Operation Allied Force and the Role of Air Power
1999; United States Army War College; Volume: 29; Issue: 4 Linguagem: Inglês
10.55540/0031-1723.1955
ISSN0031-1723
Autores Tópico(s)Military History and Strategy
ResumoA "W" is a "W."In sports a win is a win.Even a close win is preferable to losing.For instance, if a college football team like Notre Dame beats Slippery Rock 70 to 0, that is exactly the sort of lopsided victory one would expect from such a mismatch.But if Notre Dame beats Slippery Rock by a score of only 7 to 6, about all Fighting Irish fans would be able to say is, "Well, it's a `W' and not an `L.'"That is the kind of victory air power delivered in Operation Allied Force.Nevertheless, in the wake of the 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia led by the United States, some air power enthusiasts trumpeted their success.There were boasts that this was the first time air power and air power alone had defeated an enemy land army.They pointed to the performance of high-tech weapons like the B-2 bomber and the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) to claim never-before-achieved accuracy in weapons delivery.One US Air Force major general even claimed that 99.6 percent of the 23,000 bombs dropped over Yugoslavia hit their targets.[1] There were those who contended that the bombing achieved its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives because, in the end, Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic withdrew Serb forces from the province of Kosovo and acceded to the intervention of an international peacekeeping force.Furthermore, not only was all this achieved by air and missile power alone, but not a single allied life was lost in combat.
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