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Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government

2002; Oxford University Press; Volume: 4; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1093/aler/4.1.116

ISSN

1465-7260

Autores

Nuno Garoupa,

Tópico(s)

Auction Theory and Applications

Resumo

Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent‐Seeking Government Get access Nuno Garoupa, Nuno Garoupa Send correspondence to: Daniel Klerman, University of Southern California Law School, University Park MC‐0071, 699 Exposition Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90089‐0071. E‐mail: dklerman@law.usc.edu Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Daniel Klerman Daniel Klerman Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar American Law and Economics Review, Volume 4, Issue 1, 1 January 2002, Pages 116–140, https://doi.org/10.1093/aler/4.1.116 Published: 01 January 2002

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