Portal de Periódicos da CAPES

JOB SEARCH WITH BIDDER MEMORIES*

2011; Wiley; Volume: 52; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês

10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00643.x

1468-2354

Carlos Carrillo‐Tudela, Guido Menzio, Eric Smith,

Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing

This article revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.