Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
2021; Wiley; Volume: 19; Issue: 1 Linguagem: Inglês
10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6372
ISSN1831-4732
AutoresSøren Saxmose Nielsen, Julio Álvarez, Dominique Bicout, Paolo Calistri, Klaus Depner, Julian Ashley Drewe, Bruno Garin‐Bastuji, José Luis Gonzales Rojas, Christian Gortázar, Mette Herskin, Virginie Michel, Miguel Ángel Miranda Chueca, Paolo Pasquali, Helen Clare Roberts, Liisa Sihvonen, H.A.M. Spoolder, Karl Ståhl, Antonio Velarde, Arvo Viltrop, Christoph Winckler, Kris De Clercq, Eyal Klement, Arjan Stegeman, Simon Gubbins, Sotiria‐Eleni Antoniou, Alessandro Broglia, Yves Van der Stede, Gabriele Zancanaro, Inma Aznar,
Tópico(s)Influenza Virus Research Studies
ResumoEFSA JournalVolume 19, Issue 1 e06372 Scientific Opinion Open Access Scientific Opinion on the assessment of the control measures of the category A diseases of Animal Health Law: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (EFSA AHAW Panel), Corresponding Author alpha@efsa.europa.eu Correspondence:alpha@efsa.europa.euSearch for more papers by this authorSøren Saxmose Nielsen, Search for more papers by this authorJulio Alvarez, Search for more papers by this authorDominique Joseph Bicout, Search for more papers by this authorPaolo Calistri, Search for more papers by this authorKlaus Depner, Search for more papers by this authorJulian Ashley Drewe, Search for more papers by this authorBruno Garin-Bastuji, Search for more papers by this authorJosé Luis Gonzales Rojas, Search for more papers by this authorChristian Gortázar Schmidt, Search for more papers by this authorMette Herskin, Search for more papers by this authorVirginie Michel, Search for more papers by this authorMiguel Ángel Miranda Chueca, Search for more papers by this authorPaolo Pasquali, Search for more papers by this authorHelen Clare Roberts, Search for more papers by this authorLiisa Helena Sihvonen, Search for more papers by this authorHans Spoolder, Search for more papers by this authorKarl Stahl, Search for more papers by this authorAntonio Velarde Calvo, Search for more papers by this authorArvo Viltrop, Search for more papers by this authorChristoph Winckler, Search for more papers by this authorKris De Clercq, Search for more papers by this authorEyal Klement, Search for more papers by this authorJan Arend Stegeman, Search for more papers by this authorSimon Gubbins, Search for more papers by this authorSotiria-Eleni Antoniou, Search for more papers by this authorAlessandro Broglia, Search for more papers by this authorYves Van der Stede, Search for more papers by this authorGabriele Zancanaro, Search for more papers by this authorInma Aznar, Search for more papers by this author EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare (EFSA AHAW Panel), Corresponding Author alpha@efsa.europa.eu Correspondence:alpha@efsa.europa.euSearch for more papers by this authorSøren Saxmose Nielsen, Search for more papers by this authorJulio Alvarez, Search for more papers by this authorDominique Joseph Bicout, Search for more papers by this authorPaolo Calistri, Search for more papers by this authorKlaus Depner, Search for more papers by this authorJulian Ashley Drewe, Search for more papers by this authorBruno Garin-Bastuji, Search for more papers by this authorJosé Luis Gonzales Rojas, Search for more papers by this authorChristian Gortázar Schmidt, Search for more papers by this authorMette Herskin, Search for more papers by this authorVirginie Michel, Search for more papers by this authorMiguel Ángel Miranda Chueca, Search for more papers by this authorPaolo Pasquali, Search for more papers by this authorHelen Clare Roberts, Search for more papers by this authorLiisa Helena Sihvonen, Search for more papers by this authorHans Spoolder, Search for more papers by this authorKarl Stahl, Search for more papers by this authorAntonio Velarde Calvo, Search for more papers by this authorArvo Viltrop, Search for more papers by this authorChristoph Winckler, Search for more papers by this authorKris De Clercq, Search for more papers by this authorEyal Klement, Search for more papers by this authorJan Arend Stegeman, Search for more papers by this authorSimon Gubbins, Search for more papers by this authorSotiria-Eleni Antoniou, Search for more papers by this authorAlessandro Broglia, Search for more papers by this authorYves Van der Stede, Search for more papers by this authorGabriele Zancanaro, Search for more papers by this authorInma Aznar, Search for more papers by this author First published: 18 January 2021 https://doi.org/10.2903/j.efsa.2021.6372 Requestor: European Commission Question number: EFSA-Q-2020-00196 Panel members: Søren Saxmose Nielsen, Julio Alvarez, Dominique Joseph Bicout, Paolo Calistri, Klaus Depner, Julian Ashley Drewe, Bruno Garin-Bastuji, José Luis Gonzales Rojas, Christian Gortázar Schmidt, Mette Herskin, Virginie