Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

Earnings management through real activities manipulation

2006; Elsevier BV; Volume: 42; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.01.002

1879-1980

Sugata Roychowdhury,

Corporate Finance and Governance

I find evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activities to avoid reporting annual losses. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that these activities are less prevalent in the presence of sophisticated investors. Other factors that influence real activities manipulation include industry membership, the stock of inventories and receivables, and incentives to meet zero earnings. There is also some, though less robust, evidence of real activities manipulation to meet annual analyst forecasts.