Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover
1995; Wiley; Volume: 50; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2307/2329237
ISSN1540-6261
Autores Tópico(s)Corporate Insolvency and Governance
ResumoThe Journal of FinanceVolume 50, Issue 1 p. 3-21 Article Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover EDITH SHWALB HOTCHKISS, EDITH SHWALB HOTCHKISSBoston College. This article includes work from my dissertation at New York University. I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Edward Altman, Mitchell Berlin, William Greene, Martin Gruber, Larry Lang, and my chairman Kose John for their guidance, David Brown, David Scharfstein, René Stulz, Walter Torous, participants at the 1993 Western Finance Association Meetings and the 1994 American Finance Association meetings, and an anonymous referee also provided many valuable suggestions. Financial support from the State Farm Companies Foundation and from New York University is gratefully acknowledged.Search for more papers by this author EDITH SHWALB HOTCHKISS, EDITH SHWALB HOTCHKISSBoston College. This article includes work from my dissertation at New York University. I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Edward Altman, Mitchell Berlin, William Greene, Martin Gruber, Larry Lang, and my chairman Kose John for their guidance, David Brown, David Scharfstein, René Stulz, Walter Torous, participants at the 1993 Western Finance Association Meetings and the 1994 American Finance Association meetings, and an anonymous referee also provided many valuable suggestions. Financial support from the State Farm Companies Foundation and from New York University is gratefully acknowledged.Search for more papers by this author First published: March 1995 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05165.xCitations: 288 Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat ABSTRACT This article examines the performance of 197 public companies that emerged from Chapter 11. Over 40 percent of the sample firms continue to experience operating losses in the three years following bankruptcy; 32 percent reenter bankruptcy or privately restructure their debt. The continued involvement of prebankruptcy management in the restructuring process is strongly associated with poor post-bankruptcy performance. The substantial number of firms emerging from Chapter 11 that are not viable or need further restructuring provides little evidence that the process effectively rehabilitates distressed firms and is consistent with the view that there are economically important biases toward continuation of unprofitable firms. REFERENCES Aghion, Philippe, Oliver Hart, and John Moore, 1992, The economics of bankruptcy perform, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 8, 523–546. Altman, Edward, 1984, A further investigation of the bankruptcy cost question, Journal of Finance 39, 1067–1089. 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