Michel, Miguel Ángel Miranda Chueca, Paolo Pasquali, Helen Clare Roberts, Liisa Helena Sihvonen, Hans Spoolder, Karl Stahl, Antonio Velarde Calvo, Arvo Viltrop and Christoph Winckler. Acknowledgements: The Panel wishes to thank the following for the support provided to this scientific output: Elisabeth Dorbek-Kolin and Francesca Baldinelli from EFSA. Adopted: 26 November 2020 This article was originally published on the EFSA website http://www.efsa.europa.eu on 15 January 2021 as part of EFSA's publication procedures AboutSectionsPDF ToolsExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Abstract EFSA received a mandate from the European Commission to assess the effectiveness of some of the control measures against diseases included in the Category A list according to Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'). This opinion belongs to a series of opinions where these control measures will be assessed, with this opinion covering the assessment of control measures for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). In this opinion, EFSA and the AHAW Panel of experts review the effectiveness of: (i) clinical and laboratory sampling procedures, (ii) monitoring period and (iii) the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zone, and the minimum length of time the measures should be applied in these zones. The general methodology used for this series of opinions has been published elsewhere; nonetheless, specific details of the model used for the assessment of the laboratory sampling procedures for HPAI are presented here. Here, also, the transmission kernels used for the assessment of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones are shown. Several scenarios for which these control measures had to be assessed were designed and agreed prior to the start of the assessment. In summary, sampling procedures as described in the diagnostic manual for HPAI were considered efficient for gallinaceous poultry, whereas additional sampling is advised for Anseriformes. The monitoring period was assessed as effective, and it was demonstrated that the surveillance zone comprises 95% of the infections from an affected establishment. Recommendations provided for each of the scenarios assessed aim to support the European Commission in the drafting of further pieces of legislation, as well as for plausible ad hoc requests in relation to HPAI. Summary This opinion is part of a series of opinions, in which the three-first terms of reference (ToR) of a mandate received from the European Commission, have been considered. The background and specific details of this mandate can be found in the opinion. The ToRs in this mandate request an assessment of the effectiveness of: the clinical and laboratory examination in their capacity to detect disease (or estimate the disease prevalence within an establishment), either in suspect or confirmed animals in a single establishment or in establishments within restricted zones (ToR 1); the effectiveness of the duration of the monitoring period (for different scenarios) in the control of suspected and confirmed outbreaks (ToR 2); the size and duration of the restriction zones, in their capacity for mitigating disease spread (ToR 3). In order to harmonise the approach to these assessments, the methodology used in this series of opinions, covering all Category A diseases, was agreed on, and published in a separate technical report (EFSA, 2020a,b). A qualitative assessment of the clinical examination procedures for HPAI was carried out. For assessing the effectiveness of the laboratory examination, a within flock compartmental model was designed. Further, scripts were written that allowed the calculation of the median time (days) to detection of a potential HPAI outbreak in a flock (and 95% prediction intervals), given that 'standard samples', or other samples, were taken and tested using polymerase chain reaction (PCR). These scripts were run separately for Galliformes and Anseriformes, assuming different transmission rates and mean infectious periods, as well as different case fatality rates. The effectiveness of taking standard samples (to be analysed by PCR) for early detection (within 10 days post-infection) was assessed. For most scenarios tested, taking standard samples was sufficient to lead to the confirmation of the infection. Nonetheless, in the event of a virus strain that causes low transmission or low mortality, recommendations in terms of the most appropriate sampling strategy were given. Recommendations for the use of serological sampling were also provided for some of the scenarios. To answer ToR 2, and to assess the minimum length of time measures should be implemented in the protection and surveillance zones (ToR 3.2), an extensive literature search (ELS) was carried out. This ELS aimed to assess the average, shortest and longest period between the earliest point of infection