Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation
2011; Elsevier BV; Volume: 73; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1016/j.geb.2011.01.004
ISSN1090-2473
Autores Tópico(s)Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
ResumoI study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blocs, and multiple blocs.
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