Robust Mechanism Design
2005; Wiley; Volume: 73; Issue: 6 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.x
ISSN1468-0262
AutoresDirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris,
Tópico(s)Game Theory and Applications
ResumoEconometricaVolume 73, Issue 6 p. 1771-1813 Robust Mechanism Design Dirk Bergemann, Dirk Bergemann Dept. of Economics, Yale University, 28 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511, U.S.A.; dirk.berge[email protected]; http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/bergemann.htmand Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 211 Fisher Hall, Prospect Street, Princeton, NJ 08544, U.S.A.; [email protected]; http://www.princeton.edu/~smorris/.Search for more papers by this authorStephen Morris, Stephen Morris This research is supported by NSF Grant SES-0095321. We would like to thank the co-editor, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at many institutions for helpful comments. We thank Bob Evans for pointing out errors in earlier examples and Sandeep Baliga, Matt Jackson, Jon Levin, Bart Lipman, Eric Maskin, Zvika Neeman, Andrew Postlewaite, Ilya Segal, and Tomas Sjöström for valuable discussions.Search for more papers by this author Dirk Bergemann, Dirk Bergemann Dept. of Economics, Yale University, 28 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT 06511, U.S.A.; dirk.berge[email protected]; http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/faculty/bergemann.htmand Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 211 Fisher Hall, Prospect Street, Princeton, NJ 08544, U.S.A.; [email protected]; http://www.princeton.edu/~smorris/.Search for more papers by this authorStephen Morris, Stephen Morris This research is supported by NSF Grant SES-0095321. We would like to thank the co-editor, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at many institutions for helpful comments. We thank Bob Evans for pointing out errors in earlier examples and Sandeep Baliga, Matt Jackson, Jon Levin, Bart Lipman, Eric Maskin, Zvika Neeman, Andrew Postlewaite, Ilya Segal, and Tomas Sjöström for valuable discussions.Search for more papers by this author First published: 11 October 2005 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00638.xCitations: 338 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onEmailFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. 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