Examining the Non‐Executive Director's Role from a Non‐Agency Theory Perspective: Implications Arising from the Higgs Report
2005; Wiley; Volume: 16; Issue: s1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00443.x
ISSN1467-8551
Autores Tópico(s)Accounting and Organizational Management
ResumoBritish Journal of ManagementVolume 16, Issue s1 p. S1-S4 Examining the Non-Executive Director's Role from a Non-Agency Theory Perspective: Implications Arising from the Higgs Report Kevin G. Corley, Kevin G. Corley Department of Business Administration, College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1206 S. Sixth St., Champaign, IL 61820, USA Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author Kevin G. Corley, Kevin G. Corley Department of Business Administration, College of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1206 S. Sixth St., Champaign, IL 61820, USA Email: [email protected]Search for more papers by this author First published: 08 March 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00443.xCitations: 21Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL References Aguilera, R. V. (2005). ‘Corporate governance and director accountability: An institutional comparative perspective’, British Journal of Management, 16, Special Issue, pp. S39– S53.DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00446.x Committee on Corporate Governance (1998). Final Report. [Hempel Report]. Gee Publishing, London. 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