“Defending Political Equality: A Confucian Democratic Response to Bai Tongdong’s Proposal of Hybrid Regime”
2019; University of Hawaii Press; Volume: 26; Issue: 3 Linguagem: Inglês
10.1353/cri.2019.0023
ISSN1527-9367
Autores Tópico(s)China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance
Resumo“Defending Political Equality: A Confucian Democratic Response to Bai Tongdong’s Proposal of Hybrid Regime” Elton Chan (bio) Tongdong Bai. Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. xxiv, 315 pp. Hardcover $39.95, isbn 978-0-691-19599-5. Introduction It is an increasing consensus that liberal democracy is once again in crisis (Loughlin 2019; Rich 2017, pp. 2–25; Wike and Fetterolf 2018). Climbing out of the collapse of almost every democratic regime in Europe during the interwar period, liberal democracy enjoyed a relatively steady period of development after the Second World War. This development reached its height with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, emboldening some to claim, and many to believe, that human political order has reached its final stage of development—the supremacy of liberal democracy. Yet, in a mere thirty years, liberal democracy is not only externally challenged everywhere by authoritarian regimes and military dictatorship but also internally threatened by populist, often anti-intellectual, political movements as well as corrupted elites who undermine the constitutional institutions for electoral gains. This downturn may have disappointed many democrats. But to meritocracy-minded scholars like Bai Tongdong, it is the high hope for democracy that is misplaced in the first place. In his new book Against Political Equality: The Confucian Case, Bai offers a typical case of meritocracy against any unquestioning support for democratic equality as enshrined by the system of one-person-one-vote. Being motivated by the Confucian insight in the proper political relation between the elites and the average people, Bai offers a timely challenge to democracy as the ultimate political ideal. He argues that given the purpose of politics, general features of the elites and the people, it is better to adopt a form of hybrid regime in which various levels of power are shared within a hierarchical political structure. Such arguments for a hybrid meritocratic regime with some level of popular participation is built on the typical perspective of the elite-commoners divide. In this sense, Bai is making a universal claim that applies to all political societies. [End Page 131] However, Bai’s position is also special and particularistic, as this universal claim of the elite-commoner divide is interpreted through a set of specific Confucian lenses, which characterize all parties in a particular way. With the proper understanding of elites who are not only technically capable but also virtuous in the Confucian sense, the political institution can offer both the leaders and the people a proper role in advancing the general welfare of all parties. Rather than holding the people in contempt or as inferior members of society, this Confucian position aims to treat everyone with due respect without institutionally guaranteeing each individual the same level of political power. The core of Bai’s case, unlike many meritocratic positions, is not one of desert, but one of functionality and fitness of purpose. One holds more power not because of any natural desert, but because it is most fitting for the advancement of the welfare of all in society. As such, Bai’s position conflicts with the deep commitments of liberal democrats, at least for those who see democracy as intrinsically valuable, not only because he rejects the arrangement of “one-person-one-vote,” but because of two fundamental judgments: first, the people do not naturally deserve equal distribution of political power, and second, unequal distribution of political power on the fundamental level is consistent with equal respect due to each person. These two judgments indicate that Against Political Equality is first and foremost a conservative case of Confucian political order firmly rooted in the meritocratic authoritarian strand of the Confucian tradition. In an age when democracy is under siege, Bai offers a cogent reflection on the problem facing the liberal democratic order on its most fundamental level. In this review, however, I seek to engage with Bai’s position from the perspectives of both liberal democracy advocate and Confucianism. I contend that while Bai’s criticism is most powerful when democracy is conceived in a certain way, democrats do have a strong response if other conceptions of democracy are adopted. Along the lines of these conceptions...
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