Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain*
2005; Wiley; Volume: 13; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00498.x
ISSN1467-9396
AutoresIgnatius J. Horstmann, James R. Markusen, Jack Robles,
Tópico(s)Global trade and economics
ResumoReview of International EconomicsVolume 13, Issue 2 p. 185-204 Issue Linking in Trade Negotiations: Ricardo Revisited or No Pain No Gain* Ignatius J. Horstmann, Ignatius J. Horstmann Rotman School of Management and Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6, Canada.Search for more papers by this authorJames R. Markusen, James R. Markusen University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.Search for more papers by this authorJack Robles, Jack Robles University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.Search for more papers by this author Ignatius J. Horstmann, Ignatius J. Horstmann Rotman School of Management and Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3E6, Canada.Search for more papers by this authorJames R. Markusen, James R. Markusen University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.Search for more papers by this authorJack Robles, Jack Robles University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.Search for more papers by this author First published: 27 April 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00498.xCitations: 14 * We thank seminar participants at the NBER Summer Institute, University of Colorado, Michigan State University, and University of Toronto, as well as an anonymous referee of this journal, for helpful comments and suggestions. AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract There has been much discussion about what issues should be included in international "trade" negotiations. Different countries, firms, and activist groups have quite different views regarding which items should (or should not) be negotiated together. Proposals run the gamut from no linking to linking trade with investment, the environment, labor, and human rights codes. This paper provides a formal framework for analyzing this question. It employs a two-country, two-issue bargaining model and contrasts outcomes when issues are negotiated separately and when they are linked in some form. A key concept is "comparative interest," analogous to Ricardian comparative advantage. We provide general results and note, in particular, where a country can benefit by agreeing to include an agenda item for which, when viewed by itself, the country does not receive a positive payoff. 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Google Scholar Citing Literature Volume13, Issue2May 2005Pages 185-204 ReferencesRelatedInformation
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