The Right to Leave the Eurozone
2013; Routledge; Volume: 48; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
ISSN
0163-7479
Autores Tópico(s)European Monetary and Fiscal Policies
ResumoSUMMARYINTRODUCTION 126I. OTHER OPTIONS FOR LEAVING THE EUROZONE 131A. Leaving the European Union 131B. Withdrawal by Treaty Amendment 132C. Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus 1331. Applicability to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1342. The Sovereign-Debt Crisis as a Fundamental Change 134II. Withdrawal De Lege Lata 137A. The Duty to Join the Eurozone 138B. The Irrevocable Determination of Exchange Rates 140C. The Irreversible Introduction of the Euro 141D. Europe a la Carte? 142E. Argumentum e Contrario Based on Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 143F. Ever Closer Union 143G. Summary 145III. THE LEGAL POLICY CASE FOR A RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 145A. The Default Character of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 1451. Hypothetical Bargains: Planning for Failures to Opt Out 1462. Some Defaults Are Easier to Opt Out of Than Others 147a. No Withdrawal Right 148b. Granting a Withdrawal Right 149B. Beyond the Costs ofOpt-Outs and Opt-Out Failures 1501. Externalities 1502. Agency Costs 1513. Damage to Currency Union as Commitment Device 1514. Borrowing Costs 1525. Extortion 1536. Letting a Good Crisis Go to Waste 153CONCLUSION 154The Eurozone is facing an existential crisis. Greece has been teetering on the verge of national insolvency. Repeated interventions by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund have so far allowed Greece to avoid this fate, but no one can predict for how long. Portugal, Ireland, and Spain have also had to rely on rescue packages by the European Union, and it remains unclear to what extent their economies will weather the crisis.One of the options discussed in this context is for individual countries to leave the Eurozone. Initially, this option was brought into play solely for countries like Greece that were at the center of the economic crisis. Some believe that such countries could profit from leaving the Eurozone because a subsequent devaluation of their national currencies would make it easier for their economies to become competitive again.More recently, however, it has been suggested that some of the more stable EU Member States- most notably Germany- might also want to leave the Eurozone. The chief attraction of such a move would be to avoid being caught by mountainous liabilities generated by ever-new rescue packages.Against this background, a crucial question is whether the Member States have a unilateral right to exit the Eurozone while staying in the European Union. In the existing literature, this question has so far been answered with a resounding, no. By contrast, this Article takes the opposite position. More specifically, my argument has two steps: First, I show that, as a doctrinal matter, the case against a right to withdraw from the Eurozone is far from compelling. Second, I demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a right to leave the Eurozone is desirable as a matter of legal policy.INTRODUCTIONThe Eurozone is perhaps the most ambitious part of European unification. It officially came into existence on January 1, 1999, when eleven Member States replaced their national currencies with the euro.1 Exactly two years later, Greece joined the Eurozone,2 and subsequently, five other Member States followed suit.3 As of 2013, seventeen of the twenty-seven Member States are united in the Eurozone.4The Eurozone was a controversial project from its onset. The various preconditions for a successful common currency that had been posited by economists in the literature on optimal currency areas5 were not met. Most notably, the Eurozone lacked- and continues to lack- a central authority in charge of fiscal policy.6 Moreover, political integration has remained limited, and labor mobility within the Eurozone is quite low. …
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