of a bird with a HPAI virus, and the time of reporting of a suspicion by the competent authority. The average time to the reporting of a suspicion report was used then to assess the effectiveness of the length monitoring period. For most of the scenarios, the existing length of the monitoring period for HPAI (21 days) was considered sufficient; nonetheless, as clinical signs in Anseriformes are not always obvious or present, this could result in longer periods to a suspicion report (compared to chickens and other species in the Galliformes order). Some recommendations were given in this respect for some of the relevant scenarios. To assess the effectiveness of the minimum length of time, the measures should be applied in the protection and surveillance zones, the average and the longest time assessed via the ELS were used, respectively. In this regard, the minimum length of time the protection zone (21 days) and the surveillance zone (30 days) must be in place for, when based on existing legislation, were considered effective. To assess the effectiveness of the minimum radius to be implemented in the protection and surveillance zones (ToR 3.1), transmission kernels were used. These kernels had been built using data from previous outbreaks. These kernels represent the relative risk of transmission to each individual establishment from the affected establishment. For HPAI, it was observed that, assuming transmission from an affected establishment occurs, the probability of transmission beyond the protection zone was 0.52. Nonetheless, the probability of infection of an establishment located beyond 10 km (radius of the restriction zone including protection and surveillance zones), drops greatly to 5%. As not all establishments within the surveillance zone will be sampled, several recommendations were given in terms of how to mitigate the risk of further spread within the surveillance zone. It is important to note that the transmission kernels presented cover only some of the risk pathways associated with spread of the index case and they do not take account wildlife contact, or movements of live animals and products off the establishment prior to confirmation. 1 Introduction 1.1 Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases ('Animal Health Law'), hereinafter referred to as AHL, requires the Commission to lay down detailed rules on the disease control measures against listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9 (category A, B and C diseases). The Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts supplementing the rules laid down in Part III of Regulation (EU) 2016/429 on transmissible animal diseases (Animal Health Law) on disease control measures for listed diseases as referred to in point (a), (b) and (c) of its Article 9 (category A, B and C diseases). Therefore, the Commission has developed and adopted a Delegated Regulation laying down rules for the prevention and control of certain diseases ('the Delegated Regulation'). The rules laid down in the Delegated Regulation are in respect of terrestrial animals largely replicating the rules currently in force concerning the disease control measures in the event of animal diseases with serious effects on the livestock as they have proven to be effective in preventing the spread of those diseases within the Union. Consequently, many animal disease control measures laid down in existing Directives will be, to the extent that not already done by the Animal Health Law, replaced by the rules provided in the Delegated Regulation. At the same time, these rules have been aligned with the international standards from the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), wherever these existed. However, certain disease control measures proposed in the Delegated Regulation, in particular in its Annexes, were considered as outdated, i.e. possibly not based on most recent scientific evidence at the time of development. Their review is considered as necessary. Moreover, for those category A diseases for which rules were not established before or were not detailed enough, certain disease control and risk mitigating measures are, due to the lack of scientific basis, extrapolated from other diseases, for which rules existed in the past. Finally, for some other diseases the evidence and scientific knowledge, was not available to the Commission and to the Member States at the time of developing the Delegated Regulation due to the time constraints. The following diseases are examples of the later: infection with Rift Valley fever (RVF), infection with Mycoplasma mycoides subsp. mycoides SC (Contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) (CBPP), Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP), Sheep pox and goat pox, infection with peste des petits ruminants virus (PPR), African horse sickness (AHS), Glanders. In this regard, the existing rules will cease to apply as from the date of application of the Animal Health Law and its complementing legislation including the Delegated Regulation, i.e. from 21 April 2021. Certain of the proposed measures for the prevention and control of category A diseases of terrestrial animals should therefore be assessed in order to ensure that they are effective and updated based on the latest scientific knowledge in this new set of legislation. This is particularly important in the case of those diseases that are less common or have been never reported in the Union. 