The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance
2002; Cambridge University Press; Volume: 27; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1747-4469.2002.tb00809.x
ISSN1747-4469
AutoresYoshirō Miwa, J. Mark Ramseyer,
Tópico(s)Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
ResumoLaw & Social InquiryVolume 27, Issue 2 p. 401-424 The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative Corporate Governance Yoshiro Miwa, Yoshiro Miwa Yoshiro Miwa is professor of economics, University of TokyoSearch for more papers by this authorJ. Mark Ramseyer, J. Mark Ramseyer J. Mark Ramseyer is professor, Harvard Law School.Search for more papers by this author Yoshiro Miwa, Yoshiro Miwa Yoshiro Miwa is professor of economics, University of TokyoSearch for more papers by this authorJ. Mark Ramseyer, J. Mark Ramseyer J. Mark Ramseyer is professor, Harvard Law School.Search for more papers by this author First published: 28 July 2006 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.2002.tb00809.xCitations: 24 We gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Stephen Bainbridge, Yoshitaka Fukui, Curtis Milhaupt, Eric Rasmusen, Roberta Romano, Frances Rosenbluth, Daniel Spulber, David Weinstein, and Mark West. We also gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of the University of Tokyo Business Law Center (Ramseyer); the University of Tokyo Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (Miwa and Ramseyer); the Harvard Law School John M. Olin Program in Law, Economics, and Business (Ramseyer); and the Sloan Foundation (Miwa and Ramseyer). AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat REFERENCES Abegglen, James C. 1958. The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Social Organization. Glencoe , 111.: Free Press. Google Scholar Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. American Economic Review 62: 777–95. Web of Science®Google Scholar Aoki, Masahiko. 1990a. Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm. Journal of Economic Literature 28: 1–27. PubMedWeb of Science®Google Scholar Aoki, Masahiko. 1990b. The Participatory Generation of Information Rents and the Theory of the Firm. In The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, ed. BoGustafsson Masahiko Aoki, and Oliver E. Williamson, 26–52. London : Sage. Google Scholar Aoki, Masahiko, and Hugh Patrick. 1994. Introduction. In The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. Masahiko Aoki and Hugh Patrick, xxi–xxxii. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Aoki, Masahiko, Hugh Patrick, and Paul Sheard. 1994. The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview. In The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. Masahiko Aoki and Hugh Patrick, 1–50. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Becker, Gary S. 1964. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education. New York : National Bureau of Economic Research. Google Scholar Bergloef, Erik, and Enrico Perotti. 1994. The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial Keiretsu. Journal of Financial Economics 36: 259–84. 10.1016/0304-405X(94)90026-4 Web of Science®Google Scholar Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn. 1985. The Structure of Corporate Ownership. Journal of Political Economy 93: 1155–77. 10.1086/261354 Web of Science®Google Scholar Dore, Ronald. 2000. Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism; Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199240623.001.0001 Google Scholar Fukuda, Atsuo, and Shin'ichi Hirota. 1996. Main Bank Relationships and Capital Structure in Japan. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 10: 250–61. 10.1006/jjie.1996.0014 Web of Science®Google Scholar Gilson, Ronald J., and Mark J. Roe. 1993. Understanding the Japanese Financial Keiretsu: Overlaps between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization. Yale Law Journal 102: 871–920. 10.2307/796835 Web of Science®Google Scholar Gilson, Ronald J, and Mark J. Roe. 1999. Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance. Columbia Law Review 99: 508–40. 10.2307/1123585 Web of Science®Google Scholar Hall, Brian J., and David E. Weinstein. 2000. Main Banks, Creditor Concentration, and the Resolution of Financial Distress in Japan. In Finance, Governance, and Competitiveness in Japan, ed. Masahiko Aoki and Gary R. Saxonhouse, 64–80. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Hanazaki, Masaharu, and Akiyoshi Horiuchi. 2000. Is Japan's Financial System Efficient Oxford Review of Economic Policy 16(2): 61–73. 10.1093/oxrep/16.2.61 Web of Science®Google Scholar Hayashi, Fumio. 2000. The Main Bank System and Corporate Investment: An Empirical Reassessment. In Finance, Governance, and Competitiveness in Japan, ed. Masahiko Aoki and Gary R. Saxonhouse, 81–97. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Holmstrom, Bengt. 1982. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13: 324–40. 10.2307/3003457 Web of Science®Google Scholar Horiuchi, Akiyoshi, Frank Packer, and Shin'ichi Fukuda. 1988. What Role Has the Main Bank Played in Japan Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 2: 159–80. 10.1016/0889-1583(88)90019-6 Google Scholar Hoshi, Takeo, and Anil Kashyap. 2001. Japanese Corporate Finance and Governance. Cambridge , Mass. : MIT Press. Google Scholar Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and Gary Loveman. 1994. Financial System Reform in Poland: Lessons from Japan's Main Bank System. In The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. Masahiko. Aoki and Hugh Patrick, 592–633. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein. 1990. The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 67–88. 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90021-Q Web of Science®Google Scholar Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap, and David Scharfstein. 1991. Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106: 33–60. 10.2307/2937905 Web of Science®Google Scholar Ito, Takatoshi. 1992. The Japanese Economy. Cambridge , Mass. : MIT Press. Google Scholar Keizai Chosa kai, ed. Various years. Keiretsu no kenkyu [Research on the Keiretsu]. Tokyo : Keizai chosa kai. Google Scholar Kitahara, Michizane. 1970. Zukai Nihon no kin'yu [Illustrated: Japanese Finance]. Tokyo : Zaikei shoho sha. Google Scholar Kosei Torihiki iinkai, ed. 1994. Soishin: Nihon no rokudai kigyo shudan no jittai [New: The Reality of Japan's Six Large Enterprise Groups]. Tokyo : Toyo keizai shimpo sha. Google Scholar Lincoln, James R., Michael L. Gerlach, and Christina L. Ahmadjian. 