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Towards a stable finalité with federal features? The balancing acts of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe

2005; Routledge; Volume: 12; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1080/13501760500091935

1466-4429

Andreas Føllesdal,

European Criminal Justice and Data Protection

Abstract Abstract The Constitutional Treaty for Europe (CTE) strengthens federal features of the future European political order, and makes the federal tradition of political thought more salient. Stable and legitimate federal political orders require multiple forms of balancing, and many of the changes in the CTE are improvements on the Nice Treaty in these aspects. The CTE goes some way toward creating a European political order with federal features more likely to both merit and facilitate trust and trustworthiness among Europeans. Central features are the increased role of human rights, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and political parties, all operating under greater transparency. The gains in trust and trustworthiness may be worth some apparent efficiency losses in promotion of ‘the European interest’. 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