1.1.1 ToR 1: Sampling of animals and establishments for the detection of category A diseases in terrestrial animals Based on available scientific information, assess the effectiveness of existing sampling procedures to detect or rule out the presence of each category A disease of terrestrial animals and, in case of absence of effective procedures, develop them, in order to complete the rules provided for in Annex I to the Delegated Regulation. In particular, provide for disease-specific procedures for the sampling of: ToR 1.1 Animals for clinical examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or suspected to be affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones in accordance with Articles 6(2), 13(3)(c), 14(1) and 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation. ToR 1.2 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease during the performance of official investigations in establishments that are affected or suspected to be affected by category A diseases and visits in establishments located in restricted zones in accordance with Articles 6(2), 12(3), 13(3)(c), 14(1), 26(2) of the Delegated Regulation. ToR 1.3 Establishments to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease for the performance of visits in establishments located in protection zones larger than 3 km and establishments located in the surveillance zone in accordance with Articles 26(5) and 41 of the Delegated Regulation. ToR 1.4 Animals for clinical and laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease for the movement of animals from restricted zones in accordance with Articles 28(5), 43(5), 56(1)(c) of the Delegated Regulation. ToR 1.5 Animals for laboratory examinations to ensure the detection of the relevant category A disease before and after being introduced in the affected for repopulation, in accordance with Article 59(2), (3) and (9) of the Delegated Regulation. 1.1.2 ToR 2: Monitoring period ToR 2.1 Assess the effectiveness of the length of the monitoring periods set out in Annex II of the Delegated Regulation for each category A disease of terrestrial animals. In this regard, it is important to take into consideration that the monitoring period was introduced as a management tool, which represents a time frame of reference assigned to each category A disease for the competent authority to apply certain control measures and to carry out investigations in the event of suspicion and confirmation of category A diseases in terrestrial animals. This assessment should be carried out with respect to the following situations: a) the records analysis carried out by the competent authority in the framework of the epidemiological enquiry referred to in Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2016/429, in the event of suspicion of a category A disease (Article 8(4) of the Delegated Regulation); b) the derogation from killing in the event of an outbreak of a category A disease in establishments keeping animals of listed species in two or more epidemiological units (Article 13(1) of the Delegated Regulation); c) the tracing carried out by the competent authority to identify establishments and other locations epidemiologically linked to an establishment affected by a category A disease (Article 17(2) of the Delegated Regulation); d) the exemption applied to certain products from the prohibitions laid down in Annex VI taking into account the date they were produced (Article 27(3)(c) of the Delegated Regulation); e) the specific conditions for authorising movements of semen from approved germinal product establishments in the protection and surveillance zones (Article 32(c) and 48(c) of the Delegated Regulation); f) the repopulation of establishments affected by a category A disease (Article 57(1)(b) and 59(4)(b) of the Delegated Regulation). ToR 2.2 Propose the length of what should be the monitoring period in those diseases for which the time is assessed as not effective. 1.1.3 ToR 3: Minimum radius of restricted zones and duration of the disease control measures in restricted zones ToR 3.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum radius of the protection and surveillance zones set out in Annex V of the Delegated Regulation for each category A disease of terrestrial animals. ToR 3.2 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of the disease of the minimum periods during which the competent authority should apply the restriction measures in the protection and surveillance zones as set out in Annex X and XI for each category A disease of terrestrial animals. 