Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment
2011; Oxford University Press; Volume: 79; Issue: 2 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1093/restud/rdr038
ISSN1467-937X
AutoresRohan Pitchford, Mark L. J. Wright,
Tópico(s)Global Financial Regulation and Crises
ResumoJournal Article Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment Get access Rohan Pitchford, Rohan Pitchford Australian National University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mark L. J. Wright Mark L. J. Wright Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, University of California, Los Angeles and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 79, Issue 2, April 2012, Pages 812–837, https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr038 Published: 18 November 2011 Article history Received: 01 October 2008 Accepted: 01 June 2011 Published: 18 November 2011
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