1996. Keiretsu Networks and Corporate Performance in Japan. American Sociological Review 61: 67–88. 10.2307/2096407 Web of Science®Google Scholar Macey, Jonathan R., and Geoffrey P. Miller. 1995. Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States. Stanford Law Review 48: 73–112. 10.2307/1229150 Web of Science®Google Scholar Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts. 1994. Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization. Estudios Economicos 9: 3–42. Google Scholar Milhaupt, Curtis J. 2001. Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Non-legal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149: 2083–129. 10.2307/3312906 Web of Science®Google Scholar Milhaupt, Curtis J. 2002. On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other Japanese Economic Institutions. Law & Social Inquiry 27(2): 425–437. 10.1111/j.1747-4469.2002.tb00810.x Web of Science®Google Scholar Milhaupt, Curtis J., J. Mark Ramseyer, and Michael K. Young. 2001. Japanese Law in Context. Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard Asia Center. Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro. 1996. Firms and Industrial Organization in Japan. Houndmills , U. K. : Macmillan. 10.1057/9780230371460 Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. 2000a. Seisaku kin'yu to keizai hatten: Senzenki Nihon kogyo ginko no keesu [Policy Finance and Economic Growth: The Case of the Pre-War Industrial Bank of Japan]. Keizaigaku ronsku 66(3): 2–49. Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. 2000b. The Value of Prominent Directors: Lessons in Corporate Governance from Transitional Japan. Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper 267 (Nov. 1999). Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. 2000c. Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Autobile Industry. Michigan Law Review 98: 2636–67. 10.2307/1290359 Web of Science®Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. 2001. Directed Credit?: Capital Market Competition in High-Growth Japan. Harvard Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper 334 (Sept. 2001). Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. Forthcoming a. The Fable of the Keiretsu. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. Forthcoming b. Banks and Economic Growth: Implications from Japanese History. Journal of Law and Economics. Google Scholar Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer. Forthcoming c. Financial Malaise and the Myth of the Misgoverned Firm. In Global Markets, Domestic Institutions, ed. Curtis J. Milhaupt. New York : Columbia University Press. Google Scholar Morck, Randall, and Masao Nakamura. 1999. Banks and Corporate Control in Japan. Journal of Finance 54: 319–39. 10.1111/0022-1082.00106 Web of Science®Google Scholar Nakatani, Iwao. 1984. The Economic Role of Financial Corporate Grouping. In The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm, ed. Masahiko Aoki, 227–58. Amsterdam : North-Holland. Google Scholar Nihon Ginko, ed. 1984. Nihon keizai o chushin to suru kokusai hikaku tokei [International Comparative Statistics, Centered Around the Japanese Economy]. Tokyo : Nihon ginko. Google Scholar Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD]. 1997. Employment Outlook. Paris : OECD. Google Scholar Okura sho ginko kyoku, ed. [ Okura sho]. 1969. Kin'yu nempo [Finance Annual]. Tokyo : Okura sho. Google Scholar Okura sho ginko kyoku, ed. [ Okura sho]. 1970. Kin'yu seido chosai kai shiryo [Materials of the Investigative Commission on the Financial System]. Vol. 4. Tokyo : Kin'yu zaisei jijo kenkyu kai. Google Scholar Okura Sho ginko kyoku, ed. [ Okura sho]. 1971. Kin'yu nempo [Finance Annual]. Tokyo : Okura sho. Google Scholar Ongena, Steven. 2000. What Determines the Number of Banking Relationships? Cross Country Evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9: 26–56. 10.1006/jfin.1999.0273 Web of Science®Google Scholar Prowse, Stephen D. 1990. Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the United States and Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 43–66. 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90020-Z Web of Science®Google Scholar Ramseyer, J. Mark. 1991. Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan. Journal of Legal Studies 20: 91–117. 10.1086/467880 Web of Science®Google Scholar Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Minoru Nakazato. 1989. The Rational Litigant: Settlement Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan. Journal of Legal Studies 18: 263–290. 10.1086/468148 Web of Science®Google Scholar Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1993. Japan's Political Marketplace. Cambridge , Mass. : Harvard University Press. Google Scholar Romano, Roberta. 1991. The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 55–87. Web of Science®Google Scholar Sheard, Paul. 1989. The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 11: 399–422. 10.1016/0167-2681(89)90037-1 Google Scholar Sheard, Paul. 1994a. Main Banks and the Governance of Financial Distress. In The Japanese Main Bank System, ed. Masahiko. Aoki and Hugh Patrick, 188–230. Oxford , England : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Sheard, Paul. 1994b. Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring in the Japanese Main Bank System. Journal of Japanese and International Economies 8: 1–21. 10.1006/jjie.1994.1001 PubMedWeb of Science®Google Scholar Stigler, George J. 1964. Public Regulation of the Securities Market. Journal of Business 37: 117–42. 10.1086/294677 Web of Science®Google Scholar Wallich, Henry C., and Mable I. Wallich. 1976. Banking and Finance. In Asia's New Giant: How the Japanese Economy Works, ed. Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, 249–315. Washington , D. C. : Brookings Institution. Google Scholar Weinstein, David E., and Yishay Yafeh. 1995. Japan's Corporate Groups: Collusive or Competitive? An Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior. Journal of Industrial Economics 43: 359–76. 10.2307/2950549 Web of Science®Google Scholar West, Mark D. 2001. Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan. Journal of Legal Studies 30: 351–82. 10.1086/322056 Web of Science®Google Scholar Citing Literature Volume27, Issue2April 2002Pages 401-424 ReferencesRelatedInformation
Referência(s)