1.1.4 ToR 4: Prohibitions in restricted zones and risk-mitigating treatments for products of animal origin and other materials ToR 4.1 Assess the effectiveness to control the spread of disease of prohibitions set out in Annex VI of the Delegated Regulation with respect to the risk associated for each category A disease, to the listed activities and commodities. ToR 4.2 Review the available scientific information on risk-mitigating treatments that are effective to control the presence of category A disease agents in products of animal origin and other relevant materials. Based on this: a) provide an opinion on the effectiveness of the risk-mitigating treatments for products of animal origin and other materials produced or processed in the restricted zone set out in Annex VII and VIII, and b) if relevant, suggest new treatments or procedures that can be effective to mitigate or to eliminate such risk. 1.2 Interpretation of the Terms of Reference To address the ToRs of this mandate, EFSA proposed and agreed with the European Commission the following: a) The publication of 14 individual opinions, one per each of the diseases included in the list of category A diseases for terrestrial animals, with each of these opinions providing the answer to ToRs 1, 2 and 3. This document is one of the 14 opinions covering ToRs 1, 2 and 3 for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI). b) The publication of a unique opinion covering ToR 4 for all diseases listed (i.e. ToR 4 is not covered in this opinion). c) To address ToR 1 (effectiveness of sampling procedures), EFSA agreed with the European Commission on 21 scenarios (based on different articles of the Delegated Act) for which the effectiveness of the sampling procedures will be assessed (Annex B). Although these scenarios will be assessed independently, some of them may be merged if the assessment results are the same. d) To address ToR 2 (effectiveness of the monitoring period), seven scenarios previously agreed with the requestor were defined (Annex D). The assessment of the effectiveness of the monitoring period will be performed by assessing its ability to ensure that specific actions can be carried out without posing a risk of disease spread, if the monitoring period is calculated backward or forward from a specific date. If the length of the monitoring period as evaluated by EFSA is longer than the existing monitoring periods, the existing monitoring period will be considered non-effective. If the length of the monitoring period estimated by EFSA is shorter than the existing monitoring period, this existing monitoring period will be considered effective from a disease control point of view. No assessment of the plausible unnecessary economic burden that may be placed on the stakeholders as a result of an excessive length of the monitoring periods will be done by EFSA. e) The assessment of the minimum duration and the length of the radius of the protection and surveillance zones (ToR 3) will be done independently. The setting of these two zones surrounding an affected establishment, and the control measures implemented in each one of the zones are based on the general principle that the probability of disease spread is larger the closer the establishment is to an affected establishment. The validity of this statement will not be assessed in this manuscript (e.g. transmission by wild birds will not follow this principle); nonetheless, the limitations that this assumption may have in the control of certain diseases will, when relevant, be discussed. f) The following scenarios in ToR 1 (Annex B) were not relevant for HPAI, and therefore were not included in the assessment: a) scenario 7 because the minimum radius of the protection zone for HPAI is 3 km, and b) scenarios 14 and 15 as they refer to ungulates. g) The duration of the monitoring period for HPAI as described in Annex II of the Delegated Regulation is 21 days. h) The minimum length of the radius of the protection zone (PZ) and surveillance zone (SZ) for HPAI as described in Annex V of the Delegated regulation are 3 and 10 km, respectively. i) The minimum duration of the measures in the PZ and SZ for HPAI as described in Annex X and XI of the Delegated Regulation is 21 and 30 days, respectively. 