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Impact of informers on the evolution of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game

2021; Elsevier BV; Volume: 149; Linguagem: Inglês

10.1016/j.chaos.2021.111069

1873-2887

Zhenghong Deng, Ziren Wang, Huanbo Wang, Yi‐Jie Huang,

Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence

In the society, cooperation development is a significant challenge. In this paper, participation of informers is considered to affect cooperation behavior efficiently. Informers can label defectors after competing with them in the first time. Then other players can recognize defectors and keep away from them, so labeled defectors are isolated and cannot interact with others. It is indisputable that informers play a significant role during this process. In order to lucubrate the effect of informer on cooperation in prisoner's dilemma, we introduce a parameter ε to represent the proportion of inform. Numerous simulations show that informers lead surrounding defectors to be labeled and exposed. Then they are isolated by other players and cannot affect cooperation behavior negatively in a large scale, so cooperation level promotes. Besides, with the increasing of ε, cooperation can be enhanced further. We find an obvious threshold in the proportion change of informers. When ε is less than the threshold, cooperative behavior promotes but slightly. Otherwise when ε achieve a certain threshold, cooperators flourish. Out novel recognitions may provide some new perspectives for develop better social mechanism.