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Causal Propositions and Essential Properties

1988; Springer Nature (Netherlands); Linguagem: Inglês

10.1007/978-94-009-2821-3_11

0924-4530

Živan Lazović,

Philosophy and History of Science

In this paper I want to consider an argument recently used to justify attribution of essential properties to so-called natural kinds, such as species (for instance, tigers) or material substances (for instance, water). The argument exploits the idea that essentialism may best be understood on natural or causal interpretation of modality, and it is advanced in support of the belief in existence of natural kinds determined by appropriate essential properties. This belief — to which, by the way, I am rather disinclined — is a realist one in so far as essential properties are thought to exist independently of our prescientific or scientific theoretical assumptions. I do not intend to provide a way out of the jungle of metaphysical mysteries about essential properties. What I want is only to undermine one typical argument which is founded on the causal interpretation of the modal notions.