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CacheBleed: A Timing Attack on OpenSSL Constant Time RSA

2016; Springer Science+Business Media; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1007/978-3-662-53140-2_17

1611-3349

Yuval Yarom, Daniel Genkin, Nadia Heninger,

Advanced Malware Detection Techniques

The scatter-gather technique is a commonly implemented approach to prevent cache-based timing attacks. In this paper we show that scatter-gather is not constant time. We implement a cache timing attack against the scatter-gather implementation used in the modular exponentiation routine in OpenSSL version 1.0.2f. Our attack exploits cache-bank conflicts on the Sandy Bridge microarchitecture. We have tested the attack on an Intel Xeon E5-2430 processor. For 4096-bit RSA our attack can fully recover the private key after observing 16,000 decryptions.