2 Epidemiology and geographical distribution of HPAI 2.1 Epidemiology Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), also called 'fowl plague', is a contagious, multi-organ systemic viral disease of poultry, in contrast to low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) causing only mild or subclinical disease. HPAI is caused by infection with virulent strains of Type A influenza virus, belonging to the Orthomyxoviridae family, genus Alphainfluenzavirus (Swayne and Suarez, 2000). All HPAI virus strains belong to the H5 or H7 subtype (Spickler, 2015). Avian influenza is a notifiable disease, with monitoring and surveillance being essential to quickly contain emerging outbreaks and reduce the risk of zoonotic transmission (Spickler, 2015). Aquatic migratory birds, mostly within the orders of Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, are regarded as the reservoir for all genes associated with Influenza A viruses (USAHA 2008; Brouwer, et al., 2019). Although the involvement of wild birds in outbreaks is often difficult to prove, it is highly likely that domesticated poultry is infected through exposure to the faeces of wild birds (Richard et al., 2017). Other common sources of infection are both via the introduction of infected domestic poultry to a farm (followed by contamination through the faecal-oral route or by aerosol), and through the infection of domestic birds by contaminated fomites (Spickler, 2015). Airborne transmission between poultry farms is also likely in poultry-dense regions (Ypma et al., 2013). Existing national and international surveillance programmes consist of virological passive detection in dead birds, as well as active surveillance in living and hunted birds. In wild birds, both passive and active surveillance use PCR detection methods. In domestic birds, passive surveillance is used to detect all H5 and H7 subtypes, and is most effective at detecting HPAI, while active surveillance refers to the serological testing aimed mainly at LPAI detection (Brouwer et al., 2019). HPAI can spread rapidly, causing severe disease and death in poultry species such as chicken, turkey, quail, guinea fowl, domestic duck as well as in wild birds species, and pet birds (OIE 2020). In a recent global seasonality analysis, it was shown how HPAI outbreaks in poultry peak in February and are lowest in September (Awada et al., 2018). Notably, Anseriformes, such as the Pekin duck, do not always exhibit severe clinical disease when infected with some HPAI strains (OIE 2019). Humans and other mammals (e.g. cats, pigs, ferrets) are occasionally cross-infected following close contact with, manipulation or ingestion of infected birds, as was observed in the past outbreaks of H5N1, H7N9 and H7N7 (Koopmans et al., 2004; Poovorawan et al., 2013). Once infected, the incubation period for Influenza A in poultry species is between 1 and 7 days for an individual, and up to 21 days for a flock (USAHA, 2008). Symptoms of HPAI include coughing, sneezing, sinusitis, blood-tinged oral and nasal discharges, loss of feathers, diarrhoea, depression, inappetence and sudden death. Furthermore, egg production stops or decreases, producing deformed or shell-less eggs (Spickler, 2015). Necropsy findings include haemorrhages and necrosis of the respiratory and gastro-intestinal organs. Chicken and turkey species are most susceptible, with mortality rates being as high as 90–100% within 2–12 days after the first signs of illness. The differentiation between high and low pathogenicity is based on the mortality and severity of the disease in chickens; clinical manifestation and mortality in Anseriformes species, such as domestic ducks and geese, can vary depending on the virus strain, host species and the level of viral exposure, going from mild without mortality, to very severe with high mortality (USAHA, 2008; OIE, 2019; EFSA, 2020b; Swayne et al., 2020). Diagnostic samples, collected by oropharyngeal and cloacal/faecal swabs from live birds and faecal or organ samples from dead birds, are tested using direct molecular techniques (real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) (OIE 2019). For viral isolation (used as the reference standard), samples are inoculated and incubated in embryonated eggs, which are then tested for the presence of virus using RT-PCR, agar gel immunodiffusion (AGID), antigen-detection enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (ELISAs), or other immunoassays. To distinguish between LPAI and HPAI viruses, genetic tests to detect patterns in the haemagglutinin (HA) and/or virulence tests are used (Intravenous Pathogenicity Index, IVPI). While antigen testing can produce results in as little as 15 min, the current recommendation by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) is that it should only be used to interpret the presence of influenza A at flock level and not for diagnosis in individual birds (OIE, 2020). Furthermore, future antigen tests should be species-specific and validated accordingly, as the most common test for chickens and turkey is not as sensitive in detecting disease in other avian species (Spickler, 2015). 2.2 Geographical distribution of the disease Figure 1Open in figure viewerPowerPoint Map of countries where outbreaks of HPAI were reported in wild birds and
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