as a result, should positively influence firm performance and other significcuit outcomes when managed and set appropriately (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Jensen & Murphy, 1990).Consequently, understanding the detenninants of executive pay is of great theoretical and practical importance.Most executive compensation research in strategy and organization theory has focused on the pay of CEOs; relatively little attention has been paid to the compensation of other top executives (